

Delineating Dominion: Cartography and the Conception, Conquest and Control of
Eastern Africa, 1844-1914

DISSERTATION

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By

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Abstract

This dissertation documents the ways in which cartography was used during the Scramble for Africa to conceptualize, conquer and administer newly-won European colonies. By comparing the actions of two colonial powers, Germany and Britain, this study exposes how cartography was a constant in the colonial process. Using a three-tiered model of “gazes” (Discoverer, Despot, and Developer) maps are analyzed to show both the different purposes they were used for as well as the common appropriative power of the map. In doing so this study traces how cartography facilitated the colonial process of empire building from the beginnings of exploration to the administration of the colonies of German and British East Africa. During the period of exploration maps served to make the territory of Africa, previously unknown, legible to European audiences. Under the gaze of the Despot the map was used to legitimize the conquest of territory and add a permanence to the European colonies. Lastly, maps aided the capitalist development of the colonies as they were harnessed to make the land, and people, “useful.” Of special highlight is the ways in which maps were used in a similar manner by both private and state entities, suggesting a common understanding of the power of the map. Lastly, this study exposes how the conceptual power of the map facilitated the conquest and brutality of colonial rule by adding a scientific imprimatur to European rule which justified any action in quelling dissent.

Dedication

To the Author of my own history

Acknowledgments

Reflecting on the monumental help I received in completing this work only makes me that much happier there is not an orchestra cued-up to “play me off” if I go long.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about.¹

As late as the 1870s, the continent of Africa was barely touched by European conquest. While European colonies were scattered across the globe it appeared that nature and European disinterest would leave the continent out of reach. However, by the coming of the First World War nearly the entire continent had been divvied up with only Liberia and Ethiopia remaining outside European domination. This “Scramble for Africa” has long perplexed historians in terms of explaining its causes and results.


While a great deal of ink has been spilled attempting to answer the sundry of causes for the “Scramble” almost no work has been done on the map. This lack of coverage is ironic as the map is one of the chief artifacts documenting the progress of European conquest. If, as the above quote suggests, knowledge was the chief purpose of colonialism it was the map that codified and spread that knowledge. A map served as a signifier not only of what was known but also the purposes and plans of the colonizing

¹ Nicholas Dick quoted in Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 146.

power. An entirely different vision of Africa is conveyed by the exploratory map made in 1733 as shown in Map 1.1 in comparison to the cadastral map of the Kenyan Uasin Gishu plateau in Map 1.2.



Map 1.1: Isaac Beaugard. *L'Abissinie*. Scale not given. 1733. Africa, East (region), LOC.



Map 1.2: Auction Plan (provision) of Trans-Nzoya and Northern Uasin-Gishu Farms.

1.014" = 2 miles. MPG 1/1000, PRO

The first suggests an awareness of Africa while the second denotes the orderly dispersal of European owned territory. The map is critical in documenting the overall trend and purposes of the colonial process. The historiographical debates surrounding colonial warfare, economic development, and the politics of colonialism can be better understood through the lens of cartography.

The argument of this study is that cartography serves as a critical historical artifact which, when properly analyzed, reveals a detailed picture of the process of colonialism. Many explanations for the success of the European conquest of Africa deviate little from Hillare Belloc's quip that "Whatever happens we have got, the Maxim Gun and they have not." Another colonial technology, often ignored entirely, is the map. However, geography should be recognized as critically important in understanding the conquest of Africa:

It is...surprising to realize that the history of geography is completely neglected. Geography constitutes the taking of possession of the earth, and the intellectual domination of space. It represents a decisive dimension of human consciousness.²

Maps served as the chief tools by which the Europeans converted the continent of Africa from a great unknown into a colonially divided land-mass. Surveyors served as the point men for empire by measuring the land to bring it under colonial control. Unlike military units or certain government officials, the map was a common element of colonialism

² Gusdorf, Georges. *De l'Histoire des Sciences à l'Histoire de la Pensée*. Paris: Payot, 1977 quoted in Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, "Introduction: Critical Histories of Geography," in *Geography and Empire*, ed. Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 1.

from beginning to end for all the European powers. Additionally, the map serves as a clear marker of the *intention* of the colonizer. Many of the historiographical debates surrounding the motives and means of colonialism centers on unlocking the “Why?” behind events and decisions. Maps expose these intentions, as maps are only made with a purposed future use in mind, and can help shed light on key colonial questions. Lastly, maps serve as the chief measure of colonialism.³ The map was taken as a marker of the success or failure of a European civilization as its color was spread over the globe. The map also served as the chief tool of colonial legitimization, justifying the imperial project with a mixture of “civilizing mission” and national glory.

Precise objectives varied, of course, but *fin-de-siècle* imperialism was often determined by fears that ‘unclaimed’ colonial territory would fall into the hands of rival powers. Colonies were coveted not for economic reasons but as symbols of an otherwise vulnerable national pride, tangible zones which could be coloured in the appropriate fashion on school atlases, wall maps, tea towels and a thousand other items of imperial propaganda.⁴

Even if the map is recognized as an important tool of colonialism, the question remains as to how they can be analyzed and incorporated into a historical study. While the model of this study will be laid out in Chapter Two it is helpful to give a general overview of the analytical framework. The period of 1844-1914 saw a “Scramble” of geographers and explorers as much as it did colonialists. The map, therefore, connects all aspects of the

³ The reality of the map “not only conforms to a particular version of the world but to a version which is specifically designed to empower its makers.” Graham Huggan, “Decolonizing the Map: Post Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and the Cartographic Connection,” In *Past the Last Post*, ed. Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 127.

⁴ Michael Heffernan, *The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics* (London: Arnold, 1998), 55.

period of the “Scramble” from the beginnings of exploration to the division of land for auction as seen in Map 1.2. In order to draw together such a period I developed a three-tiered model of “gazes” that show the differences, as well as the general progression, of the colonial process. I use the term gaze as a way of highlighting the motive behind the creation of the individual map. As the term gaze carries a great deal of historiographical baggage a short digression on the terminology is in order. The meaning of gaze, where the viewer and viewed are in a relationship, comes largely from philosopher Michel Foucault in his work Discipline and Punish.⁵ Feminists have also carried that argument further in how gazes help to create hierarchies.⁶ While my conception of the term gaze came from the literature of cartographic historians rather than from these sources there is relevance to what they discuss. A key argument is that maps are not made simply to depict reality. As will be shown, maps are the work of authors who use a variety of tools to craft maps for a particular purpose.⁷ Each of these gazes informed what types of information would be conveyed through individual maps. Thus, each gaze was creating a relationship between Africa and the dominant aims of the colonizer. However, these

⁵ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). See also: Jeffrey Weeks, “Foucault for Historians,” in *History Workshop*, no. 14 (Autumn, 1982): 106-119 and Nick Crossley, “The Politics of the Gaze: Between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty,” in *Human Studies* 16, no. 4 (1993): 399-419.

⁶ For a good discussion of the male and female gaze see Susan R. Bowers, “Medusa and the Female Gaze” in *NWSA Journal* 2, no. 2 (Spring, 1990): 217-235. Another author has suggested that even GIS research can be reformatted to engage more with feminist perspectives; Mei-Po Kwan, “Feminist Visualization: Re-Envisioning GIS as a Method in Feminist Geographic Research,” in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92, no. 4 (Dec., 2002): 645-661.

⁷ A good book illustrating the creativity behind mapping is in a compendium of artists utilizing maps and cartographic symbology to create works of art in different art media; see Katharine Harmon, *The Map as Art: Contemporary artists explore cartography* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2009).

gazes should not be seen as monolithic. As map scholars, as will be shown in Chapter Two, have pointed out maps often lie to their viewers. The map may depict a relationship between the land and meaning, but it may be wildly inaccurate in terms of the reality.⁸ Indeed, much of the subsequent map gazes are tied to the intentions and belief of the colonizers more than the reality. Therefore, these gazes should be seen as attempts to define reality and make the land and people align with the aims and goals of the colonizing powers. By dissecting the separate elements of each map these aims can be uncovered and the general progression of these gazes can be brought to light. I argue that there existed three gazes that operated during the colonial process.

First, the gaze of the Discoverer. This gaze concerned the multitudinous and multinational effort to explore and open up “Darkest Africa.” This was the period of exploration that Joseph Conrad would refer to as “Geography Militant.” As explorers sought to create names for themselves, they served to “create” Africa in the mind of Europeans. The process of exploration did not simply uncover territory and note distinctive geographical features of the landscape but served to introduce Africa as a territorial landmass to European audiences. As a nebulous blank the continent of Africa was free of any European concerns. Once it was transformed into a territory made legible

⁸ For an example of another visual medium (photography) being used to depict a false reality see Silvana Palma, “The Seen, the Unseen, the Invented: Misrepresentations of African “Otherness” in the Colony. Eritrea, 1885-1896,” in *Cahiers d’Études Africaines* 45, Cahier 177 (2005): 39-69.

by the symbology of the map it was possible for Europeans to envision the occupation of Africa.

The gaze of the Despot followed in the footsteps of the explorers. While the concern of the previous gaze had been cataloging the landscape, the new purpose of the map was to bathe the landscape in color. This gaze documents what is primarily thought of as the “Scramble for Africa.” Occurring after one of the last “classic” expeditions, Stanly’s 1874-1877 expedition, there was a shift towards expeditions with more than geographical information as its object.⁹ This new purpose was seemingly codified in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 where Europeans laid the groundwork for the division of Africa.¹⁰ While this narrative is well known, and the map seems to catalog this shift, the power of the map to effect this change has not been well studied. Once the territory of Africa was made legible by the previous gaze, converted from a blank on a map into a distinct and recognizable geographical territory, there was a motive to fill in the map with the color and boundaries of political ownership. As the explorer had been motivated to fill the gaps of scientific knowledge, colonialists sought to fill in the new “gaps” of

⁹ R.C. Bridges, “Europeans and East Africans in the Age of Exploration” in *The Exploration of Africa in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: Proceedings of a seminar held on the occasion of the Mungo Park Bi-Centenary Celebration at the Center of African Studies*, (Edinburgh: Center of African Studies, 1971; 119-139), 119.

¹⁰In addition to adding a motivating force for political partition the map also became “essential in public and diplomatic territorial disputes...Direct occupation and conquest necessitated a large scale and detailed mapping of the continent.” Mohamed Mbodj, “So Geographers in Africa Maps with Savage Pictures Fill Their Gaps,” in *Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus*, eds. George Clement Bond and Nigel C. Gibson (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002), 49. For a good overview of the conference and its legacy see Stig Förster, Wolfgang Mommsen, and Ronald Robinson, *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: the Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the onset of partition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Africa which lacked political claims. What had been discovered was now harnessed for the purposes of conquest as Europeans sought to claim territory in Africa lest they be locked out of the general land-grab. This gaze absorbed the information gained in the previous period but utilized it for a new purpose. The carefully documented topography of the landscape was subsumed in etching delineation lines of European ownership. Triangulation points were used not to indicate the position of a mountain but the possession of a certain power. It is in this gaze that the importance of maps to decision makers can be seen as the map was a vital tool in negotiations over boundaries between European powers.

Lastly, the gaze of the Developer was applied in order to make use of these newly colored territories. Once the neat divisions of colonies had been laid across Africa there arose the question of what exactly to do with these spoils. The maps made under this gaze unlock this new purpose. The bright colors of colonial ownership faded in order to create maps focused on economic opportunities. Maps returned to a near myopic view of local territory, similar to the route sketches of explorers, to isolate the eye on particular regions. While the previous gaze had converted unknown land into politically occupied territory, this gaze converted landscapes into resources. The importance of the map in terms of documenting future use is important in assessing colonial economies. Often the economic impact of the colonies is dismissed due to the minuscule percentages of exports they provided to the European continent. However, as the maps were made with

potential future uses in mind they serve to indicate a missing element in this analysis. Specifically, they indicate the intention to invest, *not* the result, which is a far better barometer of the importance of economic factors in the conquest and utilization of the African continent.

With the broad outlines of this study's analytical model in place it is important to make a few other points about the argumentative structure. While the model presents a very orderly progression of the gazes should not be viewed as a monolithic structure. There are countless examples, some of which will be shown in later chapters, blending different elements of the gazes together. There never was a colony that existed wholly in the gaze of the Despot or wholly in the gaze of the Developer. However, the general progression of colonialism is borne out by the map. Whatever bleeding across gazes that did occur, it only happened between sequential ones.¹¹ A map made to document the economic possibilities of a river would not share similar elements to those of a map of the same river made under the gaze of the Discoverer. In this way this model serves to illustrate the overall process of colonialism while still making room for individual exceptions. In addition, this model illustrates the truth of the quote at the beginning of this chapter. The relationship between gazes was interrelated to the progression of

¹¹ Additionally, the same process could begin again in unknown parts of a claimed territory. As the British pushed into the relatively unknown and untamed northern regions of Kenya, for example, it began with exploratory route sketches made by colonial officers. Thus, even at the local level this progression of gazes helps to explain colonial efforts.

knowledge of the colonized territories. Each gaze demanded substantially greater detail of the land in order to achieve the new purposes of the colonizing power.

This model also serves to shed light on the connections between exploration and colonial conquest. While the political machinations of the “Scramble” are well established in the historiography, the role of explorers has often been ignored. For example, maps are not mentioned in the *Cambridge History of Africa* volume covering 1870-1905¹² nor in a subsequent volume which documents German and British efforts to colonize East Africa.¹³ In general, this is because the conceptual power of the map is forgotten as the map is taken as a depiction of “reality.” This ensures that works documenting general trends of exploration abandon Africa, rather than continuing into the colonial period, after it became a known quantity. In 1970, the aptly titled *Discovery of Africa* documented the exploration of Africa but only tangentially related it to colonialism.¹⁴ A more recent book covering the history of exploration, *Explorers: The Most Exciting Voyages of Discovery*, jumped from the exploration of Africa to the lunar

¹² See A.E. Atmore, “Africa on the eve of partition,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa Vol 6*, ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 10-95; G.N. Sanderson, “The European partition of Africa: Origins and dynamics,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa Vol 6*, ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 96-158 ; Marcia Wright, “East Africa, 1870-1905,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa Vol 6*, ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 539-591. Interestingly both Sanderson and Atmore mention that the European scramble was aided by conceiving of “Africa as a whole” (Atmore, 94) or as a “Prize worth competing for” (Sanderson, 99) but neither author makes the leap of analysis to examine *what* allowed Europeans to view Africa in such a way.

¹³ Andrew Roberts’s article, while very detailed, makes no mention of mapping expeditions or the role maps might have played in all of the growth in settlement and investment he charts in the Usambara Mountains. Andrew Roberts, “East Africa,” in *The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 7*, ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 649-701.

¹⁴ Richard Hall, *Discovery of Africa* (New York: Grossert & Dunlap, 1970).

landings.¹⁵ The continent of Africa loses its fascination for these studies as soon as the explorers “succeeded” in their mission to catalog the topography of Africa. The continent then fades from view as the focus shifts to the next realm of exploration whether space or of the deep-sea. The above book also highlights another problem with discussions of exploration as they fall into a romantic trap. The mythology of exploration is accepted, with the lone European braving nature and native in a quest for knowledge, and so connecting these efforts with colonialism seems untoward.¹⁶ Works on African exploration are seemingly more concerned with charting the excitement of the journeys and individual bravado than with how these efforts laid the foundation for all future colonial success.¹⁷ Consider the placement of books on African exploration in bookstores where they are often lumped with expeditions to the Arctic and even with works on pirates.¹⁸ It is unsurprising, therefore, that a recent book on the exploration of Africa, *Into Africa: The Epic Adventures of Stanley and Livingstone*, was written by a

¹⁵ Andrea Porti, *Explorers: The Most Exciting Voyages of Discovery – from the African Expeditions to the Lunar Landing* (Hove: Firefly Books, 2005). The book even equates the African expeditions with the lunar landings with all the heady connotations of Africa as a barren and empty landscape that it would seem to imply.

¹⁶ Clare Pettitt in her work on the cultural legacy of the meeting between Morton Stanley and Dr. Livingstone notes how Livingstone’s exploratory mission – and I would argue her point extends to African exploration in general – is subsumed behind a *Boys Own* adventure narrative; see Claire Pettitt, *Dr. Livingstone, I Presume? Missionaries, Journalists, Explorers, and Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

¹⁷ As a representative sample of this mythologizing, “These were true ‘Renaissance men’ – fearless and brave, they were scientists, linguists, archaeologists and naturalists. They spent years in often desparately harsh conditions, plagued by diseases such as malaria and surrounded by hostile locals – many died on their travels – but they were determined to succeed.” Robin Hansbury-Tenison, *The Seventy Great Journeys in History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2006), 159.

¹⁸ I have personally seen this organization in the now-defunct Borders, Barnes and Noble, and Half-Price Books.

sports-journalist.¹⁹ Sadly, it is not only “popular” writers who have issues with romanticism, but academic writers as well.²⁰ By establishing this progressive model of colonialism this previously ignored connection to exploration can be brought into focus. Research has already done away with much of the mythology around the exploratory journeys themselves, and it is hoped this study will do the same for the overall purpose and legacy of said journeys.²¹

If maps served as the talisman of Empire, they are helpful in answering some of the deeper historiographical questions concerning Imperialism itself.²² The term “Imperialism,” was defined by John Hobson’s 1902 study *Imperialism: A Study*. He believed that Imperialism was an “insane” moment of capitalism where it attempted to expand overseas to find an outlet for surplus capital. As he wrote in the introduction to his 1938 edition of the same book, while “we do not need to own a country in order to trade with its people,” the establishment of permanent trading stations “generally involves some territorial holding which is likely to expand with the expanding

¹⁹ Martin Dugard, *Into Africa: The Epic Adventures of Stanley and Livingstone* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004) referenced in Pettitt, 68.

²⁰ Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, having written a fine World History textbook that has been well received, has still engaged in some romanticism with his work Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, *Pathfinders* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). In his description of the history of exploration he uses chapter titles such as “Reaching,” “Vaulting,” and “Deepening” providing the connotation of romantic progress.

²¹ For a complete debunking of the conventional view of the European explorer during this period see Johannes Fabian, *Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

²² For a very fine overview of the general historiography surrounding imperialism see Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism.” *The American Historical Review* 102, no. 2 (April 1997): 388-420.

importance of that trade.”²³ His argument gained its largest exposure through V.I. Lenin who asserted, both in argument and title, that Imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism.²⁴ This predominantly Marxist interpretation localized the impetus for empire in the surplus capital and financiers of Europe.²⁵ From this base a number of distinct historiographical debates grew up surrounding particular national issues.

In the case of British colonialism the first critique of this economic model came from Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher who suggested instead of a monolithic empire-grab from The City, a localized “imperialism of free trade.”²⁶ This carried a continuity of the “informal empire” that annexed territory as a last resort and fit the maxim of a British empire that was acquired in “a fit of absence of mind.”²⁷ This also suggested a “peripheral thesis” where the frontiers of empire drove expansion more than the metropole.²⁸ A more recent argument was laid out by P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins in a series of articles in the 1980s. They argued for a new model of “gentlemanly capitalism” where imperialism gained its footing through the importance of the service

²³ J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*. (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2011), x-xi.

²⁴ V.I. Lenin. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers, 1939.

²⁵ These financiers were regarded as the “governor[s] of the imperial engine.” A.R. Dillely, “The Economics of Empire,” in *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives*, ed. Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008; 101-129), 104.

²⁶ Dilly, 105. Their argument was laid out in Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961). A good book illustrating the effect of their thesis is William Roger Louis, Ronald Robinson, and John Gallagher, *Imperialism: the Robinson and Gallagher controversy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976).

²⁷ While the statement has been much maligned there have been more recent defenses of it in Bernard Porter, *The Absent Minded Imperialists: What the British Really Thought About Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²⁸ Butlin, 27.

sector and its ties to financiers in The City.²⁹ Rather than a model driven by the frontier, they suggested a “centrifugal” thesis with “the metropolitan economy back at the center of the analysis.”³⁰

In the case of German imperialism studies of the colonies only really began in the 1960s as the issues of decolonization became enmeshed with larger critiques of German historiography.³¹ While empathy with the Third World was a strong motivation for studying Africa, most German historiography was Eurocentric in its outlook. The concern of these early works was with documenting what, within Germany, was the motivating force for German expansion abroad. A good example is Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s works which argued that the roots of German expansion in Africa were a form of social imperialism. The concern was *not* with the economy, as Hobson and Lenin argued, but with the ability to create a new national project that would discipline, or at

²⁹ Dilley, 106. The legacy of this interpretation continues as seen by an a use of this thesis in a broader study of imperialism in East Asia. See *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History*, ed. Shigeru Akita (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

³⁰ Robin Butlin, *Geographies of Empire: European Empires and Colonies c. 1880-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27. A recent critique of this model comes from John Darwin who, in the grand tradition of historians, suggests a multi-causal theory of British imperialism blending various interests (religious, commercial, humanitarian, scientific, etc.) with the government serving as facilitator and regulator of a process driven by momentum outside its direct control. He first explored this in an article John Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion” *English Historical Review* 112, no. 447. (1997): 614-642. He later expanded on this theory in a book length treatment in John, Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

³¹ This, of course, references the controversial Fischer thesis concerning Germany’s war aims during World War One and the relationship between Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany. Sebastian Conrad, *German Colonialism: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.

least distract, the working class.³² The pronouncement by Bismarck that Europe was “my map of Africa” served as the subtext for most of these early colonial studies.³³ Most of the works on colonial issues were concerned with arguing the *Sonderweg* (“Special Path”) thesis via the back-door of Africa.³⁴ More recent works on German colonialism have been informed by subaltern and post-colonial studies.³⁵

The importance of these historiographical overviews is in elucidating how maps can provide a new analytical framework for assessing these very issues. As previously noted, the economic importance of the colonies in motivating imperialism should not be

³² Conrad, 9. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol III: 1849-1914* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1995) and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969). A modern critique of the conventional narrative of German imperialism can be found in Matthew Fitzpatrick, *Liberal Imperialism in Germany: Expansionism and Nationalism 1848-1884* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). In it Fitzpatrick suggests imperialism has a longer legacy in Germany than has been supposed, noting an early cry for a fleet to assert preeminence abroad in a speech to the Frankfurt Assembly, and its implicit connection to liberalism. He also argues that the enthusiasm for colonies, as suggested in the creation of the *Deutscher Kolonialverein* (German Colonial Society) in 1882 by two former liberal members of the *Nationalverein* (National Association), “was not a result of newfound colonial enthusiasm, but rather long-term imperialist ambitions for the new liberal nation.” Fitzpatrick, 36, 105. Another work suggesting a connection between liberalism and colonialism in Germany, though falling into the periodization of “scientific colonialism” which will be critiqued in Chapter Five, is Erik Grimmer-Solem, “The Professors’ Africa: Economists, the Elections of 1907, and the Legitimation of German Imperialism.” *German History* 25, no. 3 (2007): 313-347.

³³ For a good overview of German colonial historiography up to 1970 see H. Pogge Von Strandmann, “The German Role in Africa and German Imperialism,” *African Affairs* 9, no. 277 (October, 1970): 381-389.

³⁴ This inclination has even crept back into recent literature. Isabelle V. Hull’s fine work on the German campaign against the Herero, while seemingly focused on Africa, is more concerned with trying to prove the *Sonderweg* thesis without using the term. See Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). A more recent monograph following similar logic, while specifically arguing the book “does not restore the ‘special path’ argument,” is Shelley Baranowski, *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

³⁵ Due to the multiplicity of foci in these cultural works see Conrad, 10-12 for the general themes of these newer historiographical works. For broad overviews of the more recent works in German colonial historiography see David Ciarlo, “Globalizing German Colonialism.” *German History* 26 (2008): 285-298 and Ulrike Lindner, “Plätze an der Sonne? Die Geschichtsschreibung auf dem Weg in die deutschen Kolonien.” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*. 48 (2008): 487-510.

assessed by the ledger of trade but in motivation and hoped for profits. An oil drilling operation that fails to produce oil does not indicate that the motivation for oil wealth did not drive all the effort. In the same way maps made to document expansionary or economic schemes show the intentions of the colonizers regardless of outcome.³⁶ Maps, especially the highly detailed maps made for developmental schemes, were an expensive and time-consuming process. These maps were not made “willy-nilly” and help denote key aspects of colonial developmental efforts. Very often the dreams of the colonizers, such as the hoped for French Saharan railway, were well beyond any ability to put it into action. However, while the colonizers' eyes may have been bigger than their stomachs it was still their eyes, gazing greedily upon a map of Africa, which drove the colonizing process.

In this study the organizing principle of imperialism is not economic. I agree with Douglas Porch's formulation that Imperialism was not the highest form of capitalism but the highest form of *nationalism*.³⁷ Cartographic historians have been at pains to show the power of the map in connection with state-formation. Consider an assortment of books that explore this connection between mapping and the state: *The Power of Maps*³⁸; *Maps*

³⁶ For example, twenty-two companies engaged in rubber production in eastern Africa and all were failures. That they failed should not be used as an indication that economic motives were not active in driving colonial development. See J. Forbes Munro, “British Rubber Companies in East Africa before the First World War.” *Journal of African History* 24, no. 3. (1983): 369-379.

³⁷ Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire* (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2000), 39.

³⁸ Dennis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (New York: Guilford Press, 1992).

& Man³⁹; *Geography and Empire*⁴⁰; *Mapping an Empire*⁴¹; *The Sovereign Map*⁴²; *Possessing the World*⁴³; and *Mapping for Money*.⁴⁴ This has not simply been the purview of historians of Western Europe but also Russianists.⁴⁵ There is also a lively discussion within the pages of geographic and scientific journals about the meanings and power of cartography.⁴⁶ “Cartographers manufacture power,” and in the case of Africa the map created a vision of European dominated colonies.⁴⁷ For example, in reference to Atlases, one author has noted how they helped in “inviting armchair bibliophiles to conquer [a]

³⁹ Norman Thrower, *Maps & Man: An Examination of Cartography in Relation to Culture and Civilization* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

⁴⁰ *Geography and Empire*, ed. Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

⁴¹ Matthew Edney, *Mapping an Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁴² Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History*, trans. Tom Conley, ed. Edward H. Dahl (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006).

⁴³ Bouda Etemad and Andrene Everson, *Possessing the World: Taking Measurements of Colonization from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 2007).

⁴⁴ Kees Zandvliet, *Mapping for Money: Maps, plans and topographic paintings and their role in Dutch overseas expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries* (Amsterdam: Batavian Lion International, 1998).

⁴⁵ Primarily the concern is with the Early Modern period, echoing other works that document the rise of the monarchical state and the connection to the map. A few examples include: Valerie Kivelson, *Cartographies of Tsardom: The Land and its meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Leo Bagrow, *A History of Russian Cartography up to 1800*, ed. Henry W. Castner (Wolfe Island, Ontario: The Walker Press, 1975); Fyodor A. Shibanov, “Studies in the History of Russian Cartography” *Cartographica*, Part One, Monograph No. 14. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

⁴⁶ To provide a small sampling of the types of issues that can be discussed: James R. Akerman, “The Structuring of Political Territory,” *Imago Mundi* 47 (1995): 138-154; Thomas J. Bassett, “Cartography and Empire Building,” *Geographical Review* 84, no. 3 (July, 2004): 316-335; Michael Heffernan, “Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers – New Series* 21, no. 3 (1996): 504-533; David Guilmartin, “Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 4 (November, 1994): 1127-1149; Jeffery C. Stone, “Imperialism, Colonialism and Cartography,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers – New Series* 13, no. 1 (1988): 57-64.

⁴⁷ J.H. Andrews, “Introduction,” in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 2-32), 21.

province in a sentimental fashion.”⁴⁸ Maps served as a conceptual and practical tool, as well as a legitimizing force, during the age of Imperialism. “Technical knowledge cannot be neutral,” declared Matthew Edney in his analysis of the Great Trigonometric Survey of India.⁴⁹ Maps are important not so much for the technical details they illustrate, as for the conceptions of power and the hidden meanings within the seemingly neat and tidy lines of the map. As J.B. Harley noted:

Maps have been the weapons of imperialism. Insofar as maps were used in colonial promotion, and lands claimed on paper before they were effectively occupied, maps *anticipated* empire. Surveyors marched alongside soldiers, initially mapping for reconnaissance, then for general information, and eventually as a tool of pacification, civilization, and exploitation in the defined colonies.⁵⁰

Part of the reason for the economic development of the colonies was that once the map had converted land into European property it was “natural” to develop its economy. This can even be expressed in the creation and development of colonial cities. As will be shown in Chapter 7, in Nairobi, though equally evident in Dar es Salaam, colonial cities were designed to express the social and political dominance of Europeans in physical form. The recreation of broad avenues and a European street grid were all part of a process where “Africans entering the colonial cities on their own continent were urged to

⁴⁸ Ian Barrow, *Making History, Drawing Territory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 39. The province in this case being India. For a good overview of the creation and dissemination of German handatlases see Jürgen Espenhorst, *Petermann’s Planet: A guide to German Handatlases And Their Siblings Throughout the World, Volume I: The Great Handatlases*, ed. and trans. George R. Crossman (Schwerte, Germany: Pangaea Verlag, 2003).

⁴⁹ Edney, 340.

⁵⁰ Emphasis mine. J.B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 52-81), 21.

leave Africa at the door.”⁵¹ Once the map documented Africa as possessing the same colors as Europe it only stood to reason that Africa should develop a European economy as well. This is not to dismiss the motivating power of trade as an impetus for empire, but the progression of the map does help illustrate the interrelatedness of trade and political power.

The competition between Germany and Britain for territory in East Africa from the 1880s onwards represents a perfect storm to assess this relationship between imperialism and cartography. In the first instance the context of the acquisition and development of colonial eastern Africa represents one of the high points in the “Scramble for Africa.” The German land grab was nearly unprecedented in European history. In an incredibly short period of time Germany went from possessing no colonies to acquiring the fourth-largest European empire.⁵² As Britain’s colonial effort was a mix of “policy and pragmatic reaction to events, opportunities, and perceived threats,” the German land-grab in eastern Africa led to private and governmental actions to protect their position.⁵³ The competition for German and British East Africa, then, serves as a microcosm of the entire “Scramble.” Second, both Germany and Britain were among the leaders in the

⁵¹ Gary Stewart, *Rumba on the River: A History of the Popular Music of the Two Congos* (London: Verso, 2000), 4. While indicating the way in which music was used to resist this imposition the point remains that the cities served as physical signposts of colonial attitudes. For an example of this process in Dar es Salaam see *Uebersichtskarte von der Stadt Dar-es-Salâm und deren nächster Umgebung*. (1:5,000 map) 1894, British Library BLL01004827178. For a good overview of the effect of German colonialism on the city of Tabora see Karin Pallaver, *Un'altra Zanzibar. Schiavitù, colonialism e urbanizzazione a Tabora (1840-1916)* (Bologna: Franco Angeli, 2011).

⁵² In the case of Africa the acquisitions were all acquired within the span of a single year.

⁵³ Butlin, 53.

cartographic field and this was well proven by their actions in Africa. Britain, through the establishment in 1830 of the Royal Geographic Society (RGS), became one of the pioneers in geography and cartography. This institution “was characterized by the imperialistic undergirding of the institution’s entire project and thereby reveals that Victorian geography was intimately bound up with British expansionist policy overseas.”⁵⁴ The RGS served as a popularizing force whose public lectures served to broadcast the actions of explorers in Africa while also underscoring the connection between geographic knowledge and Empire. Indeed, the Society’s famed map room was “much in demand” from political and military leaders.⁵⁵ Germany also had a prodigious geographical history and, like Britain, its colonial impulse “could trace its origins to geographical societies,” with the Berlin Geographical Society actually predating the RGS.⁵⁶ During the 1870s nine geographical societies were created and by 1900 there were 23 together producing 42 journals or periodic publications relating to cartography.⁵⁷ All of these societies led to a very geographically literate society that was envied across Europe.⁵⁸ Therefore, these two powers are the perfect subjects to highlight the connections between cartography, exploration, and empire.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 284.

⁵⁵ Butlin, 285.

⁵⁶ It was founded in 1828 by cartographer Henrich Berghaus and long favored explorations of Africa. By 1894 of the 84 geographical societies in Europe 23 of them were in Germany. Ibid., 281, 309.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 308.

⁵⁸ In 1870, the Third Republic believed it had lost the Franco-Prussian War because of the better geographical knowledge imparted to the German population through the exceptional wall-maps featured in school classrooms. Jacob, 347.

While Britain and Germany had very different attitudes towards empire the process of acquiring colonies was quite similar. Germany acquired its colony under the auspices of the *Deutsch Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft* (DOAG) while Britain utilized William Mackinnon's Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). There are clear differences in the experiences, as Bismarck accepted the *fait accompli* of Carl Peters' private actions while the British government pushed Mackinnon to act, but the utilization of companies before state involvement is similar in both cases. This similarity allows for a true comparison of how cartography was used by private and state entities in both German and British East Africa. Beyond process there also are the similarities in the territories occupied themselves. One of the distinctive qualities of the gaze of the Discoverer was that it was non-national. The German explorers Georg Schweinfurth and Gustav Nachtigal, for example, were given medals by the Royal Geographic Society. Exploration was seen as a personal act of glory which, while reflecting on their country, did not necessarily imply national triumph.⁵⁹ Because of the international flavor of exploration during this period you have cases of German and British explorers traipsing over the entirety of eastern Africa. Thus, the maps made by these explorers were not made respecting the future colonial boundaries. This fact allows for a richer analysis on how exploratory cartography was used, even in relying on the efforts of explorers from their colonial competitors, to successfully colonize the region. Lastly, the time scale

⁵⁹ For example, the discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie by Hungarian Count Samuel Teleki von Szek did not turn Hungary into one of the premier European colonizing powers in Africa.

makes this region perfect for a study of this sort. Rather than having to trace the use of maps over centuries the period of exploration and colonization of eastern Africa is quite short. Therefore, the use of maps can be traced more concretely in context as well as ensuring any comparisons are not “apples to oranges.”

Beyond shedding light on the process of colonialism this study will be of great relevance to a number of different disciplines. Cartographic historians have done yeoman’s work in trying to shed light on the importance of cartography. They have been at pains to show how so much that we accept as a mere depiction of reality is in fact the implicit language of dominance.⁶⁰ Yet, while these works are quite good at elaborating the connections between maps and larger forces, they are in some ways as wedded to the maps as their creators. Christian Jacob might write of how the map can use decorative aspects in order to prop up a specific ideology, but the point still remains that the map is the definitive focus of his work.⁶¹ This is akin to a literary criticism study of a novel which might delve into the structure of the story or grammar to expose deeper meaning and yet would be of little utility to an audience interested in the plot. Therefore, the connections made between mapping and power remain generally more ethereal than concrete. In contrast, colonial historians have accepted the scientific gloss of the map and tended to ignore it altogether.

⁶⁰ “Cartographers manufacture power. They create a spatial panopticon. It is power embedded in the map text.” Andrews, 21.

⁶¹ Jacob, 78.

Mapping justified ownership of colonial territory.⁶² Oftentimes, these maps did more than identify ownership, but legitimize the entire process of colonialism itself. In the *Historical and Modern Atlas of the British Empire*, imperial growth was shown, “with no suggestion that this was anything other than beneficial. Thus, the four maps of European colonies in Africa in 1800, 1850, 1865 and 1880 were entitled ‘Development of Africa’.”⁶³ There has been a great deal of work on the role of colonial science with a rich historiographical footprint.⁶⁴ An example would be Lewis Pyenson’s *Civilizing Mission* which focuses on science generally with cartography relegated to service as an ancillary component of study rather than the focus. In this the book is representative of the general field with a concern with science broadly and exposing the relationship between colonialism and scientific studies.⁶⁵ The only area in which the connection between

⁶² Wood, 9.

⁶³ Jeremy Black, *Maps and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 97.

⁶⁴ Colonial Science was first defined in the 1960s with a “diffusionist model” where “science” was invented and imported by the West and then was challenged by a “dependency model” where science was a tool for control. The more recent approach has been post-colonial where science, “becomes less an investigation of origins and inventions (a history that has long privileged Europe) than to enquiry into uses, meanings, effect.” David Arnold, “Europe, Technology and Colonialism in the 20th Century,” *History and Technology* 21, no. 1 (March 2005; 85-106), 87 and Ian Barrow, *Surveying and Mapping in Colonial Sri Lanka 1800-1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9-10. The goal of this most recent historiography is to show that science “is not some eternal essence slowly taking form in history; rather, it is a social practice grounded in concrete historical and geographical circumstances.” David N. Livingstone, *Putting Science in its Place: Geographies of Scientific Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 180. Another example of this push away from a monolithic view of science and its diffusion is Arnold Pacey, *Technology in World Civilization* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

⁶⁵ Primarily concerned with physicists and astronomers, he wanted to pick away at the presupposed neutrality of these researchers. Rather than labeling them as researchers he suggests that science was so linked to colonialism that they should instead be seen as functionaries within the imperial regime. Lewis Pyenson, *Civilizing Mission* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 331. David Guilmartin makes the same point about India as scientists treated India more as a “great laboratory” in which the natural world was not only studied but manipulated to maximize profit. See the previously referenced

empire and cartography has been drawn is in the areas of Southeast Asia. Matthew Edney's *Mapping an Empire* documents how the Great Trigonometric Survey of India helped to enable colonial rule. He felt the map served as a tool of ideology and practicality which, by creating a single "India," served as both a "potent symbol" of the imperial mission and created a "single, India-wide administration."⁶⁶ With a scientific map in hand, administrators believed they could effect a rule that was both rational and effective.⁶⁷ Another author who examined the role of maps in India is Ian Barrow. Published after Edney's work, his *Making History, Drawing Territory* moves beyond the narrow limits of the Trigonometric Survey and assesses five different ways that maps legitimated the British conquest.⁶⁸ His work pushed beyond the science of the map grappling instead with issues of conceptual power. He felt the greatest power of the map "lies in its seeming naturalness" which made it the best tool to legitimize British conquest.⁶⁹ An engaging study from an alternative perspective is Thongchai Winichakul's *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*. Rather than focusing on European efforts he examines how Western mapping was adopted by the indigenous

David Guilmartin, "Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, no. 4 (1994; 1127-1149), 1128.

⁶⁶ Edney, 322, 325.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 323.

⁶⁸ Barrow, *Making History*, 19. He describes them as: 1) Associative History – suggesting India was owned by Britain; 2) Progressive History – similar to Edney that precision in mapping was equated with possession; 3) Reverential History – how possession was enshrined, in this case in the naming of Mount Everest, through honoring of an individual; 4) Romantic History – the use of Indian laborers in the process of mapping sanctified the imperial mission of "lifting up" the population; and finally 5) Nostalgic History – maps that traced the "natural" conquest of India.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 2,5.

elite of Siam to combat Western efforts of domination.⁷⁰ Prior to this adoption, the concepts of sovereignty and border were not coterminous in the minds of the leaders of “Siam,” which left their territory open to European encroachment.⁷¹ Once western cartography was adopted, the government of Siam was able to play the Europeans off of one another to preserve their sovereignty. Once they possessed borders, as defined by Western cartographic methods, Siam became “real” in the minds of the Europeans.⁷² In the end, he illustrates that the ultimate “conqueror” of Siam was cartography since it was only after Western mapping methods were accepted that “Siam” was created.⁷³

While these studies have served to try to draw historical attention to maps their efforts have not influenced works on African colonialism. Jeffrey Stone published *A Short History of the Cartography of Africa*, but it remains sequestered in the field of cartographic history.⁷⁴ General works on African colonialism fail to mention the role maps played in the solidification of Empire.⁷⁵ Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis’s

⁷⁰ Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 111.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁷² In many ways the leaders recognized how cartography could be used for their own purposes. Once the borders of Siam were “created” the Europeans were faced with trying to occupy a defined area, rather than nibbling at the borders of a nebulous kingdom.

⁷³ Winichakul, 129.

⁷⁴ Jeffrey C. Stone, *A Short History of the Cartography of Africa* (Lewiston, New York: E. Mellen Press, 1995).

⁷⁵ Bruce Fetter, *Colonial Rule in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Robert Collins and James Burns, *Historical Problems of Imperial Africa* (New York: M. Wiener, 1994); H. Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997); Andrew Porter, *European Imperialism, 1860-1914* (New York: Macmillan, 1994). While maps are mentioned in Wesseling’s *The European Colonial Empires*, it is only in the context of a generalized push of European exploration and not specifically how maps aided colonialism; see H. Wesseling, *The European Colonial Empires, 1815-1919* (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2004), 54-59.

massive collection of essays, *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, never mention maps.⁷⁶ It is not only general works that miss this connection but specific works on German and British colonialism as well. For example, Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan in their detailed examination of the German and British colonial ventures, entitled *The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914* and *The Rulers of British Africa 1870-1914* respectively, never mentioned the role of maps.⁷⁷ Other works covering German imperialism have also never addressed the importance of the map to the colonial process.⁷⁸ This also applies to specific works on British East Africa.⁷⁹ The one exception to this blind spot in colonial literature in Africa, and exploring a German colony no less, is *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the Discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1915*. Written by John Noyes, a professor of German at the University of Toronto, the book explores in great detail the rhetorical power of boundary and map making in the creation of South West Africa. As befits his background he is interested in the power of language to delineate boundaries and the

⁷⁶ Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis. *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

⁷⁷ L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977). L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan. *The Rulers of British Africa 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978).

⁷⁸ Other works include: Helmuth Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa* (London: C. Hurst, 1986); Erick Mann, *Mikono Ya Damu* (Frankfurt: Lang, 2002); Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania* (Münster: Lit verlag, 1995); Martin Kaniki, *Tanzania under Colonial Rule* (New York: Longham, 1980); Arne Perras, *Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856-1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).

⁷⁹ For example Ronald Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

meanings associated with the creation of space. Colonization requires writing which he associates with cartography as a map “captures space by establishing boundaries and limiting passage across them.”⁸⁰ While his work comes closest in making a connection between mapping and colonialism, it ignores the last school of historiography that will be important for this study.

Joseph Conrad called the modern period of exploration “Geography Militant” as “conquerors of truth” scaled and traveled the world in order to fill in the blank spaces on the map. It is this factor, the militancy of cartography or the role of the military in mapping, which allowed for what he wistfully termed “Geography Triumphant.”⁸¹ What he recognized, and is ignored by so many who have examined the role of mapping and colonialism, is the military and its role in solidifying control and ensuring the development of the colony. Even the mapping process laid out in this study illustrates the violent nature of mapping. Western mapping was not “simply new data added to existing conceptions. It was another *kind* of knowledge of space with its own classificatory systems, concepts, and mediating signs.”⁸² In Africa, cartography first appropriated indigenous knowledge and then eliminated it under the veneer of the soothing colors and neat lines of the map. Each of the gazes listed above had an indigenous “mirror”

⁸⁰ John Noyes, *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the discourse of German South West Africa 1884-1915* (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1992), 106.

⁸¹ Joseph Conrad, “Geography and Some Explorers,” in *Last Essays*, ed. R. Curle (London: Dent, 1926), 12, quoted in Felix Driver, *Geography Militant* (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 4. His melancholy was due to a feeling of loss once all the blanks were filled in. The rational solidification of rule and control being so different from his romantic belief in exploration.

⁸² Winichakul, 36.

reflecting the ways in which the map enabled conceptual and, later, actual violence.⁸³

The gaze of the Discoverer was a detection of the territory and potential obstacles to European penetration. The gaze of the Despot translated into defeat and the de-legitimization of any other polity than those the Europeans charted out as “real.” Lastly, the gaze of the Developer led to the disenfranchisement and subjugation of the people for European economic motives.

Military historians have done little better than other fields in recognizing the importance of maps for their own works. This represents a glaring omission in the historiography and an ironic one at that, considering how often the topography and the geography of the land matters for any number of battles. Within military literature the question of interest is often a judgment as to whether or not a general was right or wrong to choose such-and-such a path, rather than what the general used to determine, in the leader’s mind, the best route to follow.⁸⁴ This missing question, which would open up questions on the role a map might play in the mind of a military leader, is jettisoned in order to make more strident judgments. The possession of a map, specifically a poor one, can bring ruin to any military operation. A good example would be the experience of Sir Redvers Buller in the Boer War. Though a decorated veteran, he was attacked for his conduct at the Battle of Colenso near the Tugela River. His failure to achieve victory led

⁸³ The mirror analogy is taken from comments by Douglas Porch on this author’s paper entitled “Conceptualizing Conquest: The use of cartography in the creation of colonial eastern Africa” at the Military Frontiers Conference, Columbus, OH, May 13, 2011.

⁸⁴ Herbert H. Gregory, *Military Geology and Topography* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), 197.

to his sacking and a moniker of “Reverse Buller” by the troops. Yet, an examination of the maps available to Buller shows that they were misleading about the position of the hills and the fords of the river.⁸⁵ In addition to this map his only other resources were “education maps or cadastral maps” which lacked topographical information.⁸⁶ Needless to say without a proper understanding of the terrain it is unlikely that any officer could effectively lead his troops. Martin Evans, who brought this issue to light, was able to document that the key difference between Buller’s defeat in 1881 and in the British victory in the same locale nine years later was adequate knowledge of the terrain. The British were able to defeat the Boers in 1900, in terrain favorable to the defense, only after acquiring adequate knowledge of the ground.⁸⁷ It is unfortunate for military history as a field that such an interesting analysis, which demolishes the conventional judgment of Buller, was left to a non-military historian.

Sadly, this one example is representative of a sin military historians generally commit, though in very good company, of accepting the map as an accurate representation of reality. The path chosen by a general is judged on the assumed reality of the ground rather than trying to inquire what *representation* of the ground they or their staff had access to. With this conceptual blind spot the importance or development of

⁸⁵ Martin Marix Evans, “Maps and Decisions: Buller South and North of the Tugela, 1899-1900,” in *Fields of Battle*, ed. Peter Doyle and Matthew Bennett (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002), 137-148. The only military map Buller had available to him was a 1:63,360 scale map that was detailed along lines of communication but became vague the farther it moved away from the main route.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 141.

maps seems inconsequential. To their credit some military historians have recognized this gap. Geoffrey Parker wrote an article on Spanish map-making in the edited volume *Monarch, Ministers, and Maps*.⁸⁸ Jeremy Black has also tackled this topic, but only in writing the introduction to the compendium *100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography*.⁸⁹ Concerning Germany, for example, the only military history work to address mapping is Arden Bucholz's *Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning*. Yet, his work is not concerned with the maps themselves but with the cartographic department within the General Staff. It is an institutional history, touching on the Lithographic Institute within the General Staff system, rather than a work concerned with the role maps played in Prussian war planning.⁹⁰ While Dennis Showalter mentions the importance of maps to the Prussian military, he also is unconcerned with the maps themselves.⁹¹

The utility of maps for military purposes has been left to two Earth & Environmental Science professors interested in tying the work of map specialists to military history. Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, in *Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915*, exposed the British failure to adequately utilize cartography in the planning of the failed military expedition. Glaring strategic errors

⁸⁸ Geoffrey Parker, "Maps and Ministers: The Spanish Habsburgs," In *Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 124-152.

⁸⁹ John O. E. Clark, *100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout History* (New York: Sterling, 2005).

⁹⁰ Arden Bucholz, *Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning* (New York: Berg, 1991), 28.

⁹¹ Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of German Unification* (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), 23.

were made by their failure to adequately recognize and spread cartographic information.⁹² Conventional wisdom held that the British failed in their operation because, in keeping with previous military “planning” as in the Boer and Crimean War, they went into the operation without adequate maps.⁹³ However, their research proved the operational planners had a great deal of cartographic information available to them; they just chose to ignore it.⁹⁴ They also helped to organize the international Terrain in Military History conference. This conference resulted in a published book of papers showing a potential way forward for military historians.⁹⁵ There is some hope that this historiographical mode of analysis has spread as indicated by a second conference and publication edited by two members of the United States Army Topographic Engineering Center.⁹⁶ All of these studies illustrate that a detailed analysis of the map, especially for the military historian, can result in insights not realized through another line of research.

⁹² Peter Chasseaud and Peter Doyle, *Grasping Gallipoli: Terrains, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915* (Spellmount, 2005), 45. One example they note is that while the Army and Navy agreed on the importance of Achi Baba for examining the defense of the narrows, “it was based on a misconception; the summit did not in fact give a direct view of the Narrows defenses, which were defiladed by intervening high ground... This suggests that key figure on the staff *could not read* [emphasis mine] the one-inch map, and did not understand the elementary concept of inter-visibility; the map gave perfectly good information on this point.”

⁹³ *Ibid.*, xv.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁹⁵ *Fields of Battle*, ed. Peter Doyle and Matthew Bennett (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002). A good example is the article “Terrain and the Messines Ridge” which used GIS data to examine how terrain might have influenced German tactical development. The article uncovered that the poor geology of the ridge and the high water-table in Belgian, ensured that trenches were of limited defensive capability. In doing so they note that geography played a catalytic role in bringing about the development of pillboxes and a defense-in-depth system. Doyle, et al., “Terrain and the Messines Ridge, Belgium, 1914-1918,” in *Fields of Battle*, eds. Peter Doyle and Matthew Bennett (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2002; 205-224), 220

⁹⁶ *Studies in Military Geography and Geology*, ed. Douglas R. Caldwell et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2004). This conference was held at the United States Military Academy in June, 2003, so there is hope many future scholars at the institution were able to attend and observe the conference.

In the case of Africa the role of the military has been studied but not in this specific context. Military historians tend to focus on the conquests themselves and the strategic and tactical developments in response to indigenous resistance.⁹⁷ African historians, in contrast, often explore the social development of these colonial forces, generally more concerned not with how the military force was used but its effect on those who served in it.⁹⁸ However, the role of the military did not end simply when the land was “conquered.” While military historians might take cartography as a false-constant, those historians who study development of colonial control take peace as theirs. Only through the use of “boots on the ground” can the solidification of colonial rule occur. In both German and British East Africa the role of force will be shown to be critical in the success of their imperial ventures. Whether the *Schutztruppe* or the forces of the IBEA, violence was an ever present constant in the conquest and administration of these colonies. Even more importantly the map will be shown a motivating force for this violence. Often, force was applied in order to achieve the ends that were “conquered” on the map. Attempting to make real what the map indicated led to some of the greatest violence in eastern Africa.

⁹⁷ For example Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998).

⁹⁸ See Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: the Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1991) and Timothy H. Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 1999).

This examination of colonial eastern Africa will, therefore, blend a diverse set of historical methods and practices in order to shed light on an understudied topic. The map has often been ignored by historians as we have relegated maps, “along with paintings, photographs and other nonverbal sources to a lower division of evidence than the written word.”⁹⁹ What this study will show is the way in which the map served as a critical tool in the creation of empire and by proper analysis how it can serve as a critical source in assessing the creation and growth of empire. This work will blend the fine work of cartographic historians with those of colonial, African, and military historians to bring these discrete studies into an argumentative whole. While map historians have exposed a great deal concerning the tools of cartographic analysis they have too often languished in their own discrete field. Often they have failed to heed J.B. Harley that context is central to any cartographic interpretation and should not be dismissed as general background.¹⁰⁰ At the same time historians have remained oblivious to cartographic history, not recognizing that maps serve as an important conceptual marker in the growth of states and empires. It is “precisely through the process of making a power situation appear a fact in the nature of the world that traditional authority works.”¹⁰¹ Historians, not having incorporated cartographic studies into their work, have accepted the “rhetoric of

⁹⁹ J.B. Harley, “Texts and Contexts in the Interpretation of Early Maps,” in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 34-49), 34.

¹⁰⁰ He notes that the relationship between context and map should be seen as a dialogue with the text. *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁰¹ Maurice Bloch, “Symbols, Song, Dance and Features of Articulation: Is Religion an Extreme Form of Traditional Authority?” *European Journal of Sociology* 15, no. 1 (1974; 54-81), 79.

neutrality” a map offers and ignored that maps inscribe a topographic “social order” as much as a geographic one.¹⁰² The map documents the entire colonial process and can shed light on old historical questions while exposing new avenues of further research. Therefore, this work will serve an important purpose in drawing together colonial, military, and cartographic history together to see the utility of diverse fields of focus and methodology. I believe it will marry the best from two disciplines—mapping specialists’ sensitivity to changes in texts, historians’ sensitivity to changes in context—which have scarcely been introduced to each other. My hope is that this work will help expose historians to the injunction that “history is not intelligible without geography,” and that this will provide a historical route-sketch that other historians may follow.¹⁰³

¹⁰² J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” In *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 150-168), 157, 168.

¹⁰³ Alan R. H. Baker, *Geography and History: Bridging the Divide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.

Chapter 2: Maps and Models

Now the road through Michael's section, though it looked well on the map
For the use it was intended wasn't really worth a rap.
And at night was not unlikely to occasion some mishap.
It was nicely planned on paper, and was ruled without remorse
Over cliffs, and spurs and gullies, with a straight and even course
Which precluded locomotion on part of man or horse.¹⁰⁴

“A map says to you, ‘Read me carefully, follow me closely, doubt me not...I am the earth in the palm of your hand.’¹⁰⁵ This quotation encapsulates the thoughts most of us have concerning a map. Whether to guide a family vacation or a military maneuver, maps are held to be a literal depiction of the world. In the age of the Global Positioning System this trust of maps has reached almost obscene levels. A case in point would be a German driver who “successfully” followed his GPS system straight into a pile of sand at a construction site.¹⁰⁶ That two other British drivers drove into water and off a cliff respectively while following GPS directions, illustrate that maps can become privileged over our own eyesight.¹⁰⁷ Another humorous example, more related to the period under

¹⁰⁴ Rhyme created in reference to the map used in New Zealand in the 1840s covering Nelson, Taranaki and Otago. R. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, *The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 320.

¹⁰⁵ Beryl Markham quoted in John Noble Wilford, *The Mapmakers* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 14.

¹⁰⁶ “Driver follows GPS into Sand,” *News.com.au*, <http://www.news.com.au/story/0.23599.20555319-13762.00.html> (accessed May 24, 2007).

¹⁰⁷ Simon de Bruxelles, “Sat-nav dunks dozy drivers in deep water,” *The Times*, April 20, 2006, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article707216.ece> (accessed May 24, 2007); “Drivers on edge over

study, is the mountains of Kong which were supposed to have stretched along most of West Africa as indicated by James Rennell on two maps documenting Mungo Park's journey to the Niger River.¹⁰⁸ For almost a century, even with numerous expeditions along routes that should have brought them into contact with these mountains, maps continued to list this mythical mountain chain.¹⁰⁹ Past bringing forth a chuckle, these stories underscore the reality and unreality of a map. A map is taken by its reader to accurately represent reality, yet, "like other visual images, communicate[s] influential impressions of reality, not reality itself."¹¹⁰

It is likely we would be far less trusting of the map if we were aware of how it was created. The very process of map making ensures that the readers will be lied to.¹¹¹ Depending on the scale or purpose of the map, a variety of distortions can creep in.¹¹² Sometimes these distortions are happenstance, but generally there are careful decisions made by a cartographer to ensure a map's legibility. The legibility of a map is the result of balancing the demands of accuracy with serving the needs of its user. A perfect map,

cliff route." *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/north_yorkshire/4879026.stm (accessed May 24, 2007)

¹⁰⁸ Thomas J. Bassett and Philip W. Porter, "'From the Best Authorities': The Mountains of Kong in the Cartography of West Africa," *Journal of African History* 32 (1991; 367-413), 367.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 395. Within the article he lists, taking up three pages entirely, a series of small boxes depicting the West African coast and illustrating the numerous ways in which the Kong mountains were depicted in map after map even though no one ever saw them - illustrating the conceptual power and hold a map can have over the human mind. This was not simply a problem confined to Africa as the mislabeling of three major rivers in the US by a Mexican mapmaker were used until the late 1830s. Donna J. Peuquet, *Representations of Space and Time* (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 145

¹¹⁰ Wilford, 16.


¹¹¹ Mark Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1. He suggests they are "white" lies but, as our mothers told us, a lie is still a lie.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 6, 35.

such as the 1:1 scale map documented in Lewis Carroll's *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* might be accurate but as it could "never be unfolded, for it would block the sun from the farmer's fields," cartographers have chosen to value utility as much as accuracy. In simple terms, changes are made to make a map "user friendly" and easier to read. An example would be a river and road running parallel to one another. While in reality they might run side-by-side the map-maker might adjust the depicted distance in order for the viewer to more easily determine the road from the river. While these changes on the surface seem cosmetic, they fulfill the larger goal of the cartographer which is to, "avoid disequilibrium, voids, and blank spaces," because having these in the map "would be so many ways to visually acknowledge his inability to contain the totality of the world in the web of knowledge and language."¹¹³ Thus, despite the necessity of any correction, it is in the interest of the map-maker to claim complete and utter accuracy because maps are as much a representation of their author as they are a representation of the world. A series of choices, from color to scale, are always made to construct the most useful reality in accordance with the purpose of the map.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Jacob, 264.

¹¹⁴ Monmonier, *Maps, Distortion, and Meaning*, 11, Winichakul, 52, Wood, 24.



Map 2.1: Comparison of Map Projections. Projection Comparison.

<http://mikel.agirregabiria.net/2006/peters.jpg> (accessed February 17, 2009).

That maps are creations, rather than depictions of reality, is observed in the contentious debates regarding map projections.¹¹⁵ The Mercator Projection is generally considered the best projection, especially in accurately depicting distances and direction for the purposes of navigation. However, the projection distorts the world in a way that enlarges land the farther it is from the equator.¹¹⁶ The most common complaint about the Mercator Projection is that it makes Greenland roughly the size of the African continent. Those who critique this projection suggest there is more than navigational interest behind the distortion. Cognizant of the realities of power, some have suggested that the projection is a way of expressing the dominance of the West over those they consider the “Third World.” The Peters Projection was created to rectify this problem by centering the map on the equator and giving the requisite space on the map to the amount of land occupied. However, the Peters Projection carries its own distortions that tend to flatten Russia and thus presents just as apparent misrepresentations as the Mercator. It is evident that there is fundamentally no “correct” projection past the criteria established by the map’s maker. Whatever the merits of the specific projections, they do highlight the implicit, and sometimes explicit, connection between maps and non-scientific interests. It is important to recognize that maps are not neutral artifacts but are invested with the same biases as any other source. Several examples should suffice.

¹¹⁵ Refer to Map 2.1 for a comparison of the projections listed.

¹¹⁶ Wilford, 98-99.

The Polar projection map centers its projection on the North Pole, providing a quite different view of the world than the typical Mercator Projection.¹¹⁷ Its growth as a projection was not tied to science but Cold War politics. By centering the map on the North Pole, Russia was positioned closer to the United States and appeared to be enveloping it. The United States Air Force used this projection to make a two-tiered argument about the nature of the threat the Soviet Union posed, and the superior capability of the USAF to defend the nation. First and foremost, the projection was used to convince the generally isolationist public that they could no longer trust the oceans to be effective moats against foreign enemies. Second, with the clear ability of the Soviet Union, as shown in the projection, to fly and hit either coast of the United States, it established the “fact” that in the age of nuclear weapons the only service capable of defending the United States against attack was the Air Force. There was also a more mercenary motive behind this effort. Having been created as a separate branch only in late-1947, the USAF needed to establish its *raison d’être* while competing with the Navy and Army for resources. Establishing a threat which only the Air Force was capable of meeting through an extensive bomber force and fighter/radar defensive net would ensure its survival as a separate military branch and a privileged position in the defense budget.¹¹⁸ Another example comes from the Cold War in the official maps of Moscow

¹¹⁷ See Map 2.2 for an example of this projection.

¹¹⁸ This also led to the militarization of northern Canada as it had been transformed from a relatively ignored section of the country into an “exposed flank.” P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The

made by the Soviet Union. These maps accurately laid out the streets of Moscow with one exception; they deleted the city block that contained the KGB headquarters.¹¹⁹ It does not need to be for such geopolitical reasons that choices such as these are made. Most modern maps carry with them a subtle, yet for those aware of the actual geography a glaring, mistake on each sheet. This is to ensure that if anyone were to copy the map, its makers would be able to point to this “mistake” as proof of plagiarism.¹²⁰ Thus, the accuracy of the world can be manipulated for both the most highly political and most practical of ends.

Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing A Northern Environment,” *Environmental History* 12, no. 4 (October 2007; 920-950), 922.

¹¹⁹ Jacob, 274.

¹²⁰ From a conversation with Dr. Geoffrey Parker in regards to the Collins-Bartholomew Map company, but the point applies to other map-makers as well. April 22, 2008.



Map 2.2: The USAF view of the Cold War. Polar Stereographic

<http://www.mgaqua.net/AquaDoc/Projections/img/Polar%20Stereographic.jpg> (accessed February 17, 2009).

As the forgoing discussion shows, maps are an intellectual and social construct. As John K. Wright presciently noted, “The trim, precise, and clean-cut appearance that a well-drawn map presents lends it an air of scientific authenticity that may or may not be deserved.”¹²¹ A map is designed to mediate reality through the vision and goals of the map-maker. Thus, mapping can be defined as a process where spatial reality is transformed through decisions by the cartographer to create a depiction of reality.¹²² In the case of the United States Air Force the most *useful* perception of reality was created via the Polar projection. With this definition in mind, the importance of the map for conquest and control cannot be overstated. Indeed, maps are the perfect symbol of the state:

Simply take a sheet of paper, plot some cities, roads, and physical features, draw a heavy, distinct boundary around as much territory as you dare claim, color it in, add a name...and presto, you are now the leader of a new sovereign, autonomous country...it’s on a map, so it must be real.¹²³

Tongue-in-cheek though the quotation might be Monmonier’s point on mapping is quite true. For many of us, “it’s on a map, so it must be real” encapsulates our understanding of cartography. Modern cartography presents nations “as if they were natural,” allowing people to believe nations possess a scientific quality beyond the realm of politics.¹²⁴

Maps are presented as a physical trump to any suggestion that nations, “are constructed,

¹²¹ Wright, from “Map Makers are Human” quoted in Monmonier, *Maps, Distortion, and Meaning*, 43.

¹²² Winichakul, 52.

¹²³ Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, 88.

¹²⁴ Winichakul, 50.

carved, inscribed, fabricated.”¹²⁵ In sum, if the nation is imagined as Benedict Anderson argues, then the map is an artifact of that collective imagination.¹²⁶

Sovereignty does not merely delineate national borders and in the same way maps do more than delineate the shell of a nation.¹²⁷ The map has also been used as an effective tool for governance and internal control. One way in which the map aided the state was through making the nation, and its people, much more legible. Legibility is defined as a quality a map possesses that denotes the information needed to achieve the purposes demanded under its particular gaze.¹²⁸ The greater the detail a map provides, “the more redundant and confusing the map becomes,” and it is only “through simplification of the complexity of the real world that maps derive their expressive power.”¹²⁹ Legibility is the continuing process where the cartographic representation is constructed in order to fulfill its purpose. The pre-Modern state was in a sense blind as it concerned its citizens and the land. The shift to the modern in terms of the state was to take complex local practices and turn them into something simple and manageable.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Winichakul, 129.

¹²⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

¹²⁷ John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 121. While his book covers the creation and use of documentation for state control over movement, the map fits in well with his rubric of a “Crustacean Type” of nation; one which has the ability to not only define what is “in” but prove what is “out”.

¹²⁸ As Ian Barrow notes on surveys, “this context determined what was surveyed, how it was surveyed, who surveyed it and for what purpose it was surveyed.” Barrow, *Surveying and Mapping in Colonial Sri Lanka 1800-1900*, 193.

¹²⁹ Peuquet, 151.

¹³⁰ James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.

The map is a perfect tool for destroying local monopolies of knowledge, which allows for greater central, or state, control. State officials reveled in the map as it privileged those at the top who possessed a state-centric view of the world.¹³¹ Legibility goes hand in hand with power, as the level of manipulation a state can exert is constrained by the level of knowledge or “sight” that the state possesses.¹³² A minimal state goal requires minimal information, but increasing demands necessitate more detailed knowledge about an area and its people.¹³³ The relationship between state demands and information is why so much effort was put into the early cadastral maps which would make all propertied individuals legible for taxation efforts. Cadastral maps, which record individual land parcels, were a key instrument for the “extension and consolidation of power, not just of the propertied individual, but of the nation-state and the capitalist system which underlies it.”¹³⁴ A host of opportunities are created once this knowledge is in the hands of the state. Maps turn land and people into a “thing” that can be molded to suit the interests of the state. Consider the effect on the senses when you achieve enough height to look down on a section of town, whether from a tall building or an airplane. Not only does the world seem more understandable, especially in comparison to the chaotic hustle-and-bustle that

¹³¹ Ibid., 77.

¹³² Ibid., 183.

¹³³ Ibid., 184.

¹³⁴ Kain and Baigent, 8. This statement should be taken with the caveat that cadastral maps were not solely used within the capitalist framework, and were created and used heavily during pre-capitalist periods of history. However, within the context of this paper the cadastral map is critically related to the capitalist enterprise, especially in the Development stage of the colony.

would be seen at street-level, but by extension the world appears malleable.¹³⁵ Multiply that feeling common to many of us, which itself illustrates how maps have conditioned us to think, by the possession of the power to change what you see and it becomes evident why maps seemed an aphrodisiac to rulers. Maps were “not just maps” in the hands of the state since these maps, “when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade.”¹³⁶ While in reference to the High Modernist enterprises, James C. Scott’s verdict on maps holds no less true in the earliest periods of state formation or in the colonial ventures into Africa.

In addition to state purposes the map commoditizes the world. In the same way as politicians use a map to make the world legible, the capitalist uses maps to make the world economically manageable. Rather than a confusing intersection of the realities on the ground, maps can be made to document solely the commodities within a given region separate from any sense of the people involved. Reducing the world to its component parts of commodities and infrastructure allows for an easy application of the capitalist mind to a given locale. Morton Stanley, the famous explorer of Africa, was well aware of this power, hoping “the manufacturer or merchant” would “study [maps] with the view

¹³⁵ This is part of the reason that strategic video games, such as the popular *Civilization* series, give the user this very view (often referred to as the “God-view”); the world appears sensible and controllable from this perspective.

¹³⁶ Scott, 3.

of planning commercial campaigns” as “generals study them before planning campaigns.”¹³⁷

One issue that must be addressed is how these meanings have been imprinted on the map. Therefore, it is critical that the models inferring this study be explored in-depth. The genesis of this, and many other studies on cartography, lies with the extensive work of J.B. Harley. In numerous articles Harley appealed for scholars to recognize the conceptual power of the map. In the first case he sought to help scholars see that maps were not distinct from other historical sources but a text as worthy of study as any other.¹³⁸ Drawing on the principles of Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida, he endeavored to show how the seemingly neutral cartographic facts were filled with metaphorical meanings.¹³⁹ Utilizing literary principles he suggested that maps possessed certain grammar that if understood could unlock the meanings of the map.¹⁴⁰ He argued that any map possessed two systems of rules: the rules of cartography as established by the discipline; and social rules where “signifying systems” serve to communicate a social

¹³⁷ Stanley quoted in Driver, *Geography Militant*, 117.

¹³⁸ “In the same sense that other nonverbal sign systems – paintings, prints, theatre, films, television, music – are texts...images laden with intentions and consequences that can be studied in the societies of their time.” Harley, “Texts and Contexts,” 36.

¹³⁹ For critiques of his arguments see: Jeremy W. Crampton, “Maps as Social Constructions: Power, Communication and Visualization,” *Progress in Human Geography*, 25 (2001): 235-252; Andrews, 2-32; and Barbara Belyea, “Images of Power: Derrida/Foucault/Harley” *Cartographica* 29 (1992): 1-9.

¹⁴⁰ In another way he was also analyzing maps from a semiotic (the “science of signs) perspective where each sign represents a relationship between an expression, such as a color or figure in the map key, and its referent (the content depicted). “The contention made is that maps are imbued with meaning by virtue of semiotic relationships. For a good overview of the relationship between Semiotics and map interpretation see Chapter 5 (A Primer on Semiotics for Understanding Map Representation) in Alan M. MacEachren, *How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design* (New York: Guilford Press, 1995).

¹⁴¹ Harley, “Texts and Contexts,” 45.

order.¹⁴¹ Some of these signs appear obvious such as size. Harley argued that size, from the scale of the map to the size of certain symbols or script, illustrated hierarchies the map wanted to impart.¹⁴² Another could be the bounding of the map, in terms of what was contained within the pane of the map, which could isolate or privilege certain areas of the world.¹⁴³ However, his most important insight into maps was exposing the silences of the map. These empty spaces on the map were not due to mere absence of knowledge but a “deliberate withholding of information.”¹⁴⁴ He saw these spaces as pregnant with meaning and suggested that it was important to study what was *absent* from the map as what was present.¹⁴⁵ Harley is also extremely important for his role in spreading these ideas about the importance of understanding map meanings.¹⁴⁶ Hardly any work in this section does not cite Harley in some fashion, and his role in freeing scholars to think critically about the map cannot be overstated.

One of the first practical models informing this study is Ian Barrow’s work on five types of maps used by Britain to create and possess India. Considering his focus, Barrow was pressed to illustrate why his work was distinct in comparison to Matthew Edney’s *Mapping an Empire*. Barrow wanted to address the “construction of territory”

¹⁴¹ Harley, “Texts and Contexts,” 45.

¹⁴² Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” 69.

¹⁴³ For example, a map centered on Jerusalem would carry deep religious meanings that would be wedded beyond the mere surface depiction of the map itself. *Ibid.*, 66.

¹⁴⁴ Andrews, 15.

¹⁴⁵ J.B. Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” in Harley, J.B. *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 54-107), 86.

¹⁴⁶ As creator and editor of the *History of Cartography* series he did a great deal to spread knowledge about the creation, use, and meaning of cartography. After his death it was feared this series would atrophy, but other scholars have picked up his torch with the intention of completing the rest of the planned volumes.

suggesting there was “more to the legitimating project than the trigonometrical surveyor’s claim that the use of accurate scientific methods would reveal knowledge about India.”¹⁴⁷ His premise is accurate and as it relates to the construction of German and British East Africa the colonies were not merely masses of contour lines but political and social constructions as well. Barrow used five approaches, with five different maps, to illustrate how India was constructed in the minds of the British. These approaches have been mentioned previously, and two of them are applicable to this study:

Associative History and Progressive History.¹⁴⁸ Associative maps implied ownership and Barrow noted how dedications and cartouches were used to signify control. This study will adopt his principles but apply it in a new way to modern cartography. Almost none of the maps of this colonial period possess a dedication or cartouche. This is somewhat of a chronological issue as the “Scramble” occurred when cartouches had fallen out of favor within the increasingly professionalized cartographic field.¹⁴⁹ These romantic

¹⁴⁷ Barrow, *Making History*, 9.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 17-19. I will not be using the latter three constructs he elaborates on. Reverential History, in which the possession is shown through honoring an individual, does not really apply in German or British East Africa. He takes as his example the naming of Everest after George Everest, and past a few cities, there is no attempt to do the same in Tanganyika and Kenya. As for Romantic History, in which Barrow elaborates that the stories about using native Indians to do early-style surveying as an example of British rule “lifting up” the native population were also absent in both colonies. Lastly, Nostalgic History, which traced the conquest and “sought to display moments in which British control over territory originated,” does not apply in this study. As the maps were often used to show European colonial permanence there may have even been incentive to hide any such battles. Although it might be just as likely that absent any famous “battles” for control, similar to the Battle of Plessey in India, there is little to warrant an entire map on colonial conquest.

¹⁴⁹ However, this can be rectified by using Harley’s formulation that symbology was ubiquitous in the modern map and thus the “traditional discontinuity” between a “decorative” phase and a ‘scientific’ phase of mapping, can be recognized as a myth.” Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” 77.

touches seemed out of place in a field dedicated to refinement and greater scientific accuracy. Yet, this associative power of ownership can still be recognized in the modern cartographic creation. This type of map falls broadly under the gaze of the Despot. Instead of signs and cartouches a progressive map shows possession through the use of more accurate knowledge. Barrow suggests that one could rule, hence possess, a territory once it was constructed more accurately.¹⁵⁰ This same principle is illustrated in the growing accuracy and detail of the maps made under the gaze of the Developer. As the colonies expanded, control was solidified through increased knowledge of the territory and its progressive inscription of this conquest via the medium of the map.

To adapt Barrow's associative history for use in the 19th Century involves the addition of the work of John Noyes. In *Colonial Space: Spatiality in the discourse of German South West Africa*, he sees two "gazes" behind any cartographic work.¹⁵¹ The first is that of the Despot, defined as the gaze of the state, which seeks to bound and measure off the control of the government. The second gaze is that of the Developer who looks at the land not for what it is, or how it can be possessed, but how it can be turned into something productive.¹⁵² These two gazes he argues apply to Germany as "the conflict between the social representation of the State...and the demand of capital is a

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 18.

¹⁵¹ His terminology was absorbed into the model of this study.

¹⁵² "Whereas the colonizing gaze of the scientist looks at the specific and negates it in a universalizing gesture, the gaze of the developer focus on its specificity in order to negate it within a scenario of capitalist production." Noyes, 116, 215.

constant one throughout the history of German colonialism.”¹⁵³ These gazes have been adopted for this overall model as this tension applies to Britain as well. However correct these two gazes might be, it does raise the question of how to prove the existence of either of these gazes on a map. Barrow used James Rennell’s *A Bengal Atlas* as his case study for possession through associative history. The cartouches used in this atlas were “inscriptions or dedications...designed to make the province unthreatening and familiar.”¹⁵⁴ These types of dedications had a long history of implied possession going back to cadastral surveys dedicated to the landlords who commissioned them.¹⁵⁵ Thus, a cartouche that connected the British East India Company to British colonialism would allow the viewer to recognize Bengal and believe it was possessed. The company also had an additional purpose in helping their British audience imagine they were involved in this act of possession. Barrow points out that the Company was suffering from an image crisis and used this map as part of a public relations ploy to make the public see them as not the British East India *Company* but as the *British* East India Company.¹⁵⁶ Given the paucity of cartouches, however, the only “dedication” that might parallel Barrow’s construct is an acknowledgement of who commissioned the map. In some cases this applies, as in the German Sugar Company which commissioned a map of the Pangani River to assess what land was suitable for sugar cane production, but this is the

¹⁵³ Ibid., 119.

¹⁵⁴ Barrow, *Making History*, 36.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 47.

¹⁵⁶ Barrow., 48. An additional example of this is a sketch of the Battle of Plessey included in the Atlas which identifies Company soldiers as *British* soldiers. (53)

exception.¹⁵⁷ The only way to possess the tools to show these gazes is to turn to a final work.

Rather than look for dedications, Christian Jacob suggests that a map can help spread stereotypes, including ownership, that are “ready to be engraved in the imagination and in the memory of its readers,” in a variety of subtle ways.¹⁵⁸ While he does not discuss Barrow’s book, it seems that he would contend that the map itself, from the smallest geographical mark to the title, is one large “cartouche” that involves the viewer in the possession of the territory depicted. For example, he suggests that the title of a map is “a symbolic sign that happens to sanction the congruence of the individual mental image with the socially validated one.”¹⁵⁹ Thus, when one looks at a map entitled France we expect it to conform to the socially and politically validated entity we define as “France.” The very act of gridding and bordering a map invites the viewer “to look at what the image represents not as a part of the world...but as a statement about the world.”¹⁶⁰ In these and other ways Jacob suggests every part of the map is heavily laden with meaning. He echoes the words of the philosopher-king of cartography, J.B. Harley, that “every map of the world contributes to codifying, legitimizing and promulgating the

¹⁵⁷ B. Hassenstein and C. Schmidt, *Der Unterlauf des Pangani Flusses für das Zuckersyndikat für Deutsch-Ostafrika* [map] 1:80,000, (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1896), this map is later shown in Chapter 5 (Map 5.1 and 5.2).

¹⁵⁸ Jacob, 182.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁶⁰ Rudolf Arnheim, *The Power of the Center: A Study of Composition in the Visual Arts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 55, quoted in Jacob, 108.

dominant vision in a given period and society.”¹⁶¹ Deconstructing colonial maps and illustrating how color, scale, map key, title, and bounding were used to create meaning will expose how the map played such a critical role in solidifying and justifying colonialism.¹⁶²

One final cartographic element should be brought out and that is the nature of the Paramap. Borrowing terminology from French literary theorist Gérard Genette, Denis Wood & John Fels document how the map is an argument made up of propositions.¹⁶³ These propositions are not simply located in the map itself but also in the component parts of the paramap. The paramap is an umbrella term for two map features, the perimap and the epimap. The perimap consists of some previously noted elements including the title and decorative elements surrounding the map itself. In addition, it includes any charts, illustrations, legends, or credits that help ensure that the ideological purpose of the map is proven.¹⁶⁴ The epimap consists of further elements, removed from the map itself, such as articles accompanying the map, advertisements that refer to the map, which also serve to indicate its purpose.¹⁶⁵ As these are rather nebulous terms some examples will help in understanding the terminology. The most evident feature of the epimap in this

¹⁶¹ J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” *Cartographica* 26, no. 2 (1989): 6.

¹⁶² Maps, like an alphabet, are “both coded, and the decoding is accessible to anyone who has the opportunity and the willingness to learn the signs. The decoding processes differ, however. A map displays its decoding key through the title and the legend.” Mbodj, 39.

¹⁶³ Denis Wood and John Fels. *The Natures of Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the Natural World* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008), xv.

¹⁶⁴ Wood and Fels, 9.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

study will consist of documentary evidence surrounding the map itself. In some cases, they may consist of articles submitted to the journal of the Royal Geographic Society and in others the governmental documents on border delineation. In both cases these features add a stamp of credibility to the map and add an implicit ideological component to the map. A good example of the paramap is, to return to the beginning of this chapter, the Peters projection. As Denis and Wood point out, Peter's projection was not revolutionary as it was identical to James Gall's 1885 Orthographic Projection. What caused the stir and debate was therefore not the map but the *paramap* surrounding his projection. In an essay on the side-bar of the map he declared that his projection "provides a helpful corrective to the distortions of traditional maps," and that his projection was the map the modern world deserved.¹⁶⁶ In addition to helping identify additional ideological features of the map the paramap also signifies that it will not be one single element but the interrelationship between these components that indicates a map's position in a respective gaze.¹⁶⁷

While incorporating and synthesizing these models from a variety of authors, I will also add my own gaze – that of the Discoverer. While Noyes brought out the importance of the gaze of the Despot and Developer, the missing element in all of these studies,

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 11. An additional element of the furor was an epimap feature, Arno Peter's "inflammatory book" *The New Cartography*. The best way to encapsulate its reception is quoting Arthur Robinson's opening sentence of his review of Peter's book, "The review of a book such as *The New Cartography* would ordinarily be short since much of it is misrepresentation, is illogical and erroneous, and one's initial reaction is simply to dismiss it as being worthless."

¹⁶⁷ "It is in this second stage of finding interrelationships that is critical in graphic perception, because it is within this arrangement and variation that the message lies." Peuquet, 141.

borrowing from Harley's argument concerning silences, is the meaning of blank space on a modern map. Some elements have been identified. In the first place, it is a sign of the increasing desire for scientific accuracy within the field of cartography. Prior to this modern period, any blank spaces would have been taken up with a cartouche or image. This was the critique behind the quip of Jonathan Swift in *On Poetry: A Rhapsody*: "so geographers in Afric-maps/With savage-pictures fill their gaps/And o'er uninhabitable downs/Place elephants for want of towns."¹⁶⁸ The appearance of blanks shows a privileging of Western scientific methods in the place of indigenous or amateur knowledge.¹⁶⁹ No longer would a vague sketch be sufficient, but instead a scientifically based representation would be demanded. Additionally, once science was the driving force behind cartography, "white space" could no longer be a canvas. A canvas was transformed into a gap which was an "offense against logic" and "a reproach upon the present age."¹⁷⁰ It also served as an affront to a cartographer by exposing their, "inability to contain the totality of the world in the web of knowledge and language."¹⁷¹ While the meaning of these white spaces has been elaborated on, very few have made the jump to seeing these gaps as a motivating force for exploration and conquest. Winichakul, in *Siam Mapped*, noted that mapmaking created its own mission to "fill in the blank spaces"

¹⁶⁸ Jacob, 14.

¹⁶⁹ Bassett, 322-323.

¹⁷⁰ Paul Carter, "Dark with Excess of Bright: Mapping the Coastlines of Knowledge," in *Mappings*, ed. Dennis Cosgrove, 125-148 (London: Reaktion Books, 1999): 129, and Peter Whitfield, *New Found Lands: Maps in the History of Exploration* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 169.

¹⁷¹ Jacob, 264.

of the map but generally did not expand upon this point.¹⁷² In general, these gaps have only been viewed through the gaze of the Developer, never that of the Discoverer.

Therefore, this work will synthesize and expand upon previous models by drawing on the exploration of the east African coast. This additional gaze will serve to draw a period often seen as benign or separate from the colonial process, into stark relief. Explorers were *not* neutral observers. They helped create the vision of “boundless available land awaiting occupation” which was “controlled by coordinate of latitude and longitude.”¹⁷³ These efforts to fill in the gaps with knowledge laid the foundation for colonial success.

The gaze of the Discoverer will be illustrated in three ways. First, the blanks on the map drove exploration. For many an egotistic desire to be the first to “color in” a section of the map propelled them into the interior of Africa.¹⁷⁴ Initial exploration was left to “intrepid individuals,” and only after colonization had taken root did it shift “to the big bucks and the big battalions.”¹⁷⁵ This is aptly illustrated in Winwood Reade’s Map of African Literature, published in his *African Sketchbook*. Published in 1873, this map shows the outline of the Continent of Africa, but in place of geographic or national details, the names of the explorers are placed on the part of the continent they “discovered.” For example, “Livingstone” is emblazoned in bright black letters across

¹⁷² Winichakul, 114.

¹⁷³ Harley, J.B, “New England Cartography and the Native Americans,” in *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001; 170-195), 187.


¹⁷⁴ See Map 2.3 for a literal interpretation of this desire.

¹⁷⁵ Fernandez-Armesto, 356.

the continent from the Congo to Tanganyika. In addition, the author chose to enlarge the lettering of each explorer depending on the scope and importance of their discoveries.¹⁷⁶ This is also an expansion on the power of naming as noted by several map specialists.¹⁷⁷ While they localized the power of naming in nature, such as naming Mount Everest after George Everest, this study will suggest that the desire to “name” the map was just as strong. Through successive waves of explorers, the blanks provided a motive for exploration on a continental and then a local scale in eastern Africa.

¹⁷⁶ Winwood Reade, “Map of African Literature” in *African Sketchbook* (1873) reprinted in Driver, 105.

¹⁷⁷ Jacob, 205; Barrow, 18, and Zbigniew Bialas, *Mapping Wild Gardens: The Symbolic Conquest of South Africa* (Verlag: die Blaue Eule, 1997), 109.



Map 2.3: Winwood Reade. *A Map of African Literature*. Scale unknown. In *The African Sketchbook Vol II* (1873), in Felix Driver. *Geography Militant*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 105.

Second, the act of exploration created a space suitable for conquest. By gridding the world according to the laws of cartography, the Europeans created a territory that was able to be conquered. Previously, Africa had been considered “terra nullius” but the act of exploration transformed the continent into a “tabula rasa” which was capable of being inscribed with claims of ownership.¹⁷⁸ The nature of this slate was created by the map. By gridding the land in latitude and longitude the land of Africa was transformed into legible territory. As blanks were converted into rivers and mountains in the symbology of the map the exotic and mysterious nature of Africa was diminished. The standardization of symbols, referred to by Harley as the “golden calf” of cartography as it lent order to the cartographic vision, ensured that as Africa was discovered it “looked” like Europe.¹⁷⁹ While the terrain was different these explorers helped make sense of the continent and prepared the ground for subsequent gazes. The blanks which had formerly driven exploration now drove conquest. To an imperialist the blanks on a map, “rather than interpreting them as the limits of knowledge of African geography... presumed that the empty spaces were vacant and awaiting colonists”¹⁸⁰ These blanks were thus devoid of people and resistance, and needed only to be occupied and filled in cartographically. Thomas Bassett relates a quote by Ferdinand Lesseps that illustrates this quite clearly. In discussing an expedition by Gustave Binger, Lesseps described how “one of the largest

¹⁷⁸ Black, 202.

¹⁷⁹ Harley, “Deconstructing the map,” in *The New Nature of Maps*, 162.

¹⁸⁰ Bassett, 324.

blank spaces remaining on the map of Africa is to find itself *attacked* by the lines of Captain Binger's march."¹⁸¹

Third, and this is one area where the separation between discrete fields causes a problem; the role of the military in "filling in" the blanks goes unnoticed. In most narratives concerning exploration, the shift in narrative from exploration to colonization is short, with the role of the military either taken as a given, considered a constant, or only referenced when one is able to show indigenous resistance to it. This is in contrast to the reality where violence was most often used "in the context of repression rather than conquest."¹⁸² The waves of exploration previously mentioned often found their end in the military wave of conquest that followed. After this final conquest of the contested ground, which was now inscribed through a map, the other two gazes, those of the Despot and Developer, were able to run free.

¹⁸¹ Bassett, 325. Emphasis mine.

¹⁸² Roland Oliver, *The African Experience* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1991), 199.

Chapter 3: “Geography Militant”

I do not much wish well to discoveries, for I am always afraid they will end in conquest and robbery.¹⁸³

Africa was for many the “Dark Continent” in a multitude of ways. In addition to serving as a racial epithet the continent also remained “dark” to the knowledge of the Europeans.¹⁸⁴ Jonathan Swift’s pithy verse on placing “elephants for want of towns” summed up the use of the interior of Africa for most cartographers. A perfect example is Vincenzo Coronelli’s 1690 map where instead of describing the interior of Africa, he simply gave up and placed a cartouche instead.¹⁸⁵ This was an improvement over the 1573 map suggesting the interior, from just below Egypt to the Cape, belonged to the empire of Praester John. The successive centuries did little to improve upon his “effort”. Herman Moll’s 1710 map of Africa implied that Ethiopia was in control of most of the unexplored interior. Yet even in making this claim he indicated his lack of knowledge with the additional note, under Ethiopia, that this country was “Wholly Unknown to

¹⁸³ Samuel Johnson, letter to W.S. Johnson, 14 March 1773 in Anthony Sattin, *The Gates of Africa* (St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 351.

¹⁸⁴ Which in and of itself, as only white European knowledge seemingly was “knowledge,” speaks volumes about European racial attitudes.

¹⁸⁵ Black, 204. In place of details he chose to put a cartouche containing a lion, a strange beaked “bird” with bat-like wings, and, yes, an elephant.


Europeans.”¹⁸⁶ This was not just a European problem, as an 1803 Arabic map of Africa, *Iklīm Africa*, left most of the interior of Africa blank.¹⁸⁷ As late as 1836, an American atlas still suggested that a long mountain chain ran, just inside the coastal region of eastern Africa, from Mombasa south to Mozambique.¹⁸⁸ On its face this seems like a small point but colonization required that Africa first become a discrete and legible entity.¹⁸⁹ Before the gazes of the Despot and of the Developer could be used Africa itself had to be “discovered.” Fundamentally both of these later gazes are “local” rather than global, being narrowly tailored to either the nation or the economy.

¹⁸⁶ Nathaniel Harris, *Mapping the World* (San Diego: Thunder Bay Press, 2002), 200.

¹⁸⁷ Ralph Ehrenberg, *Mapping the World* (Washington: National Geographic, 2005), 152. While numerous maps could be used to indicate this lack of sure knowledge it is helpful to be able to page through a number of maps in succession. Two good collections of early cartographic efforts concerning Africa are, Richard L. Betz, *The Mapping of Africa: A Cartobibliography of Printed Maps of the African Continent to 1700* (Netherlands: Hes DeGraaf, 2007) and Egon Kemp, *Africa auf Karten des 12.-18. Jahrhunderts* (Edition Leipzig: Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, 1968).

¹⁸⁸ See Map 3.1.

¹⁸⁹ Sanderson, 130.



Map 3.1: Vincenzo Coronelli. *Africa*. Scale not Given. In *100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout History*, ed. John O.E. Clark. New York: Sterling Publishing, 2005, 204.



Map 3.2: David H. Burr. *Africa*. In *A Universal Atlas: Comprising Separate Maps Of all the Principal Empires, Kingdoms & States Throughout the World and forming a distinct Atlas of the United States*. New York: D.S. Stone, 1836. JRL

Maps are critical for documenting this transformation of Africa as they provide the visual proof of new goals. Beyond the practical matters of logistics and transportation that can explain the lack of mapping of the interior of Africa until the 19th century, the fundamental principle of the map explains this deficit of knowledge. The implicit assumption behind the creation of any map is its intention for future use.¹⁹⁰ Prior to any plan, or need, for future engagement in a block of land, a map is not much more useful than word of mouth or the barest knowledge of the land. This understanding of the map adds an additional layer of the general narrative of the “Scramble for Africa” as typifying a period defined as “New Imperialism.” As in most dichotomous relationships, what defines this new imperialism that emerged in the latter half of the 19th Century is how it is *not* “Old Imperialism.” Broadly defined old imperialism was the period of European exploration and colonization from the early modern period to 1783. The goal of this period of imperialism was not conquest as much as trade.¹⁹¹ The nature of this trade was mercantile, primarily extractive, and non-territorial with the Europeans content to create a node of trade along a coastline. Thus, with a minimal exertion of resources the European traders were able to place trading centers in a suitable location to latch onto a nexus of local trade networks. Drawing out trade to these centers, for example the

¹⁹⁰ Bialas, 69.

¹⁹¹ A good example of a book documenting the map for just these purposes is the previously cited *Mapping for Money* by Kees Zandvliet. Covering the use of mapping in Dutch overseas expansion in the 16th and 17th centuries the maps were chiefly nautical charts made at points of economic importance. The map was given to administrators with the view that the map was “an aid to clarify military, economic, and administrative particularities in order to make sound decisions.” Zandvliet, 132, 135.

Portuguese colony of Goa, enabled the Europeans to acquire raw materials and goods from the interior that would be extremely difficult to acquire otherwise. If the nature of mapping is understood in terms of future use, the lack of knowledge of the interior of Africa makes perfect sense. During the period of “Old Imperialism,” where nodes of trade rather than square miles were the barometer of success, it is self-evident why knowledge of the interior was neither pursued nor desired. The benefit of these trade nodes was that with European inducement the interior would come to them. It was not necessary to have accurate knowledge because it was not needed. A perfect example of this would be the Dutch who, though established on the Cape for 250 years, never bothered to map the interior.¹⁹² In contrast, the period of “New Imperialism” involves new nations, new means, and most importantly new goals. Of great importance is the new means and how they interrelated to the new European goals. No longer content to sit on the coasts Europeans wanted to penetrate the interior to extract resources more efficiently.¹⁹³ While the means of advance are well established, Headrick’s Tools of Empire as good a starting point as any, the role of the map in this shift has not been well studied. Despite all of the military and industrial changes that are often suggested as the cause of this new imperialism, its genesis resides in select individuals with innocuous equipment designed not to kill but to observe.

¹⁹² Bialas, 47.

¹⁹³ The debate of what specifically prompted this desire is a large historiographical debate, briefly covered in the introduction, of which there are as many answers as there are historians writing on the topic.

It is no surprise that the gaze of the Discoverer would be the first of the three gazes considering the word itself. Before a territory can be politically controlled or economically developed it must be understood. Once measured, utilizing the structure and symbology of the map, a territory becomes legible and malleable to those who can understand the language of power embedded within the map. This is not to suggest the first gaze is a passive process, but rather involves the active creation of a space in which the state and other agents may operate. Correcting the idea of passivity is important in this period especially as terms such as bounding and measuring appear neutral. However, there is nothing innocuous in the act of measurement or exploration.¹⁹⁴ Maps are about making, “a ‘correct’ relational model of the terrain,” but what is correct is defined by the mind of the cartographer.¹⁹⁵ A map is a series of propositions, to borrow Dennis Wood’s phrasing, that rest on a fundamental assumption:

Its assumptions are that the objects in the world to be mapped are real and objective, and that they enjoy an existence independent of the cartographer; that their reality can be expressed in mathematical terms; that systematic observation and measurement offer the only route to cartographic truth; and that this truth can be independently verified.¹⁹⁶

Explorers, as they documented their routes into Africa, were performing the foundational work of colonialism. In this mapping is not different from many other uses of science in

¹⁹⁴ While one need not go as far as author Bruno Latour, who would argue scientific objects possess their own agency, the act of defining the world is always connected to a hierarchy, of whatever form, that serves the interest of the cartographer.

¹⁹⁵ Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” in *The New Nature of Maps*, 154.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

the colonial context. All types of measurements and experimentation served the ends of imperialism. In examining the role of French physicists and astronomers, seemingly even more removed from the act of colonization, Lewis Pyenson suggested that instead of being termed researchers they should instead be labeled as functionaries since they served the imperial purpose.¹⁹⁷ The connection between science and conquest was not tenuous, as “astronomy produced maps” while the wireless technology used by physicists to study the ionosphere “was a critical military technique,” and thus “for this reason [the military] acquiesced to scientific projects of little or no military significance.”¹⁹⁸ For all subsequent analysis of the role of maps it is necessary to see that science, so clearly tied to the military-industrial complex in the present, was no less the able auxiliary of colonization in the 19th Century.

Exploration was not a neutral endeavor and was “freighted with multiple and contested meanings, associated variously with science, literature, religion, commerce and empire.”¹⁹⁹ As in the peeling of an onion, there are even more layers to examine beneath the veneer of scientific neutrality. Returning to the example of the *Map of African Literature*, it is clear that one strong motive force for exploration were the egos of the explorers themselves. There was an intoxicating feeling that these explorers were “conquerors of truth” who served “as a missionary of science, extending the frontiers of

¹⁹⁷ Pyenson, 331.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 332.

¹⁹⁹ Driver, 2.

(European) geographical knowledge.”²⁰⁰ This connection to conquest for science can be shown in how explorers were awarded medals by geographic societies and their exploits memorialized in monuments.²⁰¹ Sir Thomas H. Holdich, writing a textbook on boundary mapping, captures the essence of the romantic explorer:

It is for him to penetrate into the wildest recesses of mountain systems, to discover the trend and the conformation of snowbound ridges and dividing chasms; to seek out from the depths of the forest the traces of primeval occupation, and the marking of farthest limits of civilization; to explore the sun baked desert wilderness, scraping casual acquaintance with wild-eyed and inquisitive nomads; to explore to their rocky sources some of the great rivers of the world, and withal, to keep the peace between hostile factions, and persuade them that all is working well for the best of all possible worlds.²⁰²

Only with the understanding of these romantic underpinnings can Joseph Conrad’s sad epitaph, written after the “filling in” of Africa, that the future explorer was, “condemned to make his discoveries on beaten tracks” be understood.²⁰³ Add to this the missionaries

²⁰⁰Driver, 4.

²⁰¹ Such as the monument to David Livingstone on the side of the Royal Geographic Society, the J.H. Speke monument in Kensington Gardens, London, and the Hermann von Wissmann statue in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

²⁰² Col. Sir. Thomas H. Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1916), 211. This quote is eerily similar to a statement by Cassidorius in his book *The Surveyor* (written in 540 A.C.E.) suggesting the eternal romance between the surveyor and his craft: “But the land surveyor is like a judge; the deserted fields become his forum, crowded with eager spectators. You would fancy him a madman when you see him walking along the most devious paths. But in truth he is seeking for the traces of lost facts in rough woods and thickets. He walks not as other men walk. His path is the book from which he reads; he shows what he is saying; he proves what he hath learned; by his steps he divides the rights of hostile claimants; and like a mighty river he takes away the fields of one side to deposit them to the other” Quoted in Edmond Kiely, *Surveying Instruments: Their History* (Columbus: Carben Surveying Reprints, 1979), 43.

²⁰³ Conrad, 134 quoted in Driver, 4.

who explored in order to save souls and traders who explored for profit, and the neutrality of the act of exploration falls away.

If exploration was not a neutral scientific endeavor, then it should best be seen as a process by which knowledge was used to create a territory that was capable of engaging the gaze of the Despot or Developer. The very process of exploration, which I term the wave thesis, suggests the non-neutral nature of exploration. Similar to the effect of waves along the coast, groups of explorers progressively built upon the work of those who came before to penetrate more deeply into the interior. Often, these waves were made up of very different individuals. In the case of eastern Africa dedicated explorers usually followed in the footsteps of earlier missionaries. In some cases traders and merchants also served as catalysts for later famous explorers like Burton and Stanley. Like the effect of waves upon the coastline these explorers gradually eroded what existed, whether blanks in geographic knowledge or the components of local knowledge, until all of Africa was brought under the western gaze of scientific cartography. What indigenous mapping that existed in Africa was distinctly local, and “the bird’s eye view convention was wholly foreign to them.”²⁰⁴ Similar to the process which occurred in Siam, modern cartography demanded the local knowledge, and local expressions of knowledge, be

²⁰⁴ Bialas, 78. Though, as noted in the introduction, African knowledge was a prerequisite for any exploratory success.

destroyed.²⁰⁵ By observation the early explorers served to demythologize and demystify the entire continent. By cataloging the world the Europeans were appropriating it and through their measurements, the world became “disciplined” and “normalized.”²⁰⁶ Rather than preserving local knowledge of the sacredness of a certain grove of trees, the same forest would be catalogued in relation to other geographic and lose its distinctiveness and power. Thus, the knowledge that did exist was absorbed into the dominant frame of vision of the scientific map. Beyond this, as seen in Map 3.3, explorers also captured territory by appropriating African knowledge for European purposes. The map below lists “native routes” from the coast to Lake Tanganyika. What routes existed were slowly being appropriated for the advancement of European knowledge. As will be seen it was not merely explorers who would appropriate these routes, but military units and even the railways. Each subsequent trip along that path would mean a deeper erasure of local knowledge as these native routes instead would become associated with a European explorer rather than the Africans who created the route in the first place.

²⁰⁵ Winichakul, 56. In the case of Siam local beliefs of sovereignty, which was not coterminous with the border and was capable of being shared, were destroyed in order to present Siam as a properly bounded “nation” to Europeans.

²⁰⁶ Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” 166.



Map 3.3: E.G. Ravenstein. *Native routes to the Masai country and to the Victoria Nyanza*. 1:2,000,000. Stanford's Geographical Establishment, 189-. JRL

The make-up of these several waves is not concrete, nor without overlap, but in general was the following progression: missionaries, explorers, and lastly colonizers. One should note that in the above map it indicates, in the upper right hand corner, that a missionary provided the native routes to the Royal Geographic Society. While missionaries seem a bit out of place, John Noyes points out:

It is no chance matter that, in the 19th century, the armies of colonization are always preceded by the missionaries and scientists, the one infusing space with the desire of an omnipresent authority, the other subjecting it to an omniscient gaze intent upon a tabulation of knowledge. It is this principle which serves to 'capture' the spaces it invades.²⁰⁷

An addition should be made to the above quote making note of the role traders served in the same process. While they did not infuse space with an omnipresent authority, they did graft onto the space an omnipresent profit motive. To appropriate a famous quation summarizing colonial motives in the New World, God and gold were the initial motives with glory, pursued by explorers and colonial soldiers, following thereafter. For example, the date for the beginning of this study comes not from a military unit but a missionary journey. It was in 1844 that German missionary-explorer Reverend Dr. Johann Ludwig Krapf established a small mission (Rabai) beyond the environs of Mombasa.²⁰⁸ From this small beginning he and another missionary, Reverend Johann Rebmann, would alight the European passion for the exploration of eastern African by glimpsing a snow-capped mountain in Africa. These same missionaries were also the

²⁰⁷ Noyes, 126.

²⁰⁸ Nigel Pavitt, *Kenya: The First Explorers* (London: Aurum Press, 1989), 18.

first to view Mount Kenya in 1851.²⁰⁹ Later missionaries helped create an early, subsequently false, map of the interior of Tanganyika showing a large lake connecting the actual lakes of Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa.²¹⁰ In addition, the pioneering role played by missionaries did not end after the initial encroachment into the interior but formed a pattern in African exploration. In 1875 it was newly arrived missionaries who first explored Nyasaland and proved that Lake Nyasa extended much further north than had been previously thought.²¹¹ Well before Frederick Lugard arrived in Uganda at the behest of the Imperial British East Africa Company, Catholic and Protestant missionaries had explored and been very active in converting Africans.²¹² As many of these missionaries made maps of their journeys they implicitly served as the first wave of colonization, as “to explore unknown country was in a sense to subdue it.”²¹³ German missionaries in particular were committed to colonialism because, “they felt that the German sword should be thrown into the balance against slave traders and heathen warlords.”²¹⁴

However, missionaries and traders need not be committed to colonialism, as the very process of these initial explorations compelled the other waves to follow. By

²⁰⁹ Stone, *A Short History*, 52.

²¹⁰ Hall, 105.

²¹¹ J.N.L. Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery and Exploration* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967), 338. The connection between missionaries and subsequent exploration/colonization is even more clear as these missionaries were accompanied by an engineer in the service of the British African Lakes Company.

²¹² In this situation the efforts of the missionaries proved even more substantial in enabling colonization. The religious division in Uganda enabled Lugard to capitalize on the religious strife in order to divide and conquer the region for the IBEA, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

²¹³ Driver, 22.

²¹⁴ Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa*, 28.

increasing knowledge these missionaries created an incentive for future exploration. When the interior remained a nebulous unknown it was easy to graph onto it a vision of Praester John's kingdom or an Ethiopian hegemony. These missionaries and traders succeeded in putting a crack in the dam of knowledge; leading to an inevitable flood of exploration. It needs to be remembered that the map is not only "the special embodiment of knowledge" but also a "stimulus to further cognitive engagement."²¹⁵ Consider the foregoing examples. Glimpses of mountains drove numerous explorers to chart and traverse both Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya. Glimpses of water-routes and lakes drove most of the early exploration of eastern Africa in an attempt to trace the origin of the Nile River. Thus, partial knowledge provided by these missionaries created the desire for complete knowledge. Missionaries helped create the blanks explorers attempted to fill in.

The very process by which these missionaries, traders and explorers recorded their routes eased the way for subsequent travelers. Often the tool of the trade was the route sketch. These were hand drawn creations, often made in the field, which were "little more than route traverses...with sights to prominent features off the routes, sometimes supplemented by rapid sketches of the landscapes."²¹⁶ Often route sketches, such as the one suggesting a large singular lake in central Tanganyika, were incorrect. However, these maps did fulfill their purpose. One must always be cognizant of the

²¹⁵ Denis Cosgrove, *Mappings* (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 2.

²¹⁶ Crone, 113. For a good representation of a typical route sketch see Map 3.4.

intended future use of a map or its purpose may be misunderstood. These route sketches created pathways from the coastline to the interior and did not intend to show the user much else. In a stark way the first map “gaze” consisted of *only* the gaze of each individual explorer. Beyond sightings of far off mountains, oftentimes incorrectly placed on the map, explorers were often confined to what they could see and what knowledge they gained from local guides.²¹⁷ These sketches were “descriptive and picturesque, and were ideal for identifying safe journeys and locating towns, fords, and impasses.”²¹⁸ Consider J.H. Speke’s facsimile map of 1858 noted below as Map 3.5. While certainly not decorative, it succeeds in its purpose of practicality by listing what an explorer would *need* to know to retrace his route. These route sketches, often little more than a line on the map, “gave limited data” but often included ideas about rainfall, availability of grain, friendliness/hostility of the natives, and the rest.²¹⁹ Beyond indicating their own journey these sketches indicated routes of possible expansion for those that came after.²²⁰ Speke, as noted in Map 3.6, followed his old route five years later when returning to map the same area in greater detail. Consider also the previously mentioned map on indigenous routes. These routes would gradually be appropriated for European use as subsequent

²¹⁷ Despite being a time of great scientific advancement a number of the early explorers were not as exact as one may suppose. Joseph Thomson had to be taught how to use a sextant *after* his first expedition to Africa. Meanwhile, the famous explorer Richard Burton, “was not very good either; his survey notebooks suggest he got bored with compass bearings and latitudes and longitudes.” R. C. Bridges, “Nineteenth Century Exploration and Mapping: The Role of the Royal Geographic Society,” in *Maps and Mapping of Africa*, ed. Patricia M. Larby (London: SCOLMA, 1987), 12.

²¹⁸ Barrow, 68.

²¹⁹ Bridges, “Nineteenth Century Exploration,” 12.

²²⁰ Bassett, 320.


explorers would follow the path laid by those who came before. While it is true that the explorers might not want to finish their journeys on beaten tracks, they certainly were not averse to following the paths of others to reach a new unknown. The routes recorded in the massive *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*, prepared in 1897 by R. Kiepert and M. Moisel, illustrates this overlap perfectly.²²¹ Along every defined route there is a tangled web of names and years indicating the common paths of so many explorers.²²² There are so many explorers that the map key has as many notations listed for explorers as it does for terrain features these explorers recorded!²²³ The importance of these common routes and their effect on directing exploratory efforts can also be seen where these routes did *not* exist. As shown in Map 3.9 there is a massive white gap of territory whose geographical details are as wholly unknown to the Europeans as they were in the 15th Century.²²⁴ However, bordering this space are the paths of the various explorers where topography, geography and the nature of the land are documented in great detail. It is clear that the routes served as conduits for future exploration, in some cases these early routes helped dictate what might be avoided entirely.

²²¹ See Map 3.7.

²²² R. Kiepert, M. Moisel and P. Sprigade, *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika* [map] 1:300,000, (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1897), JRL. Showing an amusing facet of the modern desire to privilege the “new” many explorers have “faded into the background” as solid or dotted lines with only the most recent deserving a colored route. Another humorous point is that in the entirety of this German map none of the famous non-German explorers, specifically Livingstone and Stanley, receive a colored route.


²²³ See Map 3.8.

²²⁴ The description almost echoes the older map given at the beginning of the chapter with the words “South border of Unyamewsi still unknown.” (*Südgrenze von Unyamwesi noch unbekannt*)




Map 3.6: Sir William Garstin. *The Jubilee of Speke's discovery of Victoria Nyanza.*


London: Royal Geographic Society, 1909, JRL.



Map 3.7: R. Kiepert, M. Moisel and P. Sprigade. *Tanga (C6)*. 1:300,000. In *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1897, JRL.



Map 3.8: R. Kiepert, M. Moisel and P. Sprigade. *Tanga (C6)*. 1:300,000. In *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1897, JRL.



Map 3.9: R. Kiepert, M. Moisel and P. Sprigade. *Tanga (C6)*. 1:300,000. In *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1897, JRL.

And who were those who followed in these routes? The exploration of eastern Africa began in the late 1840s and 1850s as the Portuguese, the only Europeans with a colonial holding in the region, had, similar to the Dutch at the Cape, done little to no exploration or mapping of the interior.²²⁵ However, between 1849 and 1889 a “revolution in geography” occurred in this region as the “whole map was transformed” by the knowledge accumulated by explorers.²²⁶ Ironically, the first impetus for exploration concerned not the region itself but its relation to more valued territory. Recognizing the growing importance of Egypt, the first major expeditions into the interior of East Africa were the travels of Richard Burton to locate the source of the Nile. Commissioned by the Royal Geographic Society, he was ordered to push into the interior to locate Lake Tanganyika and then “proceed northward toward the range of mountains marked upon our maps as containing the probable source of the Nile, which it will be your next great object to discover.”²²⁷ From 1857-1859, accompanied by his sole surveyor John Hanning Speke, the two worked inland until they reached Lake Tanganyika, with Speke even sighting Lake Victoria.²²⁸ During a later voyage, in 1860-1863, Speke was able to confirm his assertion that Lake Victoria, rather than Lake Tanganyika, was the source of

²²⁵ Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery*, 312.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 325.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ R.A. Skelton, *Explorers' Maps: Chapters in the Cartographic Record of Geographical Discovery*, (New York: Praeger, 1958), 287; Robin Hallet, “European Exploration as a Theme in African History” in *The Exploration of Africa in the Eighteenth And Nineteenth Centuries: Proceedings of a seminar held on the occasion of the Mungo Park Bi-Centenary Celebration at the Center of African Studies* (Edinburgh: Center of African Studies, 1971), 83.

the Nile.²²⁹ Concurrently with Burton and Speke, David Livingstone, probably the most famous of the African explorers, was attempting to ascertain the source of the Nile as well as determine how Central Africa could be linked to the coast by a waterway.²³⁰ He was the first European to see Victoria Falls and Lake Nyasa.²³¹ The long running debate over the source of the Nile was finally put to rest by Morton Stanley. Between 1874-1876, Stanley completed a circuit of Lake Victoria fully establishing it as the source of the Nile and then proceeded to circumnavigate Lake Tanganyika and traced the Congo River to its mouth.²³² Following up on these successes, the Royal Geographic Society sent, from 1879-1884, Keith Johnston and Joseph Thompson in an attempt to achieve Livingstone's goal and connect Dar es-Salaam via waterways to Lake Nyasa and the Congo.²³³ While failing to establish the existence of the long hoped-for waterway, they did discover Lake Rukwa and subjected a large area of previously unexplored land to scientific study.²³⁴

While the British generally took the lead, there were also many German explorers.

The first professional German explorers, unlike the missionaries Krapf and Rebmann

²²⁹ Skelton, 288. The reason for this seeming discrepancy was that Speke travelled north on the return journey from their expedition, while Burton was rendered incapacitated due to illness, allowing him to make the discovery alone. This later caused a great deal of controversy leading to a planned debate between the, by now hostile, explorers at the British Association for the Advancement of Science on the source of the Nile which was postponed indefinitely when Speke died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound the day before the scheduled debate.

²³⁰ Porti, 3.

²³¹ Skelton, 286.

²³² Porti, 5; Skelton, 291.

²³³ Fernandez-Armesto, 356.

²³⁴ Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery*, 339.

who prompted all of the foregoing exploration, were Doctors Heinrich Barth and Alfred Vogel, who explored the Western Sudan and Lake Chad.²³⁵ Another early explorer was Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs whose knowledge of desert survival came from an earlier stint in the French Foreign Legion. He explored the Sahara and was funded by the German East African Society in 1878 to travel south from Tripoli to Lake Chad.²³⁶ For his later work in the exploration of Ethiopia Rohlfs was decorated by the Royal Geographic Society.²³⁷ At the same time as these expeditions, Gustav Nachtigal became the first to cross from Lake Chad to the Nile while George Schweinfurth explored the Upper Nile and Congo regions.²³⁸ In Tanganyika, it was Count von der Decken who scaled and charted the top of Mount Kilimanjaro in 1861.²³⁹ If there was a German equivalent to David Livingstone it would have to be Hermann von Wissmann. After crossing the continent from Angola to Zanzibar, one of two continental crossings, he explored the Kasai River system for King Leopold II and “revealed the Congo system as it is known today.”²⁴⁰ The above period forms what has been termed “Classic Exploration” because explorers primarily concerned with geographical objects.²⁴¹ However, this is more of the mythos of exploration and an analysis of the effect of the gaze of the Discoverer will help connect these actions to later colonial efforts.

²³⁵ Hall, 96-97.

²³⁶ Porti, 4.

²³⁷ Hall, 98.

²³⁸ Ibid.,

²³⁹ W. Henderson, *Studies in German Colonial History* (London: F. Cass, 1962), 2.

²⁴⁰ Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery*, 343.

²⁴¹ Bridges, “Nineteenth Century Exploration,” 9.

The gaze of the Discoverer helps establish a number of themes that will return in this study throughout the colonial period. One of the first important aspects of the operation of any gaze, first seen under the gaze of the Discoverer, is the importance of the blank. As noted earlier, the blank was transformed in the modern period from a blank canvas into motivation to fill in the lack of scientific knowledge of Africa. The term “Geography Militant” coined by Joseph Conrad, summarizes this attitude when described as the:

Period of systematic compiling by arduous artisans and scholars, later joined by explorers filling in the “blank” spaces on the map by gathering on site the necessary data while at the same time verifying the accuracy of the existing maps. When there was a lack of data, the area was left blank, void of any information, thus inviting further work...ignorance was considered only temporary because human genius would ultimately uncover every inch of the earth.²⁴²

The blank of the map became a common element operating under these gazes. In the case of the Discoverer that blank was a lack of knowledge. However, as the blank of each gaze was filled in it helped create new “blanks” of knowledge and a new motive force for the subsequent gaze. Thus, the gaze of the Discoverer, and the drive to uncover the knowledge of Africa serves as the model of motivation that will reoccur throughout this study. With this connection between gazes established it is easier to see how these exploratory journeys were not scientifically neutral. It is important to recognize that while many of these explorers were facilitating an eventual colonial exercise, they

²⁴² Mbodj, 42.

themselves were saw themselves as merely scientifically cataloging the world.²⁴³ In uncovering the geography of Africa explorers were paving the way for the subsequent gaze and the entire process of colonialism. Cartography helped create the “idea of boundless available land awaiting occupation.”²⁴⁴ All of these exploratory maps, reproduced numerous times in the geographical journals in Germany and Britain, “fostered the image of a dehumanized geometrical space...whose places could be controlled by coordinate of latitude and longitude.”²⁴⁵ This gaze was concerned with the creation of territory, and it was only after the creation of such a legible space that it could be occupied by the subsequent gazes. There are two other points to emphasize before we turn to the establishment of political dominion over the land these explorers uncovered.

The first is that this period of exploration was *not* nationalistic, even if it paved the way for European national triumphs. To return to the blanks of this gaze the motive driving exploration was one of personal pride and ego. Much of the concurrent expeditions that occurred in Central Africa during this time period were attempts to locate a central water-route across the continent or the source of the Nile. In particular,

²⁴³ Even so, sometimes the overlap between exploration and exploitation was far clearer. An 1893, Royal Geographic Society pamphlet entitled “Hints to Travelers” contained the directive to make the following observations in “uncivilized or semi-civilised [sic] countries”: “(1) What are the available resources of the country that may be turned to industrial or commercial account? (2) What commercial products can find an available market in the country? (3) What are the facilities for or hindrances to intercourse between the country and the rest of the world?” Quoted in Driver, 40-41.

²⁴⁴ Harley, “New England Cartography,” 187.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

the debate regarding the source of the Nile became quite acrimonious before it was able to be put to rest scientifically. Also, it highlights that the blanks that were most present in Africa at that time were a reason to explore. Prior to Burton and Speke's first journey, as indicated above in Map 3.10, little else was known of the interior of Tanganyika past the rough placement of Mount Kenya and Mount Kilimanjaro. The borders of Lake Nyasa were not defined, with the 1856 map of Africa prior to Burton and Speke's first journey indicating that some believed it was not a lake but a continuation of the Indian Ocean. If personal ego drove most of these explorers there was less concern with national acclaim and claims to territory. While it is true that explorers were seen as national heroes, this is separate from any colonial claims. The gaze of the Discoverer, concerned primarily with the classification and codification of a space, allows for distinctly extra-national exploration. Many German and British explorers were traveling and cataloging land that would never become a national colony of the respective explorers. Hence detailed sketch maps of the River Rufiji, located in southern Tanzania, could be made by an Englishman while a German, Count Eduard Wickenburg, could travel from the Red Sea along the western edge of modern-day Kenya to Mount-Kilimanjaro.²⁴⁶ That these maps are so similar indicates the way in which the gaze of the Discoverer functioned in the same manner in both British and German cartography.

²⁴⁶ W. Beardall, *Sketch Map of the River Rufiji from a Survey by W. Beardall, Zanzibar; March, 1881* [map] 1:558,195, (Royal Geographic Society, 1881), JRL; R. Dorkapil, *Übersichtskarte der Reisen des Grafen Eduard Wickenburg in Ost-Afrika* [map], 1:3,000,000 (Gotha: Justus Pertes, 1902), JRL.

Beyond establishing the model of the blanks as a motivation for European action in Africa, the gaze of the Discoverer also established the tradition of utilizing force to achieve European ends. Our conception of what these expeditions consisted of, with one brave adventurer facing nature alone, is so far from the truth as to be laughable. Robin Butlin well encapsulates the common view of the African explorer:

Frequently portrayed as a white male European with a pith helmet, armed with weapons to combat wild animals and human antagonists, attended by a large number of male indigenous bearers and assistants, marching in single file, and showing great courage in the face of many human and natural hazards.²⁴⁷

However much the press would “portray explorers as personifications of heroic individualism” they only achieved their goals with “extensive and sustained assistance from those who were their purported objects of investigation.”²⁴⁸ Explorations were extremely well organized affairs, sometimes demanding hundreds of porters not to mention hired auxiliaries for protection. It was not unusual to see a large protective detail travelling with a small party of explorers to protect them from threats both human and animal. While Burton and Speke received accolades they neglected to mention their success depended on appropriating the knowledge of Arab caravan leaders and the carrying power of over 200 porters.²⁴⁹ The gaze of the Discoverer began the process of hiding these acts of conceptual and physical violence as this effort would be hidden

²⁴⁷ Butlin, 226.

²⁴⁸ Dane Kennedy, “British Exploration in the Nineteenth Century: A Historiographical Survey,” *History Compass* 5, no. 6 (2007; 1879-1900), 1891-1892.

²⁴⁹ Christopher Ondaatje, “Search for the Source of the Nile,” in *The Seventy Great Journeys in History*, ed. Robin Hansbury-Tenison (London: Thames & Hudson, 2006), 196.

behind a single red line celebrating the exploits of their exploratory mission.

Unfortunately for the people of Africa the Europeans would not remain content to stay within the bounds of that single red line. Explorers helped create currents that would be followed by others who would flood the landscape of Africa.

Part of the reason for this flood was that the next wave of Europeans was not content to stay within these currents and broke the banks of the narrow uses a route sketch afforded. Early explorations had carried an air of adventure and mystery as they were the act of the intrepid explorer against the forces of nature and ignorance.²⁵⁰ Often filled with notations on wild game and wells there was a sense the exotic land was untamed and control over “Darkest Africa” was impossible. In drawing Africa into the gridded framework of longitude and latitude lines the explorers had created a legible territory. Through this process of creating increasingly accurate maps, “the earth was tamed, and progressively rendered nonmysterious, unwonderous, disenchanted.”²⁵¹ In doing so the explorers created the necessary prerequisite for colonialism. Once Africa was made legible it was impossible for Europeans not to envision alternate ways to use the land. Once made into a territory as “real” as any in Europe it was perfect to imagine it as a space to occupy and possess. These maps, to the audiences in Europe, did not merely depict discoveries of lands-masses or lakes but helped to “discover” the territory

²⁵⁰ For a good overview of the connection between maps and feelings of romantic adventure see Richard Phillips, *Mapping Men & Empire: A Geography of Adventure* (London: Routledge, 1997).

²⁵¹ Barrow, 65.

of Africa.²⁵² The reason that route sketches did not fulfill the entirety of European dreams for the continent was due to the transformation of Africa into a legible geographical territory. Once made into a recognized land mass Africa was depicted as lacking in only one quality – an owner

²⁵² While it should go without saying it is important to note that all of the efforts of these maps simply marks “the adoption by European geographers of knowledge that had been in native hands for centuries.” Whitfield, 171.

Chapter 4: “Germany’s India”

I think that I may truly say that if the modern politician requires, as indeed he does require if he is worthy of his task, to be equipped with geographical knowledge, on the other hand you geographers must admit that geography owes much to the modern politician.²⁵³

The subtle shift from “objective” science to colonialism was not pronounced as it took little for what was created under the gaze of the Discoverer to be appropriated by the gaze of the Despot. After Morton Stanley’s 1874-1877 exploration, exploration began to move away from the mere goals of geography and began to involve geopolitics.²⁵⁴ Explorations, where “national flags flew aloft above travelers’ camps,” became intertwined with the motives of political and economic leaders in Europe.²⁵⁵ As knowledge spread about these discoveries organizations grew up to support exploration at

²⁵³ Butlin, 275. Quoting H.H. Asquith, the Prime Minister, speaking at a dinner given at the Royal Geographical Society.

²⁵⁴ Bridges, “Europeans and East Africans” 119.

²⁵⁵ Jane Carruthers, “Cartographical Rivalries: Friedrich Jeppe and the Transvaal,” in *Mapping Colonial Conquest: Australia and Southern Africa*, ed. Norman Etherington (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2007), 114.

a national level.²⁵⁶ In 1868, the Central Society for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad (*Zentralverein für Handelsgeographie und Förderung Deutscher Interessen im Auslande*) was formed, already suggesting the extra-exploratory motives that began to supersede mere geographical interest.²⁵⁷ This was made even more explicit when the same society reorganized in 1878 with the purpose “to bring about the founding of colonies by establishing trade and naval stations.”²⁵⁸ Another society connecting geography to empire was the German Society for the Exploration of Equatorial Africa founded in 1873. In its founding document it noted that as geographers discovered land which would “sooner or later become trade markets,” academic study was a precondition for production and trade.²⁵⁹ One key public figure in building up public motivation for colonies was former missionary and advisor to Chancellor Bismarck, Friedrich Fabri. His 1879 book *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?* (Does Germany Need Colonies?) as well as William Hübbe-Schleiden’s 1881 *Deutsche Kolonisation* (German Colonization) provided the ideological framework for the right of Germany to possess colonies.²⁶⁰ Three years after Fabri’s book was published the German Colonial Association was

²⁵⁶ This is the basis for the “pressure group” thesis of German colonialism laid out by Hans-Ulrich Wehler; see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire 1871-1918*, trans. Kim Traynor (Oxford: Berg, 1985).

²⁵⁷ Mary Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1930), 35.

²⁵⁸ Butlin, 311.

²⁵⁹ Conrad, 127. “‘World Trade’ the document continued, could develop only from the ‘utilization of the aids supplied by the geographical sciences.’” Conrad, 128. Thus, the clear connection between geography and empire.

²⁶⁰ Butlin, 96 and Conrad, 25. Fabri went beyond literary commitment as he helped found the “West German Association for Colonization and Export” the year after the publication of his book. Noyes, 228.

founded.²⁶¹ This latter association was founded explicitly by commercial leaders in an effort to drum up support for colonial ventures involving a whole cacophony of public relations tools.²⁶² Colonies were also supported by the Colonial Society (*Kolonialverein*) founded in 1882 and the Society for German Colonialism (*Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation*) founded in 1884.²⁶³ Besides the realm of commerce, academia became associated with the push for colonization. While in 1825, the only chair of Geography was at Göttingen University, by 1871 there were 12 positions, and 23 by 1910.²⁶⁴ These positions held great prestige and the academics gladly lent their voices to the arguments for colonization. For example, in 1882, a group of academic geographers signed onto an appeal for the creation of a German Colonial Society.²⁶⁵ In 1892 “Geography of the German Colonies” was introduced as a school subject and the first university chair in

²⁶¹ Stoecker, 19, and Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa*, 19.

²⁶² Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa*, 30. This included the *Kolonial Monatsblätter* and *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* as well as cinematographic performances, library work, expeditions and lectures. For a good example see the postcard (Illustration 5) made to commemorate Dr. Carl Peter’s “vast colonial empire in East Africa” in Conrad, 26. These also included Colonial Exhibitions and the growth of Ethnographic Museums. Conrad, 141. For a good coverage of the growth of Ethnology in Germany see Glenn H. Penny, *Ethnology and Ethnographic Museums in Imperial Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). It should be noted Penny does not see these museums as a driving force of colonization but instead that imperialism was “pushed into the museums” by the audience. Penny, 13.

²⁶³ These were not small groups. For example, the *Kolonialverein* enrolled 3,260 members its first year and even created an official journal (*Kolonialzeitung*); Mary Evelyn Townsend, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* (Chicago: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1941), 165.

²⁶⁴ Gerhard Sander and Mechtild Rössler, “Geography and Empire in Germany, 1871-1945,” in *Geography and Empire*, ed. Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 116.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 119. This included Theobald Fischer, who held a chair of Geography at the Kiel and Marburg Universities, and Georg Gerland, who held a chair at Strasburg University. These goals would be achieved when the *Kolonialverein* and *Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation* merged in 1887 to become the German Colonial Society (*Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*) Butlin, 96.

Colonial Geography was founded in Berlin in 1911.²⁶⁶ The linkages could also go even deeper, with academics actively involved in the process of exploration and colonization itself. Siegfried Passarge, who led a colonial expedition to Cameroon, returned to become the chair of Geography at the new Hamburg Colonial Institute.²⁶⁷ The pressure groups that pushed for colonization were often a melding of disparate academic and business elites who wanted to prevent Germany from being “shut out” of Africa.²⁶⁸ Europeans, having conceived of Africa as a discrete unit via the gaze of the Discoverer, had turned the continent into a “thing” which could be “lost.”²⁶⁹ Even German explorers were making these connections. For example, Count von der Decken, who was the first to scale Mount Kilimanjaro, wrote in 1864 about the desirability of a colony and naval base in East Africa.²⁷⁰ The outcry for colonies was occurring concurrently with a greater awareness, on the part of the citizenry of Germany, of Africa.²⁷¹ Thus, just as Germans became aware of the opportunities in Africa those very opportunities seemed threatened.

Another important point in this discussion of colonial awareness is the nature of the German colonial organizations themselves. Specifically, they were all grassroots

²⁶⁶ Conrad, 129.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 120. In 1908, this was the only department in Germany dedicated exclusively to colonial geography, and would eventually become the University of Hamburg.

²⁶⁸ William Roger Louis, “Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919,” in *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, ed. Gifford Proser, and William Roger Lewis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 51. German merchants believed that unless they were able to stake a stable claim, they would be “at the mercy” of other Europeans.

²⁶⁹ Sanderson, 130.

²⁷⁰ Kaniki, 74.

²⁷¹ Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa*, 28. “The combination of missionaries, geographers, and explorers helped to create an informed reading public with an interest in colonial expansion.”

organizations with the goals of convincing *both* the public and government of the need for colonies. A distinct difference between the German and British colonial efforts was the commitment of the government to colonialism. In the case of Germany the government, especially Chancellor Bismarck, was particularly unenthusiastic with the prospect of wasting national resources on such an effort. In addition to suggesting that his “map of Africa was Europe,” Bismarck thought that the “colonial business for us would be similar to the silken pelts of Polish noble families who do not possess even shirts.”²⁷² Prior to the efforts of German civilians in Eastern Africa he had separately rejected: French colonies in Cochin China in 1871; a protectorate over Zanzibar and land in Borneo in 1874; a plan by German merchants to settle in South Africa in 1876; a plan to settle New Guinea in 1880; and as late as 1882, a personal role in a German colonial society.²⁷³ A key feature of German colonial efforts was that they were undertaken initially without cooperation between the government and private-sector.²⁷⁴ Into this environment now stepped an individual whose “personal ambition” would shape all future German colonial efforts in East Africa – Carl Peters.²⁷⁵

In 1878 Germany possessed no colonial possessions in eastern Africa, but by 1886 had come to acquire a land of 362,688 sq. miles - an area almost the size of France,

²⁷² Holger Herwig, *Luxury Fleet*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 95.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 96.

²⁷⁴ Stoecker, 29. This is quite the contrast to the Imperial British East Africa Company whose maps would be printed by the Intelligence Division of the War Office.

²⁷⁵ Carl Peters has been written with a “C” or “K” depending on the source. For ease I will use “Carl” and the only appearance of “Karl” will be if the source cited spells his name as such.

Germany and Belgium combined - largely because of the initial efforts of this one man.²⁷⁶ Germany had possessed a commercial influence in Eastern Africa as early as 1844 when Adolf Jacob Hertz, from Hamburg, sent a ship to Zanzibar for trade purposes.²⁷⁷ During the 1860s two houses of trade, O'Swald and Hansing, developed linkages to the African interior while remaining based in Zanzibar.²⁷⁸ These were not small investments as by 1871 these firms accounted for almost a quarter of Zanzibar's foreign commerce.²⁷⁹ Despite these investments the German government continued to demure on any suggestion of state involvement or colonies. Carl Peters, the creator of the Society for German Colonialism later the German East African Society, was not content to sit on the sidelines attempting to coerce the government into action.²⁸⁰ Peters embarked on a determined effort "to forestall foreign rivals by an aggressive policy of rapid land-grabbing in East Africa."²⁸¹ In 1883-1884, Peters travelled with three colleagues to the coast of Africa disguised as mechanics in order to penetrate the interior and stake a German claim to the region. Part of the reason for their disguise was that the German Foreign Office was unsupportive due to the government's commitment to leaving Africa alone.²⁸² Leaving Zanzibar on November 4, they "travelled through

²⁷⁶ Townsend, *The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*, vi, and J. P. Moffett, *Tanganyika: A Review of its Resources and Their Development* (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons Ltd., 1955), 15.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 131 and Henderson, 46.

²⁷⁸ Mann, *Mikono Ya Damu*, 25.

²⁷⁹ Henderson, 47. The exact figure is 22.2%.

²⁸⁰ Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa*, 11.

²⁸¹ Henderson, 17.

²⁸² Perras, 51.

Uzingua along the Wami river into Uluguru, making bogus treaties as they moved along.”²⁸³ The wording of these treaties should suffice to show the purposeful drive to annex territory:

Dr. Karl Peters, in the name of the Society...declares his willingness to take over the territory of the Sultan Mangungo with all rights for German Colonization subject to any existing suzerainty of Mwenyi Sagara. In pursuance thereof, Sultan Mangungo hereby cedes all the territory of Msovero, belonging to him by inheritance or otherwise for all time, to Dr. Karl Peters, making over to him at the same time all his rights. Dr. Karl Peters in the name of the Society...undertakes to give special...attention to Msovero when colonizing Usagara.²⁸⁴

Returning to Germany in 1885 with a dozen of these “treaties” Peters acquired an Imperial charter for his now 140,000 sq. mile holdings.²⁸⁵

Upon receipt of this charter Peters proceeded to take two steps; to change the German East African Society into the German East Africa Company (DOAG), and his position to that of managing partner; and immediately sending exploratory caravans to the interior to acquire more territory.²⁸⁶ Following the British model of colonization, and colonization efforts by Europeans in general, both the colonies of Southwest Africa and East Africa were established by chartered companies.²⁸⁷ His caravan push also proves the continuing motivating power of the blanks in a map. As soon as German claims were

²⁸³ G.C.K. Gwassa, “The German intervention and Africa resistance in Tanzania,” in *A History of Tanzania*, ed. I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), 98.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 99.

²⁸⁵ Gwassa, 100 and Perras, 1.

²⁸⁶ Gwassa, 101, and Albert F. Calvert, *German East Africa* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 2. One of the first pushes was towards the north in an attempt to acquire not only Mount Kilimanjaro but also Mount Kenya.

²⁸⁷ Fetter, 9.

solidified there was an immediate desire to acquire more territory and color in a greater portion of the political gap of the map. While blanks had formerly stimulated individuals to explore, these blanks were now being pursued in order to claim territory for the company.²⁸⁸ Between 1884 and 1886, eighteen expeditions were sent out under reserve officers to establish stations and sign treaties with indigenous rulers to extend the German holdings.²⁸⁹ This push for expansion was so strong as to arouse the criticism of the British with Lord Salisbury suggesting this land-grab rested:

upon the doctrine of Hinterland which they have to a great extent invented and which appears to mean that if you have possession in an uncivilized country you have a right to extend those possessions to an unlimited distance from the sea, until you strike the frontier of another civilized country.²⁹⁰

Further territory was gained between 1889 and the turn of the century through the use of mercenaries.²⁹¹ Thus, as the gaze of the Despot fell onto Africa the level of force used to acquire territory was raised. This use of force would only continue to grow, with many of those same reserve officers later receiving commands in the *Schutztruppe*.²⁹² This force was also solidified in the creation of company stations in the “Uluguru Valley, one in Uzingua...two in Usagara, two in the Pangani Valley, one on the coast on the frontier

²⁸⁸ Kaniki, 78.

²⁸⁹ David Killingray, “Military power in German colonial policy,” in *Guardians of Empire*, Ed. David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 94.

²⁹⁰ Heinz Schnepfen, *Why Kilimanjaro is in Tanzania* (Dar es-Salaam: National Museums of Tanzania, 1996), 24.

²⁹¹ Stoecker, 93.

²⁹² *Ibid.*; Killingray, 94. For example von Zelewski, von Bülow, von Kleist and R. Schmidt later commanded military stations in the interior as part of the *Schutztruppe* or official protective force for German East Africa.

with British territory and one at Bagamoyo”²⁹³ In addition to solidifying German control over the territory these stations were critically important in both practical and conceptual ways.

“These [stations] were principally designed to protect them and their mercenaries from being suddenly overwhelmed by a hostile indigenous force. But they also served as way stations, as refuges and storehouses on their expanding routes to the interior, as islands in an alien sea...and as bridgeheads for the intrusion of colonial power into the region. Once constructed, they constituted in indigenous terms the citadels of an altogether novel, external, hegemonic power with which, quite suddenly and inexorably, they found themselves confronted.”²⁹⁴

These stations physically etched into the landscape the message that the land was now German property.²⁹⁵ However, it was not just in the physical architecture of buildings that this message was being inscribed; it was also being written in through the architecture of the map.

The goals and make-up of maps designed under the gaze of a Despot differ significantly from those used by the explorer. Color is used not to depict what is natural but what is unnatural; the nation.²⁹⁶ Rather than delineating terrain, color is now harnessed to delineate territory. This shift in use can only occur after a territory has been brought under the gaze of a Despot as it is used to suggest control and create

²⁹³ Kaniki, 95. See Figure 4-9 for cartographic evidence of the stations established in Usagara.

²⁹⁴ D.A. Low, *Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

²⁹⁵ Daniel Walther, *Creating Germans Abroad* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), 88. While the citation is in reference to actions in Southwest Africa the point applies to this colony as well.

²⁹⁶ Holdich, 2. “Nature knows no boundary lines. Nature has her frontiers truly, but lines, especially straight lines, are abhorrent to her.”

boundaries.²⁹⁷ Boundaries are a function of modern geography, tied uniquely to the structures of the modern state which demands their creation.²⁹⁸ The creation of boundaries is tied to the usefulness of the map. Color and bright lines convert a wilderness into an orderly picture of control. These maps made Africa politically legible even if “what counts,” under this gaze “is the delusion of clarity.”²⁹⁹ However, this delusion is critical as without it only personal opinion would delineate where the lines of ownership would begin and end.³⁰⁰ Color allows one to make sense of the world, such as the identification of red with the British Empire so that if one saw that where they lived was colored red they knew they were a part of that entity.³⁰¹ As Conrad’s Marlow described Africa:

a large shining map, marked with all the colours of a rainbow. There was a vast amount of red – good to see at any time, because one knows that some real work is done in there, a deuce of a lot of blue, a little green, smears of orange, and, on the East Coast, a purple patch, to show where the jolly pioneers of progress drink the jolly lager-beer.³⁰²

Color also serves as a catalytic agent to the process of pushing towards those blanks which will be well on display in the actions of the DOAG and the Imperial British East Africa Company in Chapter 6. When examining the red on Marlow’s map above the “viewer could readily comprehend Britain’s economic, political, and military reach,” thus

²⁹⁷ Akerman, 144.

²⁹⁸ Winichakul, 56.

²⁹⁹ Bassett, 326, and Bialas, 85. See also Noyes, 108.

³⁰⁰ Wood, *The Power of Maps*, 19.

³⁰¹ Bialas, 86.

³⁰² Joseph Conrad, *The Heart of Darkness*, 135 quoted in *Heart of Darkness, The Man Who Would Be King, and Other Works on Empire*, ed. David Damrosch (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007).

implying the extent of British power.³⁰³ Color was a physical demarcation of the implicit fears of German colonialists when they looked at their map of Africa. Without the export of some of their own color onto the map of Africa, they rightly feared that any remaining territory would be gobbled up.³⁰⁴ Color could also facilitate conquest as illustrated in the French map of 1890, which used lightly-shaded areas of West Africa to imply what would “eventually” become part of the French colonial empire.³⁰⁵ This same effect will be illustrated by the use of colored “spheres of influence” to propel conquest deep into the interior of Africa.

Lest this discussion of color seem too much of an overreach it is helpful to show how discordant the *lack* of color on a map made under this gaze is. The map below illustrates the important effect that color has on our understanding of colonial Africa.

³⁰³ Barrow, *Making History*, 185.

³⁰⁴ Bismarck’s successor, Caprivi, once poked fun at this budding enthusiasm for colonies: “They believe that, if we had colonies, and bought ourselves an atlas, and coloured Africa blue all over, then we would be respectable people.” See Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism*, 45.

³⁰⁵ Bassett, 326.



Map 4.1: *General Map of Eastern Equatorial Africa*. 1:3,801,600. British War Office, 1892. Africa East (region), LOC



Map 4.2: *General Map of Eastern Equatorial Africa*. 1:3,801,600. British War Office, 1892. Africa East (region), LOC

This “General Map of Eastern Equatorial Africa” was made by the British War Office in 1892. However, before the coloring could be added in to indicate “Spheres of Influence, Protectorates or Dominions” the map production was cancelled. This map provides a fascinating way to expose the importance of color.³⁰⁶ It is a political map but, lacking color, the map has no effect. The map, sans color, actually has quite a dissonant effect on the reader as what we “expect” to see is absent. Without any inscribed color the falsity of the colonial project is exposed. The reality is not the swaths of colonial color, but the peoples and geography of Africa. This map also underscores the unifying power of so many elements in the map. The title and key create certain expectations that color is meant to validate. These mutual signs serve to reinforce one another to inscribe the meaning the cartographer intended. It is helpful to begin with this map as the effect of color will be magnified having seen the effect of its absence.

Beyond color, the bounding of the map itself could be used to establish a sense of control. While viewers tend not to think of it, the map compartmentalizes the world. Short of examining a globe, where the entirety of a given territory and its interrelatedness to the rest of the earth are apparent, maps are a creation which localizes the view on an isolated territory. The frame of the map separates the land from any other perspective than that which its maker is attempting to express. The viewer is thus invited to “look at what the image represents not as a part of the world in which he or she lives, but as a

³⁰⁶ For a good overview of the utilization of color in maps see Karen S. Pearson, “The Nineteenth-Century Colour Revolution: Maps in Geographical Journals” *Imago Mundi* 32 (1980): 9-20.

statement about this world.”³⁰⁷ If one examines a map of Germany by extension the viewer has been given license to ignore the surrounding countries and the contiguity of Europe. In the case of Africa, this loss of contiguity allowed Europeans to carve up the continent by segmenting parts of Africa as separate colonies. An extreme example would be the Italian map of colonial Somalia where, in an effort to fixate the mind on this colonial possession, anything that was not part of the colony was left entirely blank.³⁰⁸ Related to this process was the importance of the title. While the bounding of the map might implicitly carve up a larger territory the title serves as “a symbolic sign that happens to sanction the congruence of the individual mental image with the socially validated one.”³⁰⁹ Returning to our example of Germany, the viewer would face a distinct mental jolt if a map depicting it did not possess a title or listed it as France. This assumes, of course, that the viewer is aware of the territorial outline of Germany and could recognize the incongruence of title and depiction. However, if the viewer was unaware of the country before seeing the map it is just as likely they would accept the depiction of “France” as a central European nation. Through all these means the map serves to spread stereotypes “ready to be engraved in the imagination and in the memory of its readers.”³¹⁰ It also allowed the gaze of the Despot to appropriate the exploratory

³⁰⁷ Jacob, 108.

³⁰⁸ Istituto geografico militare, *Somaliland Italiano* [map] 1:200,000, (Istituto geografico militare, 1910), JRL. In one particularly amusing case this meant an entire table-sized map sheet was almost entirely blank except for the one small corner segment of Italian territory.

³⁰⁹ Jacob, 195.

³¹⁰ Jacob, 182.

information for their own purposes. Maps 4.1 and 4.22 were the result of many exploratory efforts that were appropriated in order to serve a political function. This process of using the map as a form of conceptual conquest was the precursor to all of the subsequent waves of violence during colonialism.



Map 4.6: B. Hassenstein. *Originalkarte von Joachim Graf Pfeil's Reisen in Ost-Afrika.*

1:1,750,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1886, JRL.

A map by Joachim Pfeil, one of the men who accompanied Peters on his 1883-1884 journey to East Africa, helps to chart this shift.³¹¹ It might be best to view Pfeil's map as a "missing link" between exploratory and colonial maps. On its face it seems to possess a number of the attributes we have suggested for exploratory route sketches.³¹² There is a great level of detail along the route he took while also documenting the previous explorers' routes he followed. The profiles listed at the bottom and sides tracking elevation changes also suggest a desire for nothing more than geographic knowledge. However, in several ways this map illustrates the shift towards a Despotic gaze. Color is used to indicate control over the land. Red is used to demarcate the stations established by the German East Africa Society to legitimate and perpetuate the control that Peters had achieved with his treaties. It should be noted that each of these stations were set up along routes of numerous explorers that had come before and, as indicated on the key, old caravan routes; adding credence to the assertion that the actions of traders and explorers had a strong correlative effect on future colonial efforts. Blue is used to demarcate the land of particular tribes from whom Peters had extracted treaties.³¹³

³¹¹ For Pfeil's recollections of his actions and an attempt to usurp the singular role Carl Peters gave himself in German colonization see Joachim Graf von Pfeil, *Zur Erwerbung von Deutsch-Ostafrika: ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte*. (Berlin: Verlag von Karl Curtius, 1907).

³¹² See Map 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 for the detailed images to accompany the following text.

³¹³ It is distinctive on this map, unlike almost every other from this period, that defined borders are given to the tribal kingdoms. Almost always they were listed only as a name across the land without a discernible border suggesting both their rootlessness and the privileging of European borders. While it is unclear why these borders are listed, the likely reason is that with such a tenuous hold on the land and dependent on treaty agreements the DOAG felt too weak to suggest dominance in their maps. On the other hand, these borders could also be used to help establish the limits of German authority in Eastern Africa as they were operating under the strictures of "effective occupation" as defined by the Berlin Conference of 1884. To

One other note about color is how it denotes the permeability of tribal borders, specifically by the colonial red color as Pfeil journeyed across East Africa. As red also signified areas of control, specifically a red box around each of the colonial stations, this would suggest that the true power lay in DOAG which could travel or establish itself anywhere in the region.³¹⁴ In addition, because the key lists these colored stations and not the colored borders of the tribal regions, it suggests only German developments will possess true permanency. The bounding of the map also helps to establish the power of the German claim. Compared to the modern borders of Tanzania, this map localizes the view to the central region around Dar es Salaam.³¹⁵ Considering this was where Peters travelled it initially makes perfect sense. However, there is another underlying reason for localizing the map. As this map does suggest connotations of control it was critically important to keep the Despotic gaze focused on the areas that the Germans had claimed prominence. Exploratory journeys often involved travels across huge swaths of land with no thought as to ownership because that was not the goal. With the German desire to establish a legitimate claim to the region it made even more sense to localize the map enabling the viewer to accept the German claim to this particular area of eastern Africa.

meet the bar of effective occupation a European power had to possess the territory by agreement with local chiefs, that they flew their flag there, and had set up an administrative structure to keep order. Indicating both the borders, and the colonial stations, would document this control and solidify the German Colonial Society's claim to effective occupation of the region. In this manner, even though borders are listed for these tribal kingdoms they only matter because of the needs of the colonizer.

³¹⁴ Pfeil was more than a cartographer as he established the very first DOAG station in Usagara as shown in Map 4.4.

³¹⁵ Tanzania defined as the modern term for the African mainland region (excluding Rwanda and Burundi) of the modern-day United Republic of Tanzania which includes Zanzibar.

By bounding the map in this manner the effect of the color to etch DOAG control over the land was magnified. It also privileged the German efforts by blocking out competing claims of control in the British efforts to the north in Mombasa. However, as the next maps show there were ways even around competing claims.

Once these claims had been made, Peters and the new German East Africa Company made strident efforts to expand the holdings in Eastern Africa. Peters commissioned, under the imprimatur of his company, sixteen expeditions from the coast to as far inland as Rwanda in an effort to establish control over the region.³¹⁶

³¹⁶ Robert Edgerton, *Africa's Armies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 39.



Map 4.6: Dr. Paul Engelhardt and I. von Wensierski. *Karte von Central-Ost-Afrika*.
1:3,000,000. Berlin: Engelhardt'schen Landkartenhandlung, 189-. Africa East (region),
LOC



Map 4.8: Dr. Paul Engelhardt and I. von Wensierski. *Karte von Central-Ost-Afrika*.

1:3,000,000. Berlin: Engelhardtischen Landkartenhandlung, 189-. Africa East (region),

LOC



Map 4.10: Dr. Paul Engelhardt and I. von Wensierski. *Karte von Central-Ost-Afrika*. 1:3,000,000. Berlin: Engelhardtischen Landkartenhandlung, 189-. Africa East (region), LOC

The above map documents the effect of these drives into the interior and Peters' goal to expand across Africa.³¹⁷ While carrying a similarly benign title as the previous map, it does contain an important addition. Beyond indicating this was a map of a specific area of Africa it notes it was made "using the material of the German East Africa Company."³¹⁸ The claims of the map to the much greater territory than noted in Pfeil's map illustrate the importance of these caravans.³¹⁹ As laid out on the map key a number of expeditions, whose routes can be seen in the close-up in Map 4.9, enabled the Company to press into the interior and sign treaties with native leaders and establish more stations.³²⁰ This map also underscores the importance of bounding in terms of the effect of the map. Unlike the previous map, which localized the gaze just on Pfeil's route, this was made to highlight the extensive claims of the DOAG. This map also served as evidence against competing claims for land. By this point the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) had established itself in Mombassa and was attempting to lay claim to territory. This illustrates how a map made under the gaze of the Despot would be used to establish ownership and create competing claims to territory. As seen in Map 4.8 the DOAG lays claim to territory well north of the eventual dividing line between German and British East Africa. Not only are the claims made to the territory of Witu,

³¹⁷ The date for this map is given by the Library of Congress as an ambiguous 189- but that date cannot be correct. An agreement to spheres of influence between the IBEAC and DOAG was signed in 1886 and the Witu territory north of Mombassa was given up in 1890.

³¹⁸ Map 4.6. In case the title is not clear in the image it is: *Karte von Central-Ost-Afrika nach authentischen Quellen unter Benutzung des Materials der Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Gesellschaft.*

³¹⁹ See Map 4.7


³²⁰ Two stations noted in Map 4.9 were described on page 103.

which would cause a great deal of problems for the IBEA, but seemed to lay claim to territory as far north as the southern-bank of the Juba River.³²¹ What also is important about this map is the way in which the indigenous population is utilized to serve European ends. Maps made during this period hardly ever noted the the boundaries of the indigenous population as in Pfeil's map. This would be even more out of place under the gaze of the Despot as these maps were created to privilege European ownership. In this case these recognitions of territorial reality should *not* be seen as benign or a belated recognition of the reality of African claims. The only reason the cartographer deigned to indicate such lines was not to suggest permanency to the claims of the native tribes but the claims of the DOAG. As the limits of the control of the company were vested in the territorial claims of those they made treaties with, it is for that purpose that these peoples were given red-lined borders. As soon as a tenuous hold was established over the territory, by the letter of the treaties and their placement on the map, the cartographer quickly did away with any semblance of indigenous ownership. This map, along with the map depicted in Map 4.11 – 4.13 below, documents the process of appropriation. The treaties made by the Europeans were reflected in the map not to indicate the peoples, but to indicate the expanding reach of the DOAG.

³²¹ As the Juba River formed the boundary between Kenya and Italian Somaliland these were quite extensive claims. The issue concerning the Witu Sultinate will be covered in Chapter 6.



Map 4.11: J.I. Kettler. *Übersichtskarte des Mittleren Ostafrika*. 1:125 miles. In *Deutsche Kolonialkarten Nr. 7*. Weimar: Geographisches Institut. Africa East (region), LOC



Map 4.12: J.I. Kettler. *Übersichtskarte des Mittleren Ostafrika*. 1:125 miles. In *Deutsche Kolonialkarten Nr. 7*. Weimar: Geographisches Institut. Africa East (region), LOC



Map 4.13: J.I. Kettler. *Übersichtskarte des Mittleren Ostafrika*. 1:125 miles. In *Deutsche Kolonialkarten Nr. 7*. Weimar: Geographisches Institut. Africa East (region), LOC

This Overview (*Übersichtskarte*) map of eastern Africa was part of a German Colonial map series.³²² This aspect of the paramap, lending credence that the map was of a colonial possession, creates the association of German ownership before the viewer even gazes on the map. As the key shows the map was to depict the holdings of a number of European countries. This seeming “neutrality” lends a scientific gloss to the overreaching claims of the German colonialists.³²³ As indicated in Map 4.13 this map continues the claim of the DOAG to land well beyond the eventual dividing line between British and German territory. The map continues to claim territory north of Mombassa including the Witu area north of the Tana River. By this point the DOAG was in heavy competition with the IBEA for land in eastern Africa and this map denies *any* encroachment on German claims by the British. In this case the map is an interesting highlight of what J.B. Harley termed “silences” on the map. Harley often used this term in reference to the empty spaces on the map, but the terminology seems to fit here as well. Silences were just as important as the rest of the map as they represented what the cartographer wanted to ignore.³²⁴ In this case the omission is any indication of a British presence on the east African coast. In fact, the only areas demarcated as under British influence is Abyssinia and Aden. But, this map also shows the next step in the process of


³²² This specific map was number 7 as part of the series *Deutsche Kolonialkarten*. As in the above map the archival date designation is ambiguous (18--). However, this map must, as in the map previous, be from before the 1890 boundary agreement if not prior to the 1886 delineation of spheres of influence.

³²³ I have not included an image for the sake of space but the German-colored territory indicated on this map also includes most of present-day Somalia!

³²⁴ Andrews, 15. See also Chapter 3 in the same volume for an overview of Harley’s argument concerning silences in maps and their many applications.

appropriating indigenous land. What had once been depicted as tribal land has now been absorbed into the pink color of “Area of the German East African Company under the protection of the Emperor.”³²⁵ No longer is there any recognition to the reality of the native tribes, only the claims of the German company. And, indeed, these claims were grandiose. By 1886 the respective governments of Britain and Germany established a commission to delineate spheres of influence in order to settle the competing claims to the territory.

³²⁵ *Gebiet d. Deutsch-Ostafrikan Gesellschaft, unt. Schutz d. Kaisers*
129



Map 4.14: *East Africa showing the recently-arranged Political Boundaries.* 1:8,000,000.

London: Edward and Weller, 1887. JRL

Map 4.14 illustrates the attempt to bring a measure of order to the competing territorial claims. The Germans still claimed the territory north of the Tana River, labeled on this map as Wito, but now the respective claims have been given permanence through the color on the map. This map also reestablishes the normative quality of denying any borders for the indigenous population. Now that European control was solidified, the borders of the indigenous population became superfluous. Even the title ascribes a greater reality to European claims. As this map documents the true “Political boundaries” the indigenous populations can fade into the background as much a possession as the land itself. However, this solidification of control rather than lessening the push for more territory heightened it all the more. Both spheres of influence colored in territory far beyond the present reach of either the IBEA or DOAG. What this map indicates is the motive power of the political blank of a map made under the gaze of the Despot. The goal for Peters became to fill in those areas that seemed “natural” to expand into. These “blanks” of control now were, in the opinion of the company, “calling” to be filled in with company stations. Each encroachment into the interior, rather than satiating the colonial desire merely heightened the desire to acquire more. Lest this all appear a German predilection the British were also active in competing for territory. The 1886 agreement also protected the Germans from the claims of British explorer Sir Harry Johnson who had secured land concessions to the southern slope of Mount

Kilimanjaro.³²⁶ While this map did settle some of the competition between the British and German colonizers, it set the stage for further violence in an attempt to reach the “natural” frontiers of German East Africa.³²⁷

This 1886 agreement on spheres was part of a general trend towards solidifying the borders of German East Africa. Border delineation was a key part of the shift to the gaze of the Despot and colonization. What made this so interesting in the colonial context was the relative openness between countries. While the claims for territory could become quite competitive, there was a common sense of cooperation between colonial powers. In comparison to previous periods of European history this was quite the aberration. Maps had long been regarded as privileged state secrets held in the highest confidence. The common penalty for those who sold charts to foreigners was death.³²⁸ In some cases the only maps released contained false information in order to protect geographical secrets. In contrast, the European colonial powers made great efforts to share cartographic information in order to clear up any misunderstandings over borders. Part of this was related to easing tensions and averting potential conflicts, but it was also related to the

³²⁶ Henderson, 61.

³²⁷ Stoecker, 95. This agreement was the first of many. As the gaze of the Despot created boundaries it also demanded greater accuracy to ensure its permanence. After the 1886 agreement a border was officially created in the 1890 diplomatic agreement between Germany and Britain. This was the agreement that famously gave up German claims in Africa for Heligoland Island. Even then there were continual reassessments such as the C.S. Smiths’ above mission in 1892. Later expeditions included the 1905 delineation of the western border, from Victoria-Nyanza to the Congo Free State, as well as a refinement of the original boundary. This is akin to the agreement between Ohio and Michigan regarding their common border, where disagreements over the meridian line used for demarcation not only nearly led to a shooting war between the states, but a 20 year delay in the final adjudication of the border. See C.E. Sherman, *Original Ohio Land Subdivision* (Columbus: Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 2005), 154.

³²⁸ Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” 92.

larger goal of making colonial boundaries more real than those of the colonized.³²⁹ Thus, all sorts of conquest could be made official and easy as “there was no conflict of interests between two practicing sides if one of those sides was the colonialist and the other – his own map.”³³⁰ A good example of this process was played out concerning German Southwest Africa. A dispute broke out due to two maps suggesting German claims to British territory. Tempers eventually cooled as it became clear the cause of the disagreement was scientific inaccuracy.³³¹ This incident led to an open dialogue between the two countries on colonial problems in order to prevent future conflicts. Both countries recognized that the goal of successful colonization required cooperation in establishing borders.³³² During a later incident at Olifants Kloof, German troops withdrew in the face of “correct” cartographic evidence.³³³ Agreements such as these were critical as:

Official maps were potentially important statements of a government’s territorial claims and could not, therefore, be easily ignored by other powers. As a result, even the most innocuous of maps, exchanged in the friendliest of circumstances for the most marginal of reasons, was capable of engendering a dispute if, in the portrayal of territorial boundaries, it

³²⁹ Noyes, 203.

³³⁰ Bialas, 172. A good example would be the decision, made by the “stroke of a pencil,” to place Kilimanjaro within the German sphere of influence. See Schnepfen, 18 and Map 4.15 – 4.17

³³¹ Matthew S. Seligmann, “Maps as the Progenitors of Territorial Disputes: Two Examples from Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa,” *Imago Mundi* 47 (1995), 174-175. The root of the dispute undermines the claims to scientific accuracy that European cartographers based their privileged position on. While the initial agreement on the border had said it would follow the 20th Meridian, “no mention made of either precisely where this meridian ran or how it was to be determined on the ground.”

³³² *Ibid.*, 177-178. This mutual interest adds additional credence to the argument made in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 that predictable and orderly boundaries, and related political control, was the prerequisite for economic development.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 178.

presented a view that differed even slightly from that of another interested power.³³⁴

There was even the amusing case in 1903 when a joint German-British surveying team reassessed the border and “properly placed” the existing towns of Stolzenfels and Reitfontein.³³⁵ Violations of these borders, enshrined with almost mythical power as seen in the above examples, demanded apologies in order to keep up the façade of the reality of these territorial limits.³³⁶ A similar case of mutual efforts at border delineation can be seen in German East Africa.

While Map 4.14 appears to provide a stable basis for IBEA/DOAG interactions, the reality was anything but. In addition to the DOAG position in Witu, which threatened to squeeze the IBEA holdings into a narrow strip from the coast, there was also considerable debate over the exact demarcation of the southern border; specifically at the town of Wanga. Wanga, present-day Vanga, Kenya, was a town on the coast directly along the 1886 dividing line. As the IBEA planned to take control of the town in August of 1889 the Germans asserted their claim to the territory. The Germans felt that vague wording of the boundary line was at fault as the agreement “was drawn up in Europe by persons not conversant with the exact geographical conditions on the east coast.”³³⁷ The sticking point was that while the line of Demarcation was to begin “from the mouth of the

³³⁴ Seligmann, 182.

³³⁵ Noyes, 284. One wonders how a town can be “placed” considering it is rooted in the ground – but this shows the conceptual power of the map, especially when driven by the gaze of the Despot to solidify the “reality” of European territorial claims.


³³⁶ Ibid., 152.

³³⁷ McDermott, 78.


river Wanga or Uмба” there was no river by that name and, in fact, no *river* at Wanga.³³⁸ During this debate the German and British governments stepped in to bring a final halt to the competing claims. In the well-known 1890 agreement German claims to Witu were given up, as well as the boundary line generally agreed to, in exchange for Heligoland Island. To underscore this new cooperative spirit between colonial competitors it was agreed that a joint-delineation committee (1889-1893) would undertake a mission to better define the proper boundary between the two countries.³³⁹ The maps made by this commission underscore the cooperation between the powers and the linkages of science to empire building as the more detailed surveys were undertaken to solve future political issues.

³³⁸ Ibid.


³³⁹ The man appointed German Boundary Commissioner, illustrating the connections between the DOAG and the state, was Dr. Carl Peters.



Map 4.15: *Anglo German Boundary in East Equatorial Africa: From the mouth of the Uмба River to Lake Jipe – Sheet III.* 1: 2 miles. London: Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1892. FO 925/280, PRO.



Map 4.16: *Anglo German Boundary in East Equatorial Africa: From the mouth of the Umba River to Lake Jipe – Sheet III. 1: 2 miles. London: Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1892. FO 925/280, PRO.*



Map 4.17: Anglo German Boundary in East Equatorial Africa: From the mouth of the Uмба River to Lake Jipe – Sheet III. 1: 2 miles. London: Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1892. FO 925/280, PRO.


This sketch map indicates a number of ways the gaze of the Despot helped to carve up Africa. Many colonial narratives will describe how borders were created at the stroke of a pen, and it is evident that this was exactly what was occurring in these negotiations over the border.³⁴⁰ The source of negotiation concerned the river falsely located south of Wanga. Negotiations further inland, around Mount Kilimanjaro, had located a point at which a straight boundary line would be drawn to the coast. At this point, however, the British suggested an alteration from the mathematical line to better follow the actual course of the river. Bisecting the colonies in such a way that Germany would possess a tiny foothold on the opposite side of the river would not only appear of little value, it likely would appear “silly” to the cartographer. In this case there is another instance of maps not representing reality as much as making the world legible; in this case by making a border that easily demarcates the political boundary between the colonies. Additionally, the negotiations are quite clear by the signatures of Lieutenant S. Fromm and Dr. Peters indicating their agreement to these changes.³⁴¹ This is not to suggest that that Dr. Peters accepted this at first blush. Early on in the delineation process he asserted the right to the port of Wanga as defined in the, previously noted, geographically false

³⁴⁰ “So many bargains and strokes of the pen were legitimized once placed on a map and acquired a force of law.” Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” 59.

³⁴¹ Lt. Fromm of the Imperial German Navy surveyed the neighborhood of Wanga as part of the delination commission. See “Commission for Delimitation of Boundary Between British and German Spheres of Influence on the East Coast of Africa” FO 2/76 (PRO) for all material related to these discussion. The eventual agreement, found on page 255 of FO2/76 as part of the official agreement reads as follows: “[the boundary] shall run from the Indian Ocean along the northern bank of the Jimbo creek, making the foreshore in the British sphere, as far as the eastern mouth of the Ngobwe Ndogo. It shall then follow the eastern bank of the Ngobwe creek to its end, and then run to the point where the above described straight line from Ras Jimbo to Lake Jipe meets the rising ground on which the village of Jasini stands.”

1886 agreement.³⁴² This orderly progression of territorial adjustment, which certainly would not have taken play, for example, in changing the Franco-German border in Alsace-Lorraine, illustrates how all the European powers understood the conceptual power of the map. Fundamentally, the goal of European border delineation was to settle concerns in order to privilege a European understanding of the land. If there were debates along this river route, for example, this would call into question the entire reality of *all* of the European claims. If we examine the rest of the maps made by this commission we can illustrate the importance of these maps to political settlements.


³⁴² See Commissioner Smith to the Earl of Roseberry December 30, 1892pg. 125 of FO 2/76 (PRO). In summarizing Peters actions to the Earl of Roseberry Sir Rennel Rodd would note Peters “ungracious inconsistency” as he lay claim to territory he never agreed to investigate with Commissioner Smith. See Mr. Rodd to the Earl of Rosebery January 18, 1893 pg. 129 of FO 2/76 (PRO).



Map 4.18: *The Kilimanjaro Mountain and its Neighbourhood*. 1: 255,440. FO 2/76, PRO.



Map 4.20: *The Kilimanjaro Mountain and its Neighbourhood*. 1: 255,440. FO 2/76, PRO.



Map 4.21: *The Kilimanjaro Mountain and its Neighbourhood*. 1: 255,440. FO 2/76, PRO.

This next series of maps outline the debates and settlement of the frontier along Mt. Kilimanjaro by this same commission and the establishment of the geographical line that was debated on the coast. These maps are of incredible importance in how they lay out the actions of the gaze of the Despot and connect such maps with political settlements. Before analyzing the politics it is engaging to see how the gaze of the Despot has subsumed geographical knowledge. One of the great catalysts to exploration of the east African interior was the reports of a snow-capped mountain in Africa.³⁴³ This mountain, Mount Kilimanjaro, attracted great attention as explorers all sought to discover and conquer its heights. Thus, the details provided on the map came from endless journeys as explorers moved inland from the coast to claim this prize. However, all of that knowledge is nothing more than a template for what really matters under this gaze – political division. This map is a microchasm of the entire colonial process in Africa and the usurpation of the previous map gaze. The first map indicates the strong connection between these maps and political decision-makers.³⁴⁴ The map indicates the competing claims given for the territory around Mt. Kilimanjaro. The genesis of the debate centered around what was defined as the “Chaga” and who had control over the eastern slope of the mountain.³⁴⁵ The problem, as it was with the 1886 agreement and the port of Wanga,

³⁴³ Lending further credence to the wave thesis, the mountain was first sighted by Reverend Dr. Johann Ludwig Krapf and Reverend Johann Rebmann. See Part I of Nigel Pavitt, *Kenya: The First Explorers* (London: Aurum Press, 1989).

³⁴⁴ Refer to Maps 4.18 and 4.19 for this analysis.

³⁴⁵ The foregoing debate on the “Chagga” is summarized in Commissioner C.S. Smith’s correspondence to the Earl of Roseberry (December 30th, 1892) on pages 117-129 of FO 2/76. For Commissioner Smith’s

was one of wording by government officials who possessed a less than accurate understanding of the country. The wording of the treaty suggested a boundary “midway between Taveta and Chaga.”³⁴⁶ This debate over the exact “midway” point between these definitions is played out on the map. The faint red line encompasses the claim of the British to territory around Kilimanjaro while the blue highlights what Peters asserted was a “natural boundary.”³⁴⁷ As far as the Germans were concerned the territory of Chaga encompassed the entire mountain of Kilimanjaro. The British, possessing a treaty with the Taveta to the southeast of Kilimanjaro, argued that this control extended onto the eastern slope of the mountain.³⁴⁸ Commissioner Smith investigated these claims and came to the conclusion that this association was due to ill-informed coastal residents who used the term, which was unknown to the actual residents of the mountain as they did not speak Swahili, as a catch-all for the entirety of Kilimanjaro. This debate over tribal claims brings us back full circle to the initial maps of this chapter. A third map in this series made by Commissioner Smith drew the faint lines of the Kimangelya, Useri, and Rombo peoples on the eastern slope of Kilimanjaro who, as his investigation indicated,

report of the boundary commission to the Royal Geographic Society see C.S. “The Anglo-German Boundary in East Equatorial Africa. Proceedings of the British Commission, 1892” in *The Geographical Journal* 4, no. 5 (November, 1894): 424-437.

³⁴⁶ These representing not exact locations but the associated territory with the indigenous groups.

³⁴⁷ His claim that there was a natural boundary from mountain side to steppe was described by Commissioner Smith as “an optical delusion.”

³⁴⁸ Being yet another instance where the territorial boundaries of African tribes only mattered in relation to European interests.

were not “Chaga.”³⁴⁹ This map also indicates that the initial British claim, jutting in like a salient to German claims, was actually the territorial claims of the Taveta. Therefore, the entirety of this debate returns to the utilization of indigenous territorial claims, as indicated in Map 4.7, for European purposes. These tribal claims to territory mattered only in so far as they helped settled a European debate over the boundary between German and British claims. Once the border was finalized it would be filled in with colonial color and wash-away any indication of these tribal claims to political identity. The second map, in Maps 4.20 and 4.21, shows the further progression of the debate as the British and German governments sought a final line. The numerous claims drawn onto the map simply serves to underscore how mere pencil strokes carved up the continent with little, if any, care as to who was being drawn upon. It also subverts the supposed inviolability of colonial borders which is the false reality the gaze of the Despot attempts to create.

One final note is the importance of science and pacification to assuring proper borders. As shown in Map 4.22 the basis for the territorial division was due to extensive triangulation work that the commission undertook to assure the accuracy of their findings. Considering the headaches caused by the Wanga debate it makes sense that they would commit to such an effort. This effort does expose several other truths. First,

³⁴⁹ An additional map found in FO 2/76 documents the claims of these respective tribes which has not been included for the sake of space. Smith’s reports also suggest Peters simply enjoyed being intransigent as he refused to accompany him when he investigated these tribal claims.

this documents the continued use of cartographic science to enable the growth of empire.³⁵⁰ Route surveys and rough triangulations were made by many explorers in helping unlock Africa for Europeans. What this map indicates, which will become even more pronounced under the gaze of the Developer, is the dramatic increase in knowledge required by each subsequent gaze. While sparse route sketches were more than enough when documenting the location of Mt. Kilimanjaro, that type of map would be woefully inadequate when trying to accurately demarcate the boundary between states. The advance of cartographic information went alongside the advance of colonial control. Related to this, as will be shown below, was the importance of violence to assure such political and scientific accuracy. A trigonometric survey is a “slow systematic labor-intensive endeavor that could only be carried out *after* a territory was under effective colonial control.”³⁵¹ The demands for accuracy as part of a trigonometric survey are very taxing and, apart from the debates on the actual dividing line, was the reason the boundary commission took so many years.³⁵² Therefore, these efforts could only be expended in areas that had been pacified. The importance of force to this process is

³⁵⁰ The importance of trigonometric surveys to the growth of British dominance in India is well documented by Matthew Edney, *Mapping an Empire: The Geographic Construction of British India, 1765-1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

³⁵¹ Kennedy, 1891.

³⁵² For a good summary of the meticulous attention to detail and slow-going that typifies a trigonometric survey see Larrie D. Ferreiro, *Measure of the Earth: The Enlightenment Expedition that Reshaped the World*, (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 11-12 with a good narrative of the experience laid out in the book’s opening paragraph. While Ferreiro’s book documents an early 18th century effort to triangulate in the New World, the process would be quite similar to the that which C.S. Smith and Lt. Fromm would have used. The only real advances in surveying from this period to the 19th Century was not in process but in the tools available which provided a greater level of scientific accuracy.

backed up by a German station (Fumba fort) on the south east side of Mt. Kilimanjaro. As the imperial colors pressed in on the map this important connection to force is often forgotten in colonial narratives.

The last interesting feature of these series of maps was the high level of governmental involvement in what was being demarcated. As seen in Map 4.18 the Secretary of State authorized a median line, north of the Chala Nakurtu lake, in an attempt to find an agreement. This underscores that maps were viewed by government officials as part and parcel of any proper policy-making agreement.³⁵³ Beyond the marking made at the direction of the Secretary of State this entire map series was also sent, as noted in a written note at the top of each, to Sir Edward Malet the British Ambassador to the German Empire.³⁵⁴ A final agreement was reached defining the spheres on July 8, 1893 with all of the above negotiations enshrined in reality through another map.³⁵⁵ The neat red line of this newest map silenced the existence of competing claims and solidified the reality of the agreed-upon boundary. As the gaze of the Despot solidified it created a new reality denying not only indigenous claims to the land but competing European ones. Thus, this agreement and map could be easily viewed in the 1895 book The Map of Africa by Treaty, helping enshrine the reality of this boundary in

³⁵³ It should be noted that the PRO archivists connected the maps to these accompanying government debates implicitly as both were given the same Foreign Office designation.

³⁵⁴ Sir Edward Malet served as Ambassador from 1884-1895.

³⁵⁵ See Sheets I, II, and III of the “Anglo German Boundary in East Equatorial Africa” found in FO 925/280, PRO.

public consciousness with no sense of alternate visions.³⁵⁶ This obliteration of other claims served the cartographic purpose of pacifying the African interior and adding a scientific permanency to the agreed borders. Despite what the map indicated the treaty agreement itself noted that “the future correction of mistakes, if such should be proved to exist by further examination, is mutually reserved.”³⁵⁷ Indeed, this would take place in 1903-1904 as a joint border delineation commission would again be sent out to refine the border and extend their work from the Victoria-Nyanza to the border of the Congo Free State.³⁵⁸ For scholars these border maps underscore how important maps were viewed by contemporaries and suggest the need to incorporate cartographic study into our works.

As the overt competition between the British and German was generally muted from 1886 onwards the German East Africa Company attempted to solidify their gains.³⁵⁹ Peters granted rights to sub-companies, such as the East African Plantation Company and the German Planters Company, and by 1888 thirty sub-companies had established

³⁵⁶ See E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty, Volume III: Great Britain and Germany to United States*, 3rd edition (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1967), 911-912. This book is a good example of what Barrow described as “Associative History” as African territory was divvied up neatly in the accompanying maps and treaties.

³⁵⁷ See pg. 266 of FO 2/76.

³⁵⁸ For the British version of the map see CO 700/East Africa 33 at the PRO. Additional two copies can be found at the JRL, an official color version (*Map of the Anglo-German Boundary from Victoria Nyanza to Long. 30 E. 1:100,000*) and a black-and-white refinement (*Anglo-German Boundary: East Africa 1904-1905. 1:100,000*. Geographic Section of the General Staff, 1906) of the line east of Kilimanjaro. For a German copy of the same agreement see *Die Deutsch-Englische Grenze zwischen 30 Längengrad und dem Djipe-See. 1:1,000,000*. In *Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, Band XX*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1907, LOC.

³⁵⁹ Again Peters attempted to subvert the agreement, in this case advancing into Uganda. His efforts will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6.

themselves in German East Africa.³⁶⁰ The company was free to do this as the German government placed neither restrictions on the company nor any protections for the Africans under their control.³⁶¹ The government wanted to follow the model of the British East India company and foist guardianship of the territory on the DOAG.³⁶² Peters' efforts are to be admired if only for the "swiftness with which Germany, guided by Peters, assumed her sovereignty over this new colony of which she had never heard."³⁶³ However, Peters rapacious desire to extract as much as possible from the colony carried the seeds of his company's own destruction. His statement that, "the one thing which would make an impression on these wild sons of the steppe was a bullet from the repeater or the double-barreled rifle, and then only when employed in emphatic relation to their own bodies," suggests as much about the company's business practices.³⁶⁴ Peters' efforts to increase control over the coastal environs, challenging the Sultan of Zanzibar's authority by occupying seven coastal towns in August of 1888, raised tensions to a fevered pitch.³⁶⁵ The spark which set off a colonial rebellion was when Emil von Zelewski, one of the reserve officers who had conducted treaty gathering operations for the company, stormed a mosque full of worshipers on the Islamic holiday

³⁶⁰ Gwassa, 101.

³⁶¹ Gann and Duignan, 11.

³⁶² Townsend, 125.

³⁶³ Steere, G.L. *The Judgment on German Africa*, 249 quoted in Edgerton, 101.

³⁶⁴ Carl Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa* (London, 1891, 222) quoted in Driver, 137.

³⁶⁵ Michael Von Herff, "They walk through the fire like the blondest German: African Soldiers Serving the Kaiser in German East Africa 1888-1914" (master's thesis, McGill University July 1991), 8.

of *Eid al-Hajj* in the Pangani region.³⁶⁶ The revolt against the lash of the German East African Company led to its collapse as it proved unable to quell the rebellion in the colony.³⁶⁷ The DOAG was so weakened it fell back to the port towns of Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam and, in siege-like conditions, waited for German support.³⁶⁸ While Peters had been the driving force behind the colonization of German East Africa, his colony was now left in the hands of an uncommitted government and the leadership of Chancellor Bismarck who, as late as 1889, confessed, “From the start I have not been a colonial person.”³⁶⁹

With this rebellion, the German government was left in the unenviable position of trying to quell a rebellion in a colony it had not wanted and had little desire to keep. If Bismarck, who had objected to the granting of a charter to the company in the first place, had been given freedom of action it is likely that “Germany’s India” would have “gone the way of the Dodo.”³⁷⁰ In response to this opportunity he said, “I would rather give up the whole East African colonial venture than agree to a military campaign to the interior.”³⁷¹ That such a campaign was eventually agreed upon denotes the changes in public consciousness that had occurred in a mere four years. The reasons for these

³⁶⁶ Askew, 42. That von Zelewski, nicknamed “the Hammer”, would ascend to a position in the *Schutztruppe*, eventually falling in battle with the Hehe in 1891, illustrates the private and state commitment to violence in order to assure German colonial success. Peter Abbott, *Colonial Armies in Africa 1850-1918* (Nottingham: Foundry Books, 2006), 147.

³⁶⁷ Killingray, 94.

³⁶⁸ Iliffe, *History of Tanganyika*, 93.

³⁶⁹ Herwig, 96.

³⁷⁰ Townsend, 59.

³⁷¹ Killingray, 95.

changes are several. First, Peters was adamantly committed to the colonial venture and, even if failing personally, desired that his legacy be preserved in the continuation of the colony. He was also adept at public relations and used the threat of the loss of *all* German colonies to rally public support. Aided by the now 43,000 members of the German Colonial Society he was able to broadcast his message quite strongly.³⁷² He was also not hindered with the knowledge that the new Kaiser had “a direct financial interest in the company.”³⁷³ Second, while Bismarck objected to colonies the *Reichstag* did not. In an act of loophole mismanagement in the creation of the German constitution, Bismarck had managed to ensure that the colonies would be one of the few areas over which the *Reichstag* could possess full budgetary power.³⁷⁴ Lastly, it seems clear that the idea of the colonies had penetrated into the public mind as something Germany needed. It is impossible to prove if the dissemination of the colonial maps helped solidify this consciousness, but it likely played a role. Maps serve to codify, legitimize and promulgate the dominant vision of a society, and by extension solidify that vision in the mind of its viewer.³⁷⁵ Additionally, by distributing large numbers of the “correct” map the space is standardized while “representations that differ from the model are quickly

³⁷² While small in number, especially in comparison to much larger organizations like the Navy League (*Flottenverein*), this society was made up of a number of influential individuals who certainly understood the inclinations of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his *Weltpolitik*. For example, the very *Schutzbrief* that authorized German protection over the DOAG in 1888 was granted by Kaiser Wilhelm II over the objections of Chancellor Bismarck. See von Herff, 7 and Conrad, 26.

³⁷³ Killingray, 95.

³⁷⁴ Andrew Roberts, “The Imperial Mind” in *The Cambridge History of Africa* ed. J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver, 24-76 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 29.

³⁷⁵ Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” in *Cartographica*, 6.

denounced as aberrant.”³⁷⁶ The strong atlas publishing community within Germany suggests that this was a booming market and many customers would have become familiar with the colonial efforts.³⁷⁷ With these constraints in place, Bismarck recognized the need to commit forces to quell the rebellion in what would now become a state colony. Illustrating more clearly than most examples the connection between exploration and conquest, Bismarck turned the operation over to one of the chief German explorers of equatorial Africa – Hermann von Wissmann.³⁷⁸ He was the perfect figure for the government to enlist as his exploratory exploits gave him the cache to persuade the *Reichstag* to commit the funds necessary for a punitive expedition.³⁷⁹

It was reported that Bismarck’s instructions to Captain Wissmann were as follows: “I am not the Imperial Court War Council in Vienna... I repeat, you have just

³⁷⁶ Jacob, 315. This reproduction lent a legitimacy to colonial claims and it is “precisely through the process of making a power situation appear a fact in the nature of the world that traditional authority works.” Bloch, 79.

³⁷⁷ A good example of this dominance is related by Crone: “The commercial ascendancy of German cartographical publishers continued to the end of the century. Thus, all the maps in the large *Universal Atlas*, published by Cassel and Co. (a British publishing house) in 1893 for the Atlas Publishing Company, London, bear the imprint ‘Printed in Leipzig.’” Crone, 129. For a good overview of German Atlas companies see the chart “German Atlas Development During the Nineteenth Century” on page 209 in Wolfgang Scharfe, “German atlas development during the nineteenth century,” in *Images of the World: The Atlas through History*, ed. Johan Amadeus Wolter and Ronald E. Grimm (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 209.

³⁷⁸ Another spelling issue as his name has been written as Wissman or Wismann, I have chosen the latter due to its use in the Royal Geographic Society’s official obituary listed below.

³⁷⁹ His background illustrates another continuation between gazes. Hermann von Wissmann was an explorer of some repute having crossed Africa twice and a recipient of a “Patron’s Medal” from the Royal Geographic Society “in recognition of his great achievements as an explorer in Central Africa.” E.G.G., “Obituary: Hermann von Wissmann” in *The Geographical Journal* 26, no 2 (August, 1905), 228.

one order: Conquer,” which is exactly what he did.³⁸⁰ Building off the example of other colonial powers, Wissmann created an Africanized force (the *Wissmanntruppe*) led by white officers and NCOs.³⁸¹ Arriving in May of 1889, Wissmann faced a dire situation. With the help of the Navy, the German East Africa Company had managed to fortify and hold their two coastal stations in Bagamoyo and Dar es-Salaam. Otherwise, the entire 700 km coast was in rebel hands.³⁸² After taking the rebel fort outside of Dar es-Salaam, Wissmann proceeded to clear out rebel areas at Pangani, Kilwa, Sadani, and Bagamoyo so that by July the coastal region was retaken.³⁸³ Rather than recounting the successive waves of battles it is important to note how much violence was undertaken once the gaze of the Despot had taken over. This is often forgotten in the effort to create a neat historical division between the exploration and colonization of Africa. These narratives create a false dichotomy of conquest or peace. They present European colonialism as a single conquest and afterwards a peaceful colony. The only violence allowed in these narratives is the initial conquest or large-scale indigenous resistance. Narratives of German East Africa follow this pattern suggesting after Wissmann’s reconquest of the

³⁸⁰ Col. Ernst Nigmann, *German Schutztruppe in East Africa: History of the Imperial Protectorate Force 1889-1911*, Trans. Robert E. Bohrenwend (Nashville: Battery Press, 2005), 1.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 2. His force consisted of six Sudanese companies (600 men), 20 Turkish police, 50 Somalis, and 350 Ngoni from Portuguese Mozambique. By the end of 1899 his force consisted of some 1,000 *askari* and 60 German officers and N.C.Os. See Abbott, 141.

³⁸² Nigmann, 7 and von Herff, 12.

³⁸³ Nigmann, 14.

coast the colony was peaceful until the Maji-Maji revolt of 1905.³⁸⁴ However, as made clear through the pages of the official history of the *Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Deutsch Ost-Afrika*, it was involved in near constant fighting from 1889-1902.³⁸⁵ It is clear that as the gaze shifted to that of the Despot the level of force increased to achieve what was colored in on the maps.

³⁸⁴ As the DOAG had proven itself incapable of holding onto eastern Africa the territory was declared a crown colony on January 1st, 1891 and the *Wissmanntruppe* was renamed the Imperial Defense Force for German East Africa. Von Herff, 14.

³⁸⁵ In fact, from the period of 1889 and 1896 there was an average of nine punitive expeditions a year. Abbott, 147.



Map 4.23: A. Tonger. *Übersichtskarte des Kriegsschauplatzes von Ost-Africa mit der englischen und deutschen Emin Pascha Expedition*. Berlin: C. Korbgeleit's Geogr. Lith. Institut, 1890. Africa, East Africa (Region), LOC.



Map 4.24: A. Tonger. *Übersichtskarte des Kriegsschauplatzes von Ost-Africa mit der englischen und deutschen Emin Pascha Expedition.* Berlin: C. Korbgeweit's Geogr. Lith. Institut, 1890. Africa, East Africa (Region), LOC.

The above map documents in numerous ways force was used to ensure colonialism through punitive expeditions of the *Schutztruppe*. The title of the map describes it as a map documenting the East African theater of war.³⁸⁶ Thus, the gaze of the despot had changed *Ost-Afrika* from a possession into a zone of combat in order to control what it had conquered cartographically. Some of the expeditions undertaken are noted in the dotted lines of the *Schutztruppe* expeditions of Map 4.25. Even as the map documents the invasions to control territory deemed German, the map also suggests where there would be future conflict. As shown in Map 4.24 the general boundaries of the colony had been established and the goal of the military was to assure what was contained inside these boundaries become German. Like a stain the DOAG claims were to spill out until reaching the “natural frontiers” of the German colonial possession.³⁸⁷ Only through a liberal application of force was this cartographic conquest to be made real. In the case of German East Africa, most colonial warfare occurred within the context of repression rather than conquest.³⁸⁸ The problem was that most of the indigenous populations did not believe they had been conquered. In fact, many had not. However, under the gaze of the Despot the borders of German East Africa had been established and what opposition Wissmann faced was not seen as a fight between autonomous political entities, but a

³⁸⁶ *Übersichtskarte des Kriegsschauplatzes von Ost-Afrika.*

³⁸⁷ As this map was made in 1890 it suggests that not only the whole of Kilimanjaro but also Taveta itself belong within the borders of German East Africa.

³⁸⁸ Oliver, 199.

rebellion against the ordered rule enshrined in the map. As in Europe, Africa had been partitioned and Wissmann was attempting to control what was German:

But there was one great difference: in European history, annexations and wars were followed by peace treaties, boundaries, and maps. In Africa, they started with maps and treaties and war came later, if at all.³⁸⁹

During the period of 1891-1897 alone the *Schutztruppe* officially fought sixty campaigns, “even though local commanders reported only the more serious expeditions.”³⁹⁰ In the official history of the *Schutztruppe* the lowest number of “major military operations” indicated per year from 1889-1905 was when only three operations were undertaken in 1901-1903.³⁹¹ This proves that the *Schutztruppe* were involved in near constant punitive expeditions well before the major rebellion in 1905. This does not even include other violent pacification activities. Wissmann was known for demonstrating the power of the machine-gun in order to show dominance over a region, and distributed rewards or punishments depending on what the communities did.³⁹² In the case of actual resistance harsh measures were adopted from taking women and children as hostages to divvying up cattle amongst the loyal troops to economically devastate the rebellious party.³⁹³ This violence increased as the *Schutztruppe*, an autonomous power, sought to “influence in the

³⁸⁹ Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism*, 98.

³⁹⁰ Killingray, 97.

³⁹¹ Compiled from Appendix 5 “Listing of the Major Military Operations and Actions with Details of the Participating Leaders and Units” in Nigmann, 204-218.

³⁹² Koponen, 131. This overzealousness would lead to Wissmann to be recalled in 1891 as the *Reichstag* blanched at his having spent *four times* the agreed amount for his punitive expeditions. Von Herff, 26.

³⁹³ Koponen, 131

genesis of colonial policy, rather than merely in its implementation.”³⁹⁴ Emil von Zelewski, who assumed command of the *Schutztruppe* after Wissmann’s dismissal, refused to follow Governor von Soden’s conciliatory line and pressed into the interior for a punitive expedition against the Hehe near present-day Iringa, Tanzania. Ambushed by 3,000 Hehe warriors at Lugalo on August 17, 1891 it was the greatest defeat in the history of the *Schutztruppe*. Emil von Zelewski was killed along with 9 other European officers, 200 *askaris* and 96 porters.³⁹⁵ These losses brought about a large scale conflict that was only ended in 1898.³⁹⁶

Indigenous resistance had a great effect on the ability of the German colonists to explore and control large areas defined as German-controlled on the map. A good example would be the region of Kilimanjaro. While it was successfully scaled in 1861 the area remained in flux for quite some time. During the 1880s, the two indigenous tribes around Kilimanjaro, the Rindi and Sina, competed for control by hiring mercenaries to fight their rival. Not until 1889, were the explorers Baumann and Meyers

³⁹⁴ Von Herff, 27. A good example of this continued autonomy was that after Governor von Soden only ex-officers were appointed to the Governorship. Following von Soden was Friederich Freiherr von Schele in 1893 followed by Hermann von Wissmann himself in 1895-1896. He was later replaced by a former Prussian staff officer, Eduard von Liebert, who was followed in 1901 by another ex-soldier Adolf Graf von Götzen. So committed were these ex-officers that they all, sans Wissmann, led troops in battle. The leader of the *Schutztruppe* during Wissmann’s tenure was none other than Lothar von Trotha who would become infamous in his actions against the Herero in German Southwest Africa. Because of this military influence the *Schutztruppe* were nearly autonomous, with their own separate military authority (*Oberkommando der Schutztruppen*) in Berlin that local commanders could appeal to over any civilian oversight. Koponen, 97.

³⁹⁵ Von Herff, 24.

³⁹⁶ Abbott, 147. Von Herff notes that this conflict was so troublesome that the Germans adopted “mild policies” towards the Hehe in order to avert a second uprising. Von Herff, 25.

able to arrive in Moshi on the south slope of the mountain.³⁹⁷ Even then the *Schutztruppe* were in weak position as most of their forces were drawn south against the Hehe. This even led to seeking the help of local mercenaries (*ruga ruga*) and the German Anti-Slavery Committee for help.³⁹⁸ While the region was explored it was not until 1893, that troops were able to fight a battle for control of the area and even then Carl Peters could, in 1895, only “recommend” it as an area of future settlement.³⁹⁹ Even after this conquest there were periodic rebellions, up to February of 1900, until the *Schutztruppe* established a post in Arusha to keep the region under control. Fighting such as this, which permeated the entirety of the colony almost non-stop from 1884-1907, has largely been ignored due to the overarching colonial narrative. Without the actions of the *Schutztruppe* it is likely the gaze of the Despot would have been strangled in the cradle. Tied to this the map was the motive force for all of this violent action. The *Schutztruppe* literally were the “teacher of the nation” as they attempted to use military force to make reality coincide with what was depicted on the map.

As the *Schutztruppe* quelled these successive rebellions out of the ashes of those conflicts arose a whole military apparatus of civil control designed to assure German

³⁹⁷ Mann, 109-110. That there was such a lack of control over the mountain belies Peters’ claims that the Germans possessed the entirety of Mount Kilimanjaro.

³⁹⁸ Ralph A. Austen, *Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics 1889-1939* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 32. Despite the benign name the Anti-Slavery Committee had already assisted German efforts by supporting a retaliatory attack in 1892 on the Nyamwezi. Von Herff, 22. Described by Koponen as an armed band, it was well-known for its cruelty. See Koponen, 130. Their importance from Usambara to Kilimanjaro can be traced by the map made documenting their various expeditions. See *Originalkarte des Nördlichen Deutsch-Ostafrika für das Deutsche-Antisklaverei-Komitee*. 1:600,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1894, JRL.

³⁹⁹ Perras, 114, 191.

hegemony. Administrative centers were set up in one of four types of locations; along trade routes, locations of large labor forces, areas of high economic and migratory potential, and areas of high resistance.⁴⁰⁰ After the defeat of an uprising in the northern section of the colony, for example, garrisons were set up in the Pare Mountains at Kisiwani and Makanya to collect taxes.⁴⁰¹ There was a strong military presence as the civil authorities had largely ceded their power to the military, understanding that it was only through force that any governance was possible.⁴⁰² That German East Africa was the most populous of the German colonies, at nearly 8 million inhabitants, but only possessed 1,700 troops, it is unsurprising that government was largely left in the hands of the local officers. This was codified by Imperial Decree expanding the responsibilities of the *Schutztruppe* from defense to administration of the interior.⁴⁰³ Therefore, the *Schutztruppe* took over all manner of governmental functions from building public-wells to roads.⁴⁰⁴ Districts in German East Africa were modeled after Military Districts in Germany with the officers controlling the local police and authorized to detain any individual deemed to have “obstructed the maintenance of law and order.”⁴⁰⁵ Part of the attraction of service in the colonies, despite all the risks of death and disease, was that the

⁴⁰⁰ Gwassa, 103. This is not to suggest these are four distinct locations as an overlap between these types of locations was the norm.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., 106. These attempts to collect hut taxes in the southern half of the colony would serve as the catalyst for the Maji-Maji Revolt in 1905. See Von Herff, 38.

⁴⁰² Nigmann, 104 and Mann, 22. Colonial policies in the main were implemented by the *Schutztruppe* almost exclusively between 1889 and 1907 without civilian oversight.

⁴⁰³ Given on 7 September, 1894. Von Herff, 28.

⁴⁰⁴ Von Herff, 34. As we switch to the gaze of the Developer it is critical to remember the continued importance of this military force to all of the colonial economic development.

⁴⁰⁵ Mann, 202.

colony served as a “private reserve” where they could escape the routines of garrison duties and seek promotion.⁴⁰⁶ One *Schutztruppe* officer described his duties as similar to those of:

a Roman procurator with his legion in some distant province: exciting, independent, manly, and instructive...responsible for the well-being of thousands of people in an area where quick decision making was often impaired by the long distances that separated the government's representatives...Relying often on pure military might, we entered unknown regions and from the bomas, spread German influence in all directions to acclimatize the population to the New Order.⁴⁰⁷

As the Africans under their control were not considered citizens (*Reichsangehörige*) but subjects (*Untertanen*) it was easy these officers to see their duties in such a romantic light.⁴⁰⁸ Many came to see the colonies as a way to create a “New Germany.” As the laws governing Germany did not apply in the colonies the *Schutztruppe* was free to “enact legislation in the colonies irrespective of the metropole’s law code.”⁴⁰⁹ The training of the officers destined for colonial duty suggested that the government was well aware of the plethora of duties they would face. Their training included courses in tropical hygiene, Islamic law and African studies.⁴¹⁰ In addition, while German was not

⁴⁰⁶ Even Wissmann had expressed this hope after his travels across Africa intending to “throw up his commission in the Prussian army” as, after his experiences in Africa, “it would be impossible for him to submit to the drudgery of drilling recruits from year’s end to year’s end.” E.C.G., 228.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 203. *Bomas* defined as a fortification manned by 6-7 officers and N.C.Os and anywhere from a few dozen to a hundred African troops. See Koponen, 138.

⁴⁰⁸ Gann and Duignan, 73.

⁴⁰⁹ This led to quite discriminatory regimes which privileged white settlers and officials over Africans. Conrad, 37.


⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 43. These were courses that were part of the mandatory *Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen* at the Berlin University for all future officers. They often would spend 3-6 hours daily at the Colonial Office studying. See Gann and Duignan, 55.

compulsory in the colonial schools established in German East Africa, it was mandated for every *Schutztruppe* officer to learn Swahili.⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ Koponen, 569.



Map 4.26: P. Sprigande and M. Moisel. *Kilimandscharo (B5)*. 1:300,000. In *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer, 1911, JRL.



Map 4.27: P. Sprigande and M. Moisel. *Tanga (C6)*. 1:300,000. In *Karte von Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer, 1911, JRL.

While acting as rulers in a number of outposts the *Schutztruppe* served to bring the gaze of the Despot into the deepest reaches of the colony. In the first case the *Schutztruppe* were responsible for most of the cartographic advances in the colony from 1888 onwards. Four border survey expeditions were taken under the command of a Major Schlobach, and much of the detail in the *Karte von Deutsch Ost-Afrika*, as seen in Map 4.25 and 4.26, was due to their collected work.⁴¹² Colonel Nigmann praises these efforts in particular noting that

Today's map of German East Africa exists almost entirely thanks to the industrious and voluntary exertions of their Force officers, who, with watch and compass, took every opportunity to make cartographic observations of the countryside along their lines of march.⁴¹³

Unfortunately, the surveys done by the *Schutztruppe* were lost during the First World War.⁴¹⁴ One map that does salvage these losses, and indicates the role of the *Schutztruppe* in mapping the colony, is the Massai-Reserve map made to the south of Mt. Kilimanjaro.⁴¹⁵ In the key it notes how the map was made by two academics as well as

⁴¹² Nigmann, 113.

⁴¹³ Ibid. He went on to describe the following as the “status of cartography today”: “1. On the borders, 36,000 km² have been trigonometrically measured and mapped. 2. The mapping of the colony at 1:300,000 in 29 sheets with 6 attachments, have all appeared in print, except for 2 sheets. 3. The mapping (great German Colonial Atlas) at 1:1,000,000 in 9 sheets has 8 of the 9 sheets completed. 4. A military operations map for the colony – overviews of roads, provisions, water supplies, population densities, etc., at 1:1,000,000 has also appeared in 8 sheets. 5. A considerable number of specialized maps of the different regions are available at large scale.” In addition he later notes that a Military Orientation Notebook includes a “military route map of the colony in 8 sheets” which provided exhaustive knowledge of all possible theaters of war within the colony. See page 174.

⁴¹⁴ Stone, 96.

⁴¹⁵ *Das Massai-Reservat Südlich des Kilimandscharo*. 1:200,000. Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1910. nr Tanzania S.57, RGS.

Major von Prittwitz und Gaffron who was an officer in the *Schutztruppe*.⁴¹⁶ Beyond this officer's involvement it lists twenty-one others whose unpublished observations aided in the construction of this map. Of these twenty-one observers, nearly 2/3rds (13) were officers in the *Schutztruppe*.⁴¹⁷ By far the greatest compliment to these surveyors was the high opinion Commissioner Charles Eliot had for their mapping in comparison to the efforts in British East Africa:

In this respect [cartography] we are deplorably backward. When I was Commissioner of the Protectorate, I habitually consulted a German map, which took some account of the districts on our side of the boundary, and nourished myself, so to speak on the crumbs which fell from the Teutonic table. They were better than any repast which our own cartographers could provide.⁴¹⁸

Secondly, these cartographic efforts were linked the practical efforts of the *Schutztruppe* to extend and solidify German control over territory. As they exerted more controlling force over the interior and its people this level of control over the land and people was reflected in the map. The great detail indicated in these maps served as the prerequisite to the economic development seen under the gaze of the Developer. This is best played

⁴¹⁶ *Auf Grundlage der astronomischen Ortsbestimmungen Prof. Dr. Kohlschüters und unter Mitbenutzung der von Prof. Dr. Uhlig geodätisch beobachteten Dreieckspunkte hauptsächlich nach den Aufnahmen des Majors v. Prittwitz u. Graffon.*

⁴¹⁷ A listing of these officers: Hptm. Glauning, Stabsarzt Dr. Hoesemann, Unteroff. Jaster, Oberltm. Lademann, Hptm. Langheld, Lt. V. Lindeiner, Hptm. Matting, Lt. Reitzenstein, Lt. Rothert, Major Schlobach, Lt. Stadlbaur, Obstlt. V. Trotha, and Stabsarzt Dr. Widenmann. Those who were not officers also included government officials such as Forester (*Förster*) Jahn, Road building official (*Wegebaubeamter*), and district officer (*Bezirksamtmanne*) The *Schutztruppe* officers can also be checked, and found, in Appendix 10 (Rank Lists) in Nigmann, 236-263.

⁴¹⁸ Sir Charles Eliot, *The East Africa Protectorate* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 257. This lack of detailed mapping of the border region can be seen in the trigonometric efforts as documented in Map 7.27 and 7.28 in Chapter 7.

out in the region of Usambara, a northern plateau region extending to Kilimanjaro. Red lines, seen to the right side in Map 4.26, previously used to divide rival colonial claims were now used to divide the colony into administrative sections. The red which had once been confined to lines of advancement had then solidified into the small “islands of power” of the German East Africa Company stations.⁴¹⁹ After the gaze of the Despot had defined the boundaries of the colony it was the power of the *Schutztruppe* which enforced that cartographic reality on the ground. This violence not only enshrined the colonial claims made on the map but laid the groundwork of pacification necessary for building an administrative apparatus. Therefore, the *Schutztruppe* were critical agents in not only documenting the entirety of the colony but also bringing it under control. The history of German East Africa illustrates that in a colonial context the mailed fist was necessary before the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith could have free reign. The *Schutztruppe* were the means by which “a geographical region bounded by arbitrary imperialist borders was appropriated by the colonial state and turned into a society.”⁴²⁰ The violence necessary to establish the claims of the gaze of the Despot helped to create the stability and predictability needed for investment and settlement to flourish.

⁴¹⁹ Conrad, *German Colonialism*, 73.

⁴²⁰ Koponen, 559.

Chapter 5: Developing a *Deutsch Ost-Afrika*

The period of flying flags and concluding contracts must come to an end, in order to make usable our acquisitions. Now an era of serious, unspectacular work will begin.⁴²¹

As the gaze of the Despot called for a new type of map, so too did the gaze of the Developer. To accomplish this new motive, new maps were needed. First, the maps of the Developer “shifted from the surface to the subterranean.”⁴²² While the map of Dominion created terrain and the map of the Despot territory, the map of the Developer created resources. Geology became just as important as geography as the gaze of the Developer required both to properly exploit the colony.⁴²³ Second, the level of detail called for was raised by a considerable degree. While maps to show political ownership could be broad and expansive, the map of the developer called for the cartographer to

⁴²¹ Chancellor Caprivi quoted in Rudolf Hafeneder, “German Colonial Cartography 1884-1919,” (Dissertation, Bundeswehr University, Munich, 2008), 12.


⁴²² Jane Carruthers, “Friedrich Jeppé: Mapping the Transvaal c. 1850-1899,” in *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 4 (December, 2003), 971. While applying to the Transvaal the same process occurred in Tanganyika, the process made especially easy as German cartography had a long history of interest in geology as a science linked to cartography. See Crone, 126.

⁴²³ The geologic efforts in German East Africa were also helped that it possessed far more mineral wealth than British East Africa. W.A. Crabtree, “Economic Resources of German Colonies in Africa,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society* 16, no. 62 (January, 1917), 133. For an overview of the resources of German East Africa, including its mineral deposits see the entirety of the aforementioned article.

focus on the specificity of the land in order to negate its universality and prepare it for development.⁴²⁴ Third, the concern with ownership was downgraded by a degree. Unlike the map of the Despot, the map of the Developer was primarily cadastral.⁴²⁵ Thus, this new gaze was still concerned with ownership but no longer national claims to land but of individuals in relationship to a market economy. Ownership of property and land became questions that any map needed to provide to serve the needs of development.

⁴²⁴ Noyes, 215.


⁴²⁵ A cadastral map documents the boundaries of land ownership.



Map 5.1: Dr. B. Hassenstein. *Der Unterlauf des Pangani Flusses für das Zuckersyndikat für Deutsch-Ostafrika*. 1:80,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1896, JRL.



Map 5.2: Dr. B. Hassenstein. *Der Unterlauf des Pangani Flusses für das Zuckersyndikat für Deutsch-Ostafrika*. 1:80,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1896, JRL.



Map 5.3: Dr. B. Hassenstein. *Der Unterlauf des Pangani Flusses für das Zuckersyndikat für Deutsch-Ostafrika*. 1:80,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1896, JRL.

A perfect example of this type of map was made by the Sugar Syndicate for German East Africa of the Pangani River. The effects of the new gaze are noticeable in several respects. First, the title of the map shows that territorial control is taken as a given. As illustrated by the discussion of the *Schutztruppe* in the preceding chapter, control needs to be established by the military or police before any development is possible. The Pangani River was in a well-controlled region of German East Africa and so the syndicate that sponsored the map believed that it was not only German but also possessed the stability required for future planning.⁴²⁶ Second, the bounding of the map is narrowly tailored for its purpose. By 1896 the surrounding territory was well known and therefore a conscious decision was made to leave it blank. In this case the silence concerning the surrounding territory is purposeful in order to fixate the viewer on the suitability of the river for capitalist enterprise.⁴²⁷ Unlike the route sketches of explorers, which were narrowly tailored to what they had observed, this was narrowly tailored to highlight what was deemed important. If the map had possessed similar detail on regions outside the Pangani River its effect would have been lessened. By leaving the map barren the viewer's eye is drawn to the river and achieves the purpose of the cartographer. Lastly, the map illustrates the ascendancy of the cadastral map over that of the topographic. Topography was valuable for explorers as the changes in elevation were critical in

⁴²⁶ Pangani had been a customs station of the DOAG that Wissmann established as a military station in 1889 and made it a district office in 1892. Nigmann, 228.

⁴²⁷ See Map 5.1.

establishing the outlines of the terrain. It also was vitally important to the gaze of the Despot as proper topographical knowledge was a precondition for any successful projection of military force.⁴²⁸ As the very detailed boundary survey maps also showed, topography was vitally important in accurately marking the political division of territory. The cadastral map, in contrast, ignores topography unless it is necessary to document ownership. While the gaze of the Despot would attempt to eliminate competing claims to ownership, especially by the indigenous population, the gaze of the Developer wanted these claims documented above all else.⁴²⁹ “Nationalistic parochialism” served no purpose to the capitalist as artificially blurring the lines of ownership would only hinder the orderly progress of capitalism.⁴³⁰ As seen in the map, ownership of the territory by Arab traders was acceptable to the viewer. At the mouth of the river the DOAG plantation is given just as equal cartographic weight as land owned by individual Arabs.⁴³¹ In addition the map suggests that the plateau surrounding the river was fertile (*Fruchtbares*) something that the gaze of the Developer, and future investors, would be interested in. While this map highlights some of the changes in gaze, it is in the Usambara highlands that the best progression can be documented in German East Africa.

⁴²⁸ Gregory, 162. “A knowledge of the topographic features of a battle zone is a fundamental part of the officer’s equipment.”

⁴²⁹ Jeffery C. Stone, “Imperialism, Colonialism and Cartography,” in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers - New Series* 13, no. 1 (1988), 59.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁴³¹ See Map 5.2 and Map 5.3.

From the arrival of Carl Peters to the very first battles of the First World War in the region, the Usambara highlands served as the key area of colonial development and settlement. The northeastern highlands encircle the Masai Steppe, an area of some 20,000 square miles, which runs in a northwesterly direction from the coast to Kilimanjaro.⁴³² The land, stretching from Usambara through the Pare Mountains to Kilimanjaro, possesses fertile soils which can support a high population density.⁴³³ It possesses a “pleasant and healthy climate” suitable to both agriculture and settlement.⁴³⁴ The initial impetus for exploring and exploiting the region, recognized by Carl Peters, was the well-developed local commerce system which he sought to bring under German control.⁴³⁵ It was also in this region, in the temperate northeastern highlands, that the first farms were established. Development cannot stop halfway, however, and the beginning of the commercial economy demanded an expansion of the transportation facilities to better facilitate the exploitation of land and labor.⁴³⁶ By 1891, these local trade routes had been appropriated with the development of a colonial road network and the start of a railway line from the port town of Tanga.⁴³⁷ Along the trade routes German outposts grew up in order to solidify this encroachment and ensure the successful development of

⁴³² Moffett, 16.

⁴³³ Kaniki, 22. Especially the volcanic soil around Kilimanjaro.

⁴³⁴ Frank R. Cana, “Frontiers of German East Africa” *The Geographical Journal* 47, no 4 (April 1916), 297.

⁴³⁵ Mann, 100.

⁴³⁶ Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania – An African Experiment*, Nations of Contemporary Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 10.

⁴³⁷ This appropriation of previously used trade networks would be copied by the British in the construction of the Uganda Railway as documented in Chapter 7.

the land.⁴³⁸ This encroachment of Europeans bound the region together so tightly that by the outbreak of World War One all trade in the Kilimanjaro and Usambara districts passed almost exclusively along the route to Tanga.⁴³⁹ The increasing trade presence of the Europeans invited greater control as:

trade reached down to the villages, the masses serving as points of contact with the traders. Thus for the first time the African masses in the region were drawn into this system of ruthless economic exploitation with the resulting social disruption that the system itself engendered.⁴⁴⁰

This overall development of the region make it the perfect area to study the gaze of the Developer operating German East Africa. The recognition of the Usambara highlands as an area of settlement, and a shift towards the gaze of the Developer, can be seen as early as two maps made in 1889.


⁴³⁸ Gwassa, 103.

⁴³⁹ Calvert, 28.

⁴⁴⁰ Kaniki, 117.



Map 5.4: C. Barich. *Originalkarte von Usambara*. 1:400,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1889, JRL.



Map 5.6: C. Barich. *Originalkarte von Usambara*. 1:400,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1889, JRL.

The first, the *Originalkarte von Usambara*, shows a slight shift away from the gaze of the Despot to that of the Developer. If Joachim Graf von Pfeil's map in Chapter 4 served as an evolutionary link between gazes, so does this map between the gaze of the Despot and the gaze of the Developer. There are several elements illustrating this fact. The first is the changing scale of the maps made under the gaze of the Developer. Often maps made under the gaze of the Despot had been at the millions scale which illustrates the relationship between scale and gaze.⁴⁴¹ The scale of the map has not been commented on until this point as it was not critical in assessing the requisite gaze. However, the scale is a key marker of a map made under the gaze of the Developer. While incredibly detailed maps might be needed for an exact determination of a border, the depiction of political ownership could be quite broad. Not much was needed past the outline of the territory as what mattered was the color indicating ownership. In contrast, maps made under the gaze of the Developer demanded greater detail. As the gaze of the Developer progressed even more detail would be demanded as the Germans attempted to create a firm economic system in the Usambara highlands. Another element is the reduced focus on political ownership. The red line given is described as the Northern Border of the German Sphere of Influence.⁴⁴² That this map is depicting a sphere of influence rather than a defined border is proven in that the line claims the port and environs of Wanga as

⁴⁴¹ A good definition of scale is provided by a contemporary (1918) textbook: "The representative fraction scale 1/1,000,000 means that 1 inch, centimeter, foot, etc., on the map represents 1,000,000 inches, centimeters, feet, etc., in nature." See Gregory, 210.

⁴⁴² *Nordgrenze der Deutschen Interessensphäre*

German East Africa.⁴⁴³ However, while this element suggests some connection to the gaze of the Despot the rest of the map highlights the shift in focus in this region. While the color red was often used to indicate the most important feature of the map, in this *Originalkarte* the most distinctive color is green.⁴⁴⁴ The shades of green are set out to focus the eye not on political territory but the fertile area (*Fruchtbares Gebiet*) as distinct from the non-fertile area (*Unfruchtbares Gebiet*) of Usambara. The key even specifies the type of vegetation that could be found in each region.⁴⁴⁵ The dual effect of color and key achieves the developmental purposes of the map to document the fertility of the region. In contrast, the unfertile regions are presented in a cream color designed to highlight the fertile areas of Usambara. Additionally, the map illustrates how settlement was already beginning. Near Lewa a farm of the German Plantation Company was already established indicating an area of future growth.⁴⁴⁶ Related to the wave thesis the map documents how missions were advancing ahead of the economic developers. Beyond the Magila Mission north of the Plantation Company incursion, there was another mission station which provided a route for settlers and farmers to follow. Lastly, the importance of force is also shown in the farm's location near a fort of the Sultan of

⁴⁴³ See Map 5.4.


⁴⁴⁴ See Map 5.5.

⁴⁴⁵ The fertile area consisted of Tropical Wood (*Tropischer Wald*), Mountain Wood (*Bergwald*), High pastures (*Hochweiden*), and the Coastal Zone (*Küstenzone*). Also listed as fertile is *Galleriewälder* which I have only been able to “translate” as Gallery Wood. My suspicion is this, in some way, relates to high canopy tree cover but that is only a guess. The unfertile areas listed are the Nyika Steppe and the mountainous *Campinenland*.

⁴⁴⁶ This was one of the number of sub-companies created by the DOAG as noted in the last chapter. Gwassa, 101.

Zanzibar. As the DOAG still operated at this time in agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar, having leased their territory from him, this represented a fortified position that would look favorably on German interests.

Lest the importance of this green seem too overblown another map made by Dr. Oscar Baumann in 1889 indicates this shift towards development even further.



Map 5.7: Dr. Oscar Baumann. *Provisorische Kartenskizze von Usambara*. 1:800,000.

Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1889, JRL.



Map 5.8: Dr. Oscar Baumann. *Provisorische Kartenskizze von Usambara*. 1:800,000.

Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1889, JRL.



Map 5.9: Dr. Oscar Baumann. *Provisorische Kartenskizze von Usambara*. 1:800,000.

Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1889, JRL.

What should be evident at first glance is the elimination of any political demarcation. While the border had been muted in the previous map, here it is eliminated altogether. Without any border the importance of this region is fixed on the very detailed key. This specificity is not geared towards indicating ownership as much as where best to make an investment. What had previously been listed as either fertile or unfertile, is now clarified by providing greater detail as to its vegetation. For example, the coastal zone is noted for its “many coconuts and mangos.”⁴⁴⁷ As coconuts were the second most valuable commercial crop in the colony this would have been valuable information for an entrepreneurial agriculturalist.⁴⁴⁸ In contrast the Nyika Steppe, listed as unfertile in the previous map, is noted to be dry and filled with shrubbery and mimosas. This additional specificity in the map invites the viewer to divide the land into different areas of development. Therefore, this map could appeal to a wide number of agriculturalists who might see benefits in growing different crops in different areas of Usambara. The region is sectioned off by the map both in terms of development and profitability. An enterprising settler or developer could easily use this map to chart where best to develop a plantation and what a suitable cash crop might be. That the key, rather than being off the map as in most instances, takes up almost one-quarter of the map area also indicates how keenly this region was being focused on for development. Lastly, this map indicates the increasing power of the DOAG. No longer tethered to the fort of the Sultan the

⁴⁴⁷ *Viele Kokos und Mangos*. See Map 5.8

⁴⁴⁸ Askew, 44.

company has established two stations at Korogwe and Mafi.⁴⁴⁹ These were established as part of another journey by Joachim Graf Pfeil along the Pangani in 1887.⁴⁵⁰ Dr. Oscar Baumann, having surveyed Usambara extensively, underscored the need for further cartography:


In this context, the importance of systematic topographic reconnaissance of East Africa must be emphasized. It should go without saying that such an effort is indispensable and even a prerequisite for any colonial development. For there is no aspect of civilizing activities that does not have to fall back upon a map each and every day.⁴⁵¹

Over the ensuing decade Baumann's edict was taken to heart and the development of the Usambara region proceeded. The intersection of mapping detail and successful development is well apparent in a map made ten years later in 1899.


⁴⁴⁹ Map 5.9

⁴⁵⁰ See Dr. B. Hassenstein and C. Barrich. *Originalkarte von Joachim Graf Pfeil's Reiseroute Durch Useguha*. 1:1,000,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1888, JRL. For the article accompanying his journey see Pfeil, Joachim Graf von, "Beobachtungen während meiner letzten Reise in Ostafrika" in *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen* 34 (1888): 1-9.

⁴⁵¹ Baumann even went further in a note given for the word "aspect": "Any natural-historic, philological, ethnographic or other scientific research is depreciated without having a map as a basis, since one does not know where the objects were collected or the observations made. Traders, planters, missionaries in new countries need a map for orientation, and engineers, soldiers and administrative officials need it even more." Baumann quoted in Hafender, 12.



Map 5.10: H. Böhler. *Ost-Usambara 1897-1899*. 1:50,000. Berlin, 1900, nr Tanzania S.41, RGS.




Map 5.11: H. Böhrer. *Ost-Usambara 1897-1899*. 1:50,000. Berlin, 1900, nr Tanzania S.41, RGS.

Erläuterungen.

 Fluss mit Seebüscheln  Fährbare Hauptströme  Reitwege  Jagerpfade  Höhenwald  Hochweiden  Grassteppe und Sümpfe  Kaffeeplantage  Hüder der Eingeborenen  Eigentumsgränze  Hoflage der Europäer  Dorf der Eingeborenen  Kirche der engl. Mission  Stein } trigonometrische Punkte  Flasche }	<p><i>Oh spricht wie Lsch</i></p> <p><i>j - - dj</i> <i>s - - ss</i> <i>sh - - sch</i> <i>v - - w</i> <i>w - - W im Englischen.</i> <i>y - - j</i> <i>z - - s</i></p>  <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Höhenstufenkulten</i></p> <p><i>Die Landschafts- und Bergnamen sind mit steiler, die Flussnamen mit nach links geneigter, die Dorfnamen mit nach rechts geneigter Schrift eingetragen.</i></p>	<p><i>P.A.P.</i> - Prinz-Albrecht-Plantagen. <i>D.O.A.G.</i> - Deutsch-Ost-Afrikanische Gesellschaft. <i>R.H.G.</i> - Rheinische-Handel-Gesellschaft. <i>U.K.G.</i> - Usambara-Kaffeebau-Gesellschaft. <i>W.H.u.P.G.</i> - Westdeutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft. <i>O.A.P.G.</i> - Ost-Afrikanische Pflanzungs-Gesellschaft. <i>S.P.G.</i> - Sigi Pflanzungs-Gesellschaft.</p> <p><i>Die Höhenangaben beziehen sich auf einen willkürlichen Nullpunkt, welcher gegen das Mittelmeer des indischen Ozeans um 23^m verschieden liegen kann. Die für bestimmte Punkte eingedruckten, hohen Höhenzahlen haben unter sich eine Genauigkeit von 10^m.</i></p> <p><i>Die fast durchweg fehligen Gebirgsabhängungen sind stellenweise mit vom Bambus durchsetzten Wald bedeckt.</i></p>
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Map 5.12: H. Böhler. *Ost-Usambara 1897-1899*. 1:50,000. Berlin, 1900, nr Tanzania S.41, RGS.



Map 5.13: H. Böhler. *Ost-Usambara 1897-1899*. 1:50,000. Berlin, 1900, *mr Tanzania* S.41, RGS.



Map 5.14: H. Böhler. *Ost-Usambara 1897-1899*. 1:50,000. Berlin, 1900, nr Tanzania S.41, RGS.

On its face the map demonstrates the tremendous progress made since Oscar Baumann's initial maps. What is evident is that this map illustrates the progression of the gaze of the Developer as greater detail was demanded for properly utilizing the land.⁴⁵² As evidenced from the title this map again brings out this region separate from any political ownership.⁴⁵³ The goal of the map is to focus the reader on what is being done *productively* with this German land. Additionally, the scale is one of the largest that this study documents.⁴⁵⁴ All during the 1890s there was "a high level of investigation of the topography, geology, climate and the plant and animal species" in the region and this map indicates the results.⁴⁵⁵ As shown in Map 5.11 the incredible detail underscores the developmental efforts required to turn this region into a productive agricultural preserve.⁴⁵⁶ This detail suggests that as the demands of the colonizer grew so was the necessity of that detail to be reflected in the map. To take one example the map makes a distinction between main roads, bridleways, and Negro paths. Not only does this

⁴⁵² Heinrich Böhler was specifically urged on by Governor Hermann v. Wissmann who said the map was "urgently required by the governor and that the map had to give a characteristic picture of the region such as only the farmer, the scientists, the technician, the official, and the soldier could use it." Hafender, 64.

⁴⁵³ Map 5.10.

⁴⁵⁴ The scale of this map being 1:50,000 with the next largest being of the Pangani River (Map 5.1 – 5.3) at a 1:80,000 scale. While it seems paradoxical to use the term "large scale" with a smaller number the map scale applies to the relationship between the map depiction and land mass in reality. For example a 1:40,000 scale map would mean the objects depicted are 1/40,000 of the size on the ground while a 1:2,000,000 scale map would mean the objects depicted are 1/2,000,000 of the size on the ground. As the first ratio is a larger fraction we thus get the, seemingly, paradoxical "large scale"/"small scale" distinction.

⁴⁵⁵ Kaniki, 128.

⁴⁵⁶ Maps were critically important to farmers as noted by the publishers themselves. In publishing a new compendium of colonial maps in February of 1913 the title of Dietrich Reimer's new series was: *Dietrich Reimer's Mitteilungen für Ansiedler, Farmer, Tropenpflanzer, Beamte, Forschungsreisende und Kaufleute* (Dietrich Reimer's Notes for settlers, farmers, tropical planters, officers, explorers, and traders) Hafender, 100 and Anhang Z (Abb. 23).

underscore the increased transportation links built in the region but it also privileges the European roads that were being built. The main roads (*Fahrbare Hauptstrassen*) were used to connect the German plantations with the main transportation routes to the coast. In contrast, the importance of the *Negerpfade* was how these paths connected to the German plantations. The indication of these native roads and native fields (*Felder der Eingeborenen*) in yellow seems out of place, as it demarcates the reality of African land. However, within the context of the gaze of the Developer this notation is not out of place. Similar to the border maps drawn around Kilimanjaro, African land was noted on the map in order to serve the interests of the colonizer. The proper development of German plantations demanded the labor of these previously ignored people. The yellow blotches should not be seen as indications of indigenous claims to territory, but as European markers of a necessary “resource.” Fundamentally, the people of Africa were returned to the map in order to *utilize* them for European purposes. The creation of distinctions, making native land and routes different than those of the Europeans, was a way of asserting control.⁴⁵⁷ In most of the German colonies the plantation served as the main outlet for these newly created wage-laborers. Plantations were the basis for much of the

⁴⁵⁷ The map, in this regard, functioned in a similar way to the census. “Knowledge was power and the knowledge of the population produced by the census gave those in power insight into social conditions, allowing them to know the population and devise appropriate plans for dealing with them.” D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel, “Censuses, Identity Formation, and the Struggle for Political Power” in *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses*, eds. D.I. Kertzer and D. Arel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6. A good study illustrating the use of maps and censuses in a different context for control is Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

German colonial economies. In the case of Cameroon the commitment to plantations was so great that a single Belgian-German consortium (*Gesellschaft Südkamerun*) was awarded 1/5th of the available land.⁴⁵⁸ In the Usambara region, as indicated in the key, there was a plantation boom as a number of companies attempted to develop cash-crops.⁴⁵⁹ However, the production of cash-crop agriculture demanded labor and this map documents the importance of these laborers to the plantation. By 1913, the wage-earning African labor force in German East Africa was 172,000 or 1/5th of able-bodied males. Most of these wage-earners were involved in plantation agriculture.⁴⁶⁰ This growth in agriculture was so critical to the development of the colony that the German government, despite the injunction by the Brussels Act to stop slavery in regions they possessed, chose to utilize slaves as a supplemental labor force for the German plantations.⁴⁶¹ While there

⁴⁵⁸ Butlin, 547.

⁴⁵⁹ In terms of expansion the varied companies (*Prinz Albrecht Plantagen, Deutsch Ost-Afrikanische Gesellschaft, Rheinische Hundei Gesellschaft, Usambara Kaffebau Gesellschaft, Westdeutsch Handels- und-Plantagen Gesellschaft, Ost-Afrikanische Pflanzungs Gesellschaft*, and the *Sigi Pflanzungs Gesellschaft*) should be compared to the single DOAG plantation in Map 5.6. However, the DOAG still had an influential position. "Operating either directly or through subsidiaries of its own, it [the DOAG] held a virtual monopoly in key areas of German East Africa's colonial economy. Together with the trading firms closely linked with it, the company controlled the purchase of export products from both African smallholders and European plantations." Stoecker, 153.

⁴⁶⁰ Kaniki, 137; See also Jan-Georg Deutsch, "Absence of evidence is no proof: Slave resistance under German colonial rule in East Africa," *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, ed. Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn and Klaas van Walraven (Boston: Brill, 2003), 179. This more recent scholarship puts the number engaged in plantation agriculture at 92,000 by 1913.

⁴⁶¹ For a good coverage of the issue of slavery in German East Africa see Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa c. 1884-1914* (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 2006). For example, he notes that in 1914 the German *Reichstag* was still struggling to force the colonial administration to abolish slavery. The presence of slaves is also confirmed by a Danish planter who noted that Arab plantations readily produced goods using slave labor as well. See Jane Parpart and Marianne Rostgaard, *The Practical Imperialist: Letters from a Danish Planter in German East Africa, 1888-1906* (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 38.

may have been nearly 175,000 wage laborers in German East Africa before the First World War, almost 10% of the population remained slaves.⁴⁶² Even those laborers who worked the plantations were afforded little protection with harsh treatment, and no governmental oversight, leading to a death rate of 7-10% for plantation workers.⁴⁶³ All of the efforts concerned with slavery, even ransoming, was geared towards incorporating the freed slave “into an economic system producing raw materials for German industry.”⁴⁶⁴ This acknowledgement of Africans as resources rather than owners is reflected on the map. While the yellow blotches do indicate the location of native fields the red dotted-lines of German property boundaries (*Eigentumsgrenze*) were able to cross these native fields and absorb them into their claims.⁴⁶⁵ This use of color also underscores the cadastral nature of this developmental map. Red not only bounded in the property lines but also showed the privileging of European ownership. German plantations shaded in red removes these areas from consideration in developing that territory further. The red boundary lines serve to demarcate the territory as owned and separate from any possible intrusion. Red also makes these properties stand out in relation to other features suggesting that these areas of the map were to be regarded as holding the dominant

⁴⁶² Thaddeus Sunseri, “Slave Ransoming in German East Africa, 1885-1922” in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 26, no. 3 (1993), 490

⁴⁶³ Butlin, 214 and Conrad, 80. In the opinion of the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, it observed in 1901 the need for harsh treatment of the Africans in Usambara as “the population is mostly weak, mentally retarded and has a deep aversion to work.” quoted in Ida Pipping van Hulten, *An episode of colonial history: The German press in Tanzania, 1901-1914* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), 15.

⁴⁶⁴ Sunseri, 494.

⁴⁶⁵ This is well shown in Map 5-13. Additionally, this map shows the progression of development as to the south of the *Westdeutsche Handels-und-Plantagen Gesellschaft* plantation is the Magila mission previously seen as the northernmost European advance into Usamara in Map 5.6.

position in the region. While the key illustrates the land in incredible detail, even to the degree of drawing individual tree shapes to indicate high forest (*Höhenurwald*), the red of the plantations makes the territory opaque. This cadastral focus enshrines private property and creates a hierarchy where the land of the Europeans is made more real than the land of the indigenous people. The creation of the cadastral map was critical as land demarcation was the “means by which European control and influence was formally imposed, including the legitimation of colonial taxation through the regulation of land rights.”⁴⁶⁶ This map shows that as the gaze of the Developer advanced the same process of writing out, or in this case coloring out, the indigenous people continued. Lastly, the map also shows, as seen in Map 5.14, the heavily bounded gaze of this map. While West Usambara was documented by Baumann it is ignored in order to localize the gaze on the successful development of this region. However, as the next map illustrates this map also served as a motivating force showing investors what success had occurred and giving them license to dream that they could emulate it in the “blank” of West Usambara.

The 1897 map, *Die Schambalai oder West-Usambara*, was made at roughly the same time as the previous one.⁴⁶⁷ What this map illustrates is the *progression* of the gaze of the Developer and how the advance into East Usambara was simply the first of many penetrations of the European economic system.


⁴⁶⁶ Butlin, 35.

⁴⁶⁷ See Map 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17




Map 5.15: Dr. B. Hassenstein and C. Schmidt. *Die Schambalai oder West-Usambara.*

1:200,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1897, JRL.



Map 5.16: Dr. B. Hassenstein and C. Schmidt. *Die Schambalai oder West-Usambara*.

1:200,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1897, JRL.



Map 5.17: Dr. B. Hassenstein and C. Schmidt. *Die Schambalai oder West-Usambara*.

1:200,000. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1897, JRL.

In comparison to the map made by H. Böhler this appears to be a “step back.” However, as the previous map showed the development of West Usambara had not yet proceeded. This map documents the first tentative steps in that direction as well as helping to suggest that what had occurred in East Usambara could be replicated by enterprising planters. It bounds the region, both in the structure and title, to focus the eye on the possibilities available in this virgin territory. The scale, at 1:200,000, provides much more detail than those provided by Baumann and proves how for the gaze of the Developer the devil was in the details. Investors and settlers would be interested in a number of minute details that would have been of little value when documenting political ownership. In contrast, information on transportation linkages or the type of soil in a particular region would matter more than anything else. This map also illustrates several of the interrelated themes brought out thus far. As far as the importance of missionaries in opening up territory this map documents that it was constructed based on the work of a missionary and Sunday school teacher.⁴⁶⁸ Missionaries were aiding development by providing the necessary information to advance deeper into the interior. It is easy to presume these missionary stations would serve the same purpose as the Magila mission station in creating a path for farmers to follow. Additionally, this map illustrates the connection of force to proper development. The military station of Masinde was established in order to push forward the German position and protect the region from the more unstable region

⁴⁶⁸ *Nach einer Skizzenkarte des Missionars F. Lang-Heinrich in Wuga und verschiedenen gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen bearbeitet von P. Hermann Triloff, Kgl. Seminar-Oberlehrer zu Pyritz.*

of the Parre Mountains. The station was established in 1890 to “keep the caravan routes open and maintain peace in the land” and also provides the protection to open up the territory to settlement.⁴⁶⁹ This map serves to “normalize” German settlement by indicating on its key a symbol for D.F. or German Farm. This notation gives the impression of a pacified and settled region where a potential settler could imagine their own small “D.F.” being added to the map. While these farms are depicted as only small boxes on the map, as the gaze of the Developer progressed it would be easy to envision splotches of red German-owned plantations infecting the landscape. This area of the Usambara had also been well settled enough that the Germans had sited a rest station (*Erholungsstation*) close enough to the Pangani River as to allow access back to the port of Tanga. To help induce investment the map moves beyond mere topography to shade in forest to indicate potential areas of settlement.⁴⁷⁰ A network of trails is marked out, only labeled as ways (*Wege*), underscoring the need for a more developed transportation system to facilitate settlement. Fundamentally, this map was preparing the region for the same developmental progression that had occurred East Usambara. What this map, taken together with the previous one, should underscore is that once the gaze of the Developer

⁴⁶⁹ Nigmann, 226.

⁴⁷⁰ Forests were of chief importance in settling Africa as they provided an easily accessible natural resource necessary for a variety of purposes. In German East Africa a forest assessment was undertaken with the final report indicating that it “would be of the greatest value” to institute a forest protection law. William H. Rollins, “Imperial Shades of Green: Conservation and Environmental Chauvinism in the German Colonial Project” in *German Studies Review* 22, no. 2 (May, 1999), 194. By 1900 German East Africa had adopted conservation methods in order to preserve timber resources. Butlin, 410. For a more general overview of German forestry efforts see Hans G. Schabel, “Tanganyika Forestry under German Colonial Administration, 1891-1919,” in *Forestry and Conservation History* 34, no. 3 (July, 1990): 130-141.

was loosed on German East Africa it would consume the entire territory. Like an engine, once started the economic needs of the colony would demand new sources of fuel to continue converting the colony into an economically productive territory.

Speaking of engines, one of the chief elements in the development of the Usambara region, and the rest of German East Africa, was the construction of railways. In the case of the Usambara Highlands that was the Tanga Railway.⁴⁷¹ The genesis of the Tanga Railway was in the creation of a sub-company under the umbrella of the DOAG to build a railway from Tanga to Korogwe.⁴⁷²

⁴⁷¹ The name of the railway line went through various permutations from “Usambara Bahn” to the later “Ost Afrikanische Nordbahn” though I choose to refer to it as the Tanga Railway as the only thing that never changed was the railway terminus at this port. Clement Gillman, “A Short History of the Tanganyika Railways” in *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 13 (June, 1942; 14-56), 19. The importance of Tanga for German East Africa is even illustrated in the German name for the colony – Tanganyika. The Germans chose that name as they ruled the coastal port of Tanga and the “Nyika” (“bush” or “hinterland”) beyond it. Askew, 44.

⁴⁷² This being yet another instance of the DOAG obtaining influence through sub-companies, in this case the *Eisenbahn Gesellschaft für D.O.A.* with a capital of two million marks. Gillman, 17 and Helmut Schroeter and Roel Ramaer, *Die Eisenbahnen in den einst deutschen Schutzgebieten: Damals und Heute* (Krefeld: Röhr-Verlag, 1993), 26. Korogwe is located along the Pangani River in the West Usambara and can be seen at the bottom of Map 5.15.


The route of the Tanga Railway, in a similar manner as the explorers appropriated native routes, paralleled a caravan route from Tanga to Mount Kilimanjaro.⁴⁷³ The above map, part of an 1891 *Handatlas*, documents the proposed route. Unfortunately, the fears of colonial officials for this venture were well founded.⁴⁷⁴ While engineers arrived in Tanga in August of 1891 they were unable to reach Muheza, only forty kilometers from the coast, until 1895. Indeed, it took until October of 1894 before the first *fourteen* kilometers of the line were opened for service.⁴⁷⁵ No further progress was made as even what had been constructed quickly fell into disrepair.⁴⁷⁶ In response the German government assumed control and was able to finally reach Korogwe on March 15th, 1902. It was only after this point that the line was able to extend to Mombo, by February 1905. The map below indicates how the gaze of the Developer operated during the construction of the railway.

⁴⁷³ In fact, both the Tanga and Dar es Salaam railways would follow caravan routes as would the Uganda Railway. In all cases this was a further act of appropriation of indigenous knowledge serving to destroy alternative understandings of the interior. As the railways were built they came to define the colonies Askew, 44 and R.W. Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century" in *Journal of African History* 8, no. 2 (1967), 271-272.


⁴⁷⁴ Governor von Soden had little hopes predicting in September of 1891 that the company would go bankrupt in "the shortest time." Gillman, 17.

⁴⁷⁵ Schroeter and Ramaer, 142.

⁴⁷⁶ For example, the pier built to enable rail to ship transport of tonnage at the port of Tanga collapsed.



Map 5.19: *Übersichtskarte Mombo-Pangani*. 1:100,000. Berlin: Bogdan Gisevius. MFQ
1/410, PRO



Map 5.20: *Übersichtskarte Mombo-Pangani*. 1:100,000. Berlin: Bogdan Gisevius. MFQ

1/410, PRO

This *Übersichtskarte* of the extension from Momba to Kika documents the planned extension undertaken by the *Deutsche Kolonial Eisenbahn Bau-und-Betriebs Gesellschaft*. This company was founded in 1905 and took over the running of the Tanga Railway in April of the same year. One of their first projects was a forty-five kilometer extension of the railway to Pangani. Construction was begun in 1907 and the line was opened on July 27th, 1910.⁴⁷⁷ Beyond proving the Tanga Railway was turning a corner with better management, this map documents a number of factors showing the gaze of the Developer.⁴⁷⁸ Color is used to isolate the eye on what was important – the railway. As the rest of the map is cream the thick red line of the encroaching railway captures the viewer’s attention. While previous uses of red had shown the process of explorers or the delineation of spheres of influence, red was here to inscribe the new path from the Usambara region to the coast. The only other color depicted, blue, marked rivers; these did not detract from the focus on the railway as the rivers mattered only in terms of the need to build bridges over them. Red also indicates the imposition of the plans of the Developer on the land. In addition to the tracks laid on the ground the altitude map, as seen in Map 5.20, shows how the land was being re-imagined in order to suit new purposes. Altitude sketches illustrate how the land was being reduced to a mere obstacle

⁴⁷⁷ Gillman, 19.

⁴⁷⁸ The company was helped that after the *Reichstag* dissolved in 1906, the new delegates were more agreeable to fund railway projects passing a railway bills in 190, 1910, and 1914. Schroeter and Ramaer, 12. See the graph on the same page for additional evidence of this railway boom. After twelve-and-a-half years only 1,000km of railways had been built in all of the German colonies and 5,000km were built in the next nine.

to overcome as it was no longer the political possession of it that mattered but its utilization. There is, for example, no indication if the railway follows in the footsteps of an explorer who braved the mountainous region to reach the Pangani River. All of the previous efforts are eliminated in order to emphasize the orderly progression of the railway into the interior. A similar map, with altitude cross-section, was made in documenting the development of the Dar es Salaam central railway as well.⁴⁷⁹ This re-imagining was key as, beyond enabling faster and more reliable transport, the railway reshaped visions as to what was possible to develop.⁴⁸⁰ The assurance of firm transportation removed the fear of having to rely on unreliable and slow porter transportation. Once the railway was laid down it established a new measuring-stick of civilization and the advance of development.⁴⁸¹ One of the reasons that the region of East Usambara was able to develop as well as it did was that the railway had reached that area by the late 1890s. With that transportation net in place all of the developed roadways, as shown in Map 5.21, could shoot off the main rail artery as so many capillaries into the

⁴⁷⁹ See the same folder MFQ 1/410 for this map as well.

⁴⁸⁰ This is not to suggest the transportation system was not important in and of itself. The completion of the central rail line in German East Africa, “effected a major reduction in the number of caravan porters who left Bagamoyo to travel inland, from 43,880 in 1900 to 193 in 1912.” Butlin, 481. Beyond speed it also was a far more economical method of transportation. Porters, carrying 25-30kg roughly 5-30km, meant a caravan would cost of 1-1.5 Marks per kilometer per porter. Schroeter and Ramaer, 8.


⁴⁸¹ The railway and map served a dual role in creating time and space discipline for the region. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” 62. With the construction of the railway the area was converted from a wilderness into an orderly time-table of stops. For example the station of Muheza, which had taken so long to reach, was converted into a stop for railway passengers to enjoy tea or coffee. Schroeter and Ramaer, 26. For greater study on the creation of time discipline see David S. Landes, *Clocks and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), and Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).

Usambara highlands.⁴⁸² In the case of this expansion there is evidence of even the planned railway having a similar effect. Shooting off from the planned stop near Mkumbara there is a notation of a planned cable-car extension into the forests of West Usambara.⁴⁸³ Built in 1910-11 this nine kilometer rope-way was created by the Wilkins and Wiese firm to gain access to the cedar forests on the Shume plateau.⁴⁸⁴ As much as the gaze of the Developer documented successful expansion it, more importantly, enabled investors to envision economic potential. Without the construction of the railway it would be unlikely to imagine any development of the sort in that region. The importance of the railway in establishing a sense of order over the colony is well established as documented in the map below


⁴⁸² This was the case in East Usambara as small lines spread off the main line into the highlands. Calvert, 117.

⁴⁸³ *Im Bau begriffene Drahtseilbahn der Firma Wilkens un Wiese.*


⁴⁸⁴ Gillman, 20.



Map 5.22: *Untitled*. 1:5,000,000. Berlin: Bogdan Gisevius. MFQ 1/410, PRO.



Map 5.23: *Untitled*. 1:5,000,000. Berlin: Bogdan Gisevius. MFQ 1/410, PRO.



Map 5.24: *Untitled*. 1:5,000,000. Berlin: Bogdan Gisevius. MFQ 1/410, PRO.

This map, made before the completion of the Pangani extension of the Tanga Railway, underscores the ability of railways to reshape conceptions of the colony. By this point the Belgian expression “colonization means transport,” had been taken to heart by German officials.⁴⁸⁵ The map is colored to show the various portions of the country that reside up to 150km from navigable waterways or railways.⁴⁸⁶ Listed in pink was all of the land of the colony that was currently accessible.⁴⁸⁷ In the same way that the political ownership of the DOAG spread inland so did the developmental reach of the railways.⁴⁸⁸ As indicated above the railways were not simply transportation networks as they reshaped the understanding of the land and created new opportunities. By this point the areas in pink had started to be utilized in order to create a plantation agriculture economy. In the same way one could look at this map and imagine the same process that had occurred in East Usambara being replicated in all the areas that were penetrated by a railway. Indeed, that is the entire subtext of the map. As these railways, including several

⁴⁸⁵ Schroeter and Ramaer, 142.

⁴⁸⁶ See Map 5.23. *Die farbigen Flächen bezeichnen das Land bis zu 150 km Entfernung von Eisenbahnen und anschließenden Schiffahrtstraßen.*

⁴⁸⁷ See Map 5.22.

⁴⁸⁸ For a good sense of the changes wrought by the railway there is the recently published collection of dairy entries and primary documents of Rudolf Gansser. He was a military engineer in Usambara from 1896-1897 and station chief of Tabora from 1900-1901 after a distant relative collected and published what had been in the family archive. *Nicht als Abenteurer bin ich Hierhergekommen: 100 Jahre entwicklungs-“Hilfe.” Tagebücher und Briefe aus Deutsch-Ostafrika, 1896-1902*, ed. Henrich Dauber (Frankfurt/Main: Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 1991).

that were not started, pressed into the interior they would convert the land into something useable and suitable for German purposes.⁴⁸⁹ As John Noyes describes this change:

It is rather that the construction of the railroad (sometimes under guard of military force) amounts to the same thing as the conquest of the territory. In this sense, the abstract establishment of privileged lines of access to all part of the territory tends to acquire that territory *before* it is “conquered” in the sense of a military and police network directly controlling the movements of the people.⁴⁹⁰

The map also highlights a contrast to the British experience. While the new owners of the Tanga Railway had achieved a great deal they only reached Moshi in 1912, the planned further expansion to Arusha was aborted by the coming of the First World War.

⁴⁹¹ As can be seen on Map 5.22 the completed line to Moshi was not even half of the length of the British effort with the Uganda Railway which was completed in a mere seven years.

Often this general failure to “keep up with the Jones” in regards to German colonial development is laid at the feet of the pre-1907 administrators. In this narrative

⁴⁸⁹ As Winston Churchill bluntly put it, “It is no good trying to lay hold of tropical Africa with naked fingers, civilisation (sic) must be armed with the machinery if she is going to subdue these wild regions to her authority. Iron roads, not jogging porters; tireless engines, not weary men.” M.F. Hill, *Permanent Way: The Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway* (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Railways and Harbours, 1949), 297 This purpose, of course would serve *German* rather than European purposes. Railway expansion was seen as a threat to British interests as it might gain Germany “a preponderating influence in Africa by her railways, and she is conscious of it.” W.A. Crabtree, “German Colonies in Africa,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society* 14, no. 53 (October, 1914; 1-14), 6. In fact, the ability of these railways to effect British commerce was recognized after the First World War as many of the lines and extensions proposed would be built after the colony was taken from Germany. See *Karte von Deutch-Ostafrika mit Eisenbahlinien* (Map 9) in Schroeter and Ramaer, 24.

⁴⁹⁰ Noyes, 241.

⁴⁹¹ Yeager, 10. 6.15 million marks were budgeted to extend the line in order to open up a coffee-growing area on Mount Meru. Schroeter and Ramaer, 26.

1888-1907 is simply an extended entr'acte for the arrival of Germany's colonial savior Bernhard Dernberg. He is presented as a transformational figure due to his background and his new approach.⁴⁹² In 1907 a *Reich Colonial Office* was established and Dernberg, a banker of Jewish background and a left-liberal politician, was placed at its head. He is often presented as a visionary who recognized that "the most valuable asset of the colonies" was the natives, and his policies were centered on reforming the colonial system so as to take this into account.⁴⁹³ In addition he brought his businessman's eye to the colony, noting that while earlier "colonization was carried out with methods of destruction" he aimed to use "advanced theoretical and applied science in every area."⁴⁹⁴ Together with the new German East African governor Albrecht von Rechenberg this period is viewed as the golden-age of "scientific colonialism" and appears to coincide with the greatest development of the entire colony. However, as the maps have documented the development of the Usambara region far preceded his appointment. The missing element in this analysis of the development of German East Africa is the role of the military. All of the development of the colonial economy was dependent on the


⁴⁹² He was even fawned over by British officials as shown in the recollection of Dernberg's visit to Kenya by police officer Robert W. Foran, "He asked permission to address them, which was readily granted. Herr Dernberg made a short speech in fluent Swahili, much to everyone's astonishment. He told me afterwards that the language was studied industriously on the steamer during the voyage to Dar es Salaam, and his knowledge perfected during the three months visit to the Germany colony. How many British Ministers would go to all that trouble?" Robert W. Foran, *A Cuckoo in Kenya: The Reminiscences of a Pioneer Police Officer in British East Africa* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1936), 265.

⁴⁹³ Townsend, 248. This included such actions as revising colonial law so as to incorporate tribal law into it and promoting native rights.

⁴⁹⁴ Conrad, 64 quoting Bernhard Dernburg, *Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens: Zwei Vorträge* (Berlin: Mittler, 1907), 9.

application of force. “The necessary precondition” for any sort of plantation agriculture and “of self-financing administration was effective authority over the African population.”⁴⁹⁵ If we take the above example of the development of the Tanga Railway a clear line can be drawn between the military control exerted and the eventual development of the railway line.

⁴⁹⁵ John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, “Coping with Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895-1914,” in *Journal of African History* 20, no. 4 (1979), 496.



Map 5.25: *Deutsch-Ostafrika (Bl. 87)*. 1:3,000,000. In *Meyers Kleiner Handatlas*.

Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, JRL.

As seen in this map of the Usambara region the Tanga Railway is shown with its planned route to Korogwe. What has not been noted in the foregoing discussion of the railway was the importance of the military in preparing the ground as much as any surveyor. The railway proceeded from the coast, bracketed by the German holdings at Pangani and Tanga, to Korogwe and then along Masinde and into Kilimanjaro at Moschi and Aruscha. Each of those destinations is underlined with the red line demarcating a Military Station (*Militärstationen*). The importance of these stations can also be seen with the similar marking appearing under posts along the Tanga Railway extension to Pangani.⁴⁹⁶ In his overview of the construction of the Tanga Railway, Clement Gillman notes that he was never able to satisfactorily explain the route of the railway into the Pare Mountains. He noted how by taking the line along the western edge of the mountains it avoided the more advantageous eastern route which had easier access to the mountain roadways.⁴⁹⁷ As the foregoing suggests the missing element from his contemporary, and historical, account is the location and activities of the *Schutztruppe*. The “correct” route from a surveying point of view had to be mediated by the practical ability to protect its construction. In this case it is possible that this western route was followed because the railway had to follow the survey of the soldier. This interaction between economics and force meant that the railway helped to establish new military stations as its construction unlocked new

⁴⁹⁶ These military posts are also noted in Map 5.21 with Momba, Mkomasi, Masinde and Mkumbara underlined in red as well.

⁴⁹⁷ Gillman, 20.

areas of the colony to be pacified. The road branching off from Momba into the interior of West Usambara led to the creation of a new military station at Wilhelmstahl.⁴⁹⁸ For all of the delays in building the railway one of the missing elements in analyzing its progress, and development in Usambara as a whole, is the role the *Schutztruppe* played in pacifying the interior. Whatever the planned intention on building a railway to Moshi, the last stop along the Tanga railway, as late as 1893 the *Schutztruppe* were still fighting in the region around Kilimanjaro. The discontent in the region was not settled until the turn of the century. Governor Charles Eliot of the East Africa Protectorate, while speaking highly of German efforts, noted as late as 1905 that due to “the want of communications and the hostility of the natives” little in the way of settlement had occurred around southern Kilimanjaro.⁴⁹⁹ Indeed, the early success of the Maji Maji rebellion was due in part because so many of the *Schutztruppe* were stationed in the northern part of the colony attempting to pacify it.

The role of the *Schutztruppe* suggests that the nearly messianic role that Dernburg has assumed in some earlier narratives should be reassessed.⁵⁰⁰ It was only after the military had successfully pacified the region that it made sense for the continued

⁴⁹⁸ Its importance in helping pacify and develop the interior of West Usambara led to its conversion into a District Office in 1908. Nigmann, 231.

⁴⁹⁹ Eliot, 255.

⁵⁰⁰ As research has assessed the actual colonial rule “on the ground the less the appointment of Dernburg appears as a watershed in Germany’s colonial history.” Conrad, 65. Indeed, for all of his suggestions towards “scientific colonialism” he still believe in flogging African workers. Though this was not made policy he remarked, “it cannot be helped, we must for the time being adhere to racial justice.” Pipping-van Hulten, 22.

development of the railway and the northern highlands of German East Africa.⁵⁰¹ The fact that the railway was to extend to Arusha, another military station, indicates that the only perceived way to rectify Eliot's critique of settlement was through the a railway following the march of the *Schutztruppe*.⁵⁰² Dernburg's ascension also occurred the year after the Maji-Maji revolt of 1905, which was brutally put down. In fact, the very brutality of the repression most likely ensured the peaceful years of development from 1907-1914 ascribed to his actions. The official history of the *Schutztruppe* states that "the years after the great rebellion present no military events of special interest."⁵⁰³

Once the military had successfully conquered the region, the Usambara highlands were able to be developed into a region of strong economic growth. As the railroad made headway into the Usambara region so did the telegraph lines, enabling greater civil and military control over the region and subsequent comfort on the part of investors to develop the land.⁵⁰⁴ German planters "clustered around the hills of Uluguru and Usambara" and through the introduction of sisal crops created its chief export.⁵⁰⁵ Coffee,

⁵⁰¹ In terms of the tenuousness of the hold Germany had over its colony it is important to remember that in 1900 only 415 German officers and administrators were to rule between 8-10 million inhabitants. As late as 1903 there were only 30 German stations and military posts in the entirety of German East Africa. Conrad, 73.

⁵⁰² Cana, 299.

⁵⁰³ Nigmann, 177.

⁵⁰⁴ Moffett, 197. As almost all of the military stations were connected by telegraph it allowed for the quick response by the *Schutztruppe* to any colonial disturbance. See "Map – Overview of Long Distance Communication" in Nigmann, 176 for a map of these lines of communication.

⁵⁰⁵ Roberts, "East Africa," 649, 656.

despite initial success, had proven to be of limited export value.⁵⁰⁶ Germany was also a pioneer in rubber, planting 3,125 acres in the Tanga-Pangani region by 1906, but these pioneers proved to have even better business acumen by selling out early.⁵⁰⁷ As both these crops proved to be chimeras the success of the German East African economy depended on sisal. Brought from Florida to the colony in 1893, the Germans successfully grew the plant while also developing a machine to extract the hemp fiber efficiently.⁵⁰⁸ This quickly grew to be one of the most successful crops in the colony. From 1903-1906 the export of Sisal hemp by tonnage increased from 422 to 1,836 and the value of the exports increased from £16,000 to £66,900.⁵⁰⁹ By 1912, 16,000 tons of sisal hemp was being exported from the plantations in the regions along the Tanga railway to the coastal port.⁵¹⁰ Sisal proved to be such a success that the Germans banned the export of sisal bulbs “realizing the dangers of competition.”⁵¹¹ In addition to sisal, the German

⁵⁰⁶ While Coffee had shown some early success, a British observer gave “glowing estimates” of the possibilities for coffee after observing German efforts, its profits were too restricted by coffee prices in Europe. Richard D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya 1870-1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 77 and Butlin, 214.

⁵⁰⁷ The bill was left in the hands of British investors who, following the German lead, ended up owning between 1/4 to 1/3 of the rubber acreage in German East Africa. Munro, 374-375. While the British gained the land, the initial German planters received the only profits.

⁵⁰⁸ Crabtree, “Economic Resources,” 132. This was a very short run thing as of the 1,000 plants the Germans imported to the colony from Florida in 1893, only 6% survived the journey. Henrich Brode, *British and German East Africa: Their Economic and Commercial Relations* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), 103.

⁵⁰⁹ “Cultivation of Sisal Hemp in German East Africa,” in *Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information (Royal Gardens, Kew)* (1908), 302.

⁵¹⁰ Henderson, 38.

⁵¹¹ M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya* (Nairobi, Kenya: Oxford University Press, 1968), 155.

plantations also produced other cash crops including coconuts and cotton.⁵¹² Part of the reason for the success of German agriculture was the emphasis placed on scientific experimentation.⁵¹³ The emphasis on agriculture in this region was solidified by the establishment of the Biological Agricultural Institute at Amani in 1902, and the Kibongoto Agricultural Experiment Station at Kilimanjaro in 1911.⁵¹⁴ The importance of Amani is also underscored by the creation of a branch line off the Tanga Railway to the research institute in 1911.⁵¹⁵ These German efforts far outstripped any similar efforts on the part of the British government indicating the importance of this region to the success of German colonization.⁵¹⁶ Another reason for this economic boom in the region was indicated in the previous maps. The 1897 map of West Usambara not only listed German Farms but also the native villages.⁵¹⁷ The key notes these varied in size from “over 10

⁵¹² Kaniki, 132.

⁵¹³ In contrast, Governor Eliot lamented that similar efforts “have been almost entirely neglected in the British possessions.” Eliot, 257.

⁵¹⁴ Calvert, 78-79. This same author, who wrote his book in 1917, stated the Amani institute was “reputed to be the best equipped in Africa.” This is echoed by the 1925 British East Africa Commission describing the Amani Institute as “a tropical scientific institute superior to anything in the British colonies or protectorates, and comparable with Pusa in India or the Dutch establishment at Buitenzorg in Java.” Henderson, 37. On September 13, 1905 the *Zanzibar Gazette* reported that “As an experimental station Amani is far and away the best equipped of any on the east coast; it would, perhaps, be more correct to say that it is the only properly equipped biological-agricultural experimental station in this part of the world.” Quoted in Brode, 154. The output of this research was prodigious and was passed along to the Botanical Garden in Berlin. As just one example of nearly hundreds of articles on colonial agriculture from the same journal see “Über das Gedeihen der vom botanischen Garten der Usambara-Versuchsstation gelieferten Nutzpflanzen,” in *Notizblatt des Königl. Botanischen Gartens und Museums zu Berlin* 1, no. 9 (August, 7, 1897): 285-286.


⁵¹⁵ Schroeter and Ramaer, 26.

⁵¹⁶ In Kenya it was not until 1903 that an Agricultural Department was established and while experimental farms were established around main settlement areas (Nairobi, Naivasha, Malindi, etc.) only £11,618 was budgeted for agriculture. Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 316.


⁵¹⁷ Map 5.15 and 5.16.

huts” to “over 100 huts.” The location of these villages was critical for development because the German farmers needed that labor for plantation agriculture. Thus, the map listed these huts not only for the illustrative purpose but also for the practical ends this information could serve. Another reason for the placement of the military station listed on the same map was that stations were sited in areas of large population density to ensure a ready labor force.⁵¹⁸ As illustrated by the 1908 map of German East Africa, the development of the Usambara highlands was pronounced and the greatest area of development in the colony.

⁵¹⁸ Gwassa, 103.



Map 5.26: Paul Sprigade and Max Moisel. *Daressalam (6)*. 1:1,000,000. In *Grosser Deutscher Kolonialatlas*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer, 1908, JRL.



Map 5.27: Paul Sprigade and Max Moisel. *Daressalam (6)*. 1:1,000,000. In *Grosser Deutscher Kolonialatlas*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer, 1908, JRL.

As evidenced by the growth of transportation and governmental links it is clear that the Usambara region was the most heavily developed of the colony. Additionally, the importance of the railway in extending and solidifying colonial rule is quite clear. All along the railway, from Tanga to Masinde, Telegraph (*Telegraphenstationen*) and Post Stations (*Postanstalten*) ensured that the lines of communication to these developed regions were substantial.⁵¹⁹ These lines of communication enabled trade and ensured exportable goods could reach the three custom stations (*Zollänter*) located on the coast between Pangani and Tanga. Additionally, the military station of Wilhelmstahl has become the locus of power in the Usambara region gaining a custom station of its own.⁵²⁰ Wilhelmstahl, as a district office (*Bezirksamts*) truly was a force unto its own. While the governor may have possessed the executive title, these district officers, who were often *Schutztruppe* officers as well, were “the real creators of empire.”⁵²¹ Therefore, these stations indicated real centers of power and the assurance that development could be achieved. In contrast, the region around Dar es Salaam possesses little in the way of a similar development even though it was the capital of the colony. With the ready access

⁵¹⁹ See Map 5.26. Communication was seen as vital with postal staff transferred directly from Germany to duty in the colonies. Transportation and communication went hand in hand with letters carried free of charge on the railways. Schroeter and Ramaer, 16.

⁵²⁰ While it is difficult to interpret a light-red line, indicating a District Office (*Bezirksamts*), from a dark red line, indicating a Military Station (*Militärstation*), it seems clear the towns of Tanga, Pangani, and Wilhelmstahl formed a strong triangle of German power around this critical region. In another indication of the importance of the region and of force as a prerequisite to development the last stop of Moshi indicates a military station with a post, telegraph, and customs office. Thus, along the entire length of these highlands there was a strong German governmental and military presence.

⁵²¹ Conrad, 72.

to land and labor, and a suitable climate for cash-crop development, a large number of the 5,336 European inhabitants of German East Africa lived in the Usambara highlands.⁵²²

The overall process of development in the northern highland region of German East Africa is well displayed by this final German map. While not as detailed as the 1:50,000 map of East Usambara it does represent one of the most detailed, at a 1:100,000 scale, regional maps made by either Germany or Britain.⁵²³ This map shows the incredible progression of the gaze of the Developer and underscores how the gaze was not confined to Usambara but spread throughout the northern highlands. The key is incredibly detailed, showing all manner of vegetation and transport that would be important for any further development.⁵²⁴ Second, it suggests the key importance of the Usambara region to development. Maps, especially ones that are on such a large scale, are an extremely labor-intensive product to produce. An investment of significant resources, in money, expertise and time, would be required to produce a map of this caliber. Therefore, this effort would only be made in a region deemed vitally important for such a treatment.


⁵²² Henderson, 87. In 1913, this author lists 1,971 European in the Usambara highlands.

⁵²³ Even the detailed British maps made around Nairobi, Fort Hall, and Mombasa to mark their chief areas of economic development and settlement were only at a 1:125,000 scale.


⁵²⁴ In addition to dividing vegetation into six possible symbols the key also makes allowances for three types of roads, not including the railroad. See Map 5.14.



Map 5.28: *Usambara und Küsten Gebiet in den Bezirken Tanga, Pangani und Wilhelmstal in 4 Blättern (Blatt A)*. 1:100,000. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, nr Tanzania S/53, RGS.




Map 5.30: *Usambara und Küsten Gebeit in den Bezirken Tanga, Pangani und Wilhelmstal in 4 Blättern (Blatt D)*. 1:100,000. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, nr Tanzania S/53, RGS.



Map 5.31: *Usambara und Küsten Gebeit in den Bezirken Tanga, Pangani und Wilhelmstal in 4 Blättern (Blatt D). 1:100,000. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, nr Tanzania S/53, RGS.*



Map 5.32: *Usambara und Küsten Gebeit in den Bezirken Tanga, Pangani und Wilhelmstal in 4 Blättern (Blatt D)*. 1:100,000. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911, nr Tanzania S/53, RGS.



Map 5.33: *Tanga (Sheet B)*. 1:100,000. In *German East Africa*. London: War Office, 1915, JRL.

The importance of the Usambara region is laid out in two ways. Below the map title is an index map dividing the region into four leaves (*Blatt*). These include the coastal zone from the border to the Pangani River and west from the coast to the entire Usambara region.⁵²⁵ Additionally, the way the map is constructed isolates the gaze on this region. As seen in Map 5.30 the Pangani River might as well serve as the edge of the world as the map stops indicating anything after that point. The fact that north of this river is rife with incredible detail makes this division all the more striking. The other end of the map is no different. While indicating the demarcation line between the British and German colonies, the British holdings are left entirely blank apart from rivers and topographic markings that “bleed over” the line.⁵²⁶ These silences highlight the preeminence of this region for German development. After localizing the gaze on this region the rich detail of the map lays out any number of purposes. This map possesses a rich and varied key laying out everything from the Tanga Railway to individual differentiations between plant types. This detail is important for any investor in terms of trying to locate the most profitable area to expand into. For example, Coconut trees (*Kokospalmen*) are drawn into the landscape as patches of individual trees. While this distinction seems overly detailed, it makes sense as that plant was one of the more profitable exports.

The other chief aim of the map was to demarcate and privilege the German property holdings. The importance of the transportation network is illustrated with the

⁵²⁵ Map 5.28.

⁵²⁶ Another instance where what is *not* depicted on the map matters as much as what is.

dark black line scything across the region. The importance of the railway to development is even clearer in this section. As these plantations are connected with bright black or bright red lines it is easy, as was the intention of the cartographer, to look at such a map and ignore the terrain in order to fixate on German property.⁵²⁷ It is evidently a cadastral map and, similar to the map made of East Usambara, red is used to note the private holdings of the European plantations. Even the map bends to this reality. While so much detail went into indicating different types of flora all of the plantations are opaque. The key provides the only indication of the nature of the crops made at each plantation, noting a number of rubber, sisal and coffee plantations.⁵²⁸ This one stage of separation, where the crops are associated with the plantations first before being recognized as plants, establishes these properties as something distinct within the entire region. Nature, in these plantations, had been tamed and thus the plants were made secondary to the cadastral purpose of the map. Quite in contrast was the way in which the holdings of the indigenous population were delegitimized. Examining the key, native plantations are represented by small green v-shaped symbols, which in no way are distinctive from the

⁵²⁷ See Map 5.31.

⁵²⁸ *Ungefähre Übersicht über die hauptsächlichsten Kulturen der etwa 1910 vorhandenen und auf Blatt A dargestellten Pflanzungen* See Map 5.29. In East Usambara, apart from the state plantings at Amani (*Staatliche Versuchspflanzung des Biol.Landw.-Inst.*) there are seven coffee (*Kaffee*) plantations and one rubber (*Kautschuk*) at Magunga. In West Usambara there are three coffee plantations, five rubber, and two grain/cereal (*Gut, Getreide*). In the immediate area of the railway (*Im näheren Bereich der Bahn*) are four sisal plantations and twelve rubber plantations. Lastly, to return to the first map of the chapter, near the Pangani River is a diverse set of plantations growing everything from Sisal and sisal hemp to cattle breeding and cotton.

other symbols used to show types of vegetation.⁵²⁹ Unless examined very closely it is easy for native plantations (*Eingeborenenfelder*) to be conflated with the rest of the natural, and hence un-owned, vegetation. This was not a mistake and was a clear part of the design. The gaze of the Developer privileges European private property and, to best utilize the land and people, denies all threats to that hegemony. In this case the lack of any real clear distinction between native and natural would enable any investor to imagine a *tabula rasa* ready to be filled in with their own splotch of red. Even if the viewer was in error, and the land was in fact owned by the natives, they need only call on military power of the state to remake the world in conformity to the map. As the maps of the Despot delegitimized the indigenous claims to territory by failing to provide borders, the Developer delegitimized indigenous claims to property by obscuring clear ownership lines as much as possible. This map series illustrates concretely the ways in which the gaze of the Developer established itself in the northern highlands of German East Africa and created a functioning economy.

The last map provides an interesting connection. While Map 5.33 appears quite similar to the rest of the map sheets the caption notes that it was made by the *British*. In fact, this map was made in 1915 as the British invaded German East Africa during the First World War and copied the previous map for their own purposes. One need only compare Map 5.31 and Map 5.33, made of the same general area, to see how much the

⁵²⁹ See Map 5.32.

British map copied the German to the smallest detail. Thus, this map carries the same highly detailed key. It also notes the same features and even serves to privilege the private property of the German planters. That they would continue to elevate European claims, even those of their global enemies during wartime, illustrates the desire to elevate *all* Europeans above Africans. As in the negotiations over borders made under the gaze of the Despot, the gaze of the Developer trumped geo-politics. That the British felt the need to copy this map illustrates a common colonial mindset and the similar operating principles of the gaze in both colonial contexts. The British understood that this map would be extremely useful in their own developmental efforts of the colony once it was conquered and turned into a British territory.⁵³⁰ That this map was copied by the British also serves as a physical reminder of how easily the reality of the map could be undone. The copied map represented all of the dreams and effort of private citizens, investors, farmers, soldiers, and officials. However, these combined efforts would now become appropriated to aid an enemy force conquering that very dream. For all of the success of the gaze of the Developer it is helpful to remember that its conceptual power is tied to the ability to lie effectively. The very orderliness and neatness of the map hides that it is an

⁵³⁰ The territory was given to Britain but under a mandate by the League of Nations. For a history of this period see Peter A. Dumbuya, *Tanganyika under International Mandate, 1919-1946* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1995). They took on this burden by arguing the Germans were so brutal in their conquests that they had forfeited their rights to the colony. The “history of the German occupation of East Africa is a history of bloodshed and protracted war” compared to the British who “spread over what is to-day Kenya with scarcely a skirmish.” However, as these next two chapters will show this claim of “scarcely a skirmish” was a falsehood. George Steer, *Judgment on German Africa* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1939), 252.

imposition on reality that can be upset at any moment. It is somehow fitting that the Tanga Railway, with its tortuous beginnings and critical importance in developing the entire Usambara region, served its final purpose by being torn up by the *Schutztruppe* to fortify their trenches against the British invasion.⁵³¹

⁵³¹ Gillman, 21.

Chapter 6: Imperial British East Africa Company

[The] Company was by all odds the least distinguished of the African chartered companies. Poorly conceived, badly managed, and greatly undercapitalized, the company was destined from the start to a short existence.⁵³²

British East Africa was a product of necessity not of want. Prior to the German efforts documented in the previous two chapters, the British were more than content to rule the area through their close relationship with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Under the firm hand of Sir John Kirk as Consul General in Zanzibar, it appeared unlikely that the British would need to be actively involved in the interior of eastern Africa.⁵³³ Beyond furthering British influence without the need of greater commitment, Kirk personally, as late as 1884 on the eve of the Berlin Conference, did not believe “that a colony in the true sense of the term where the white race can permanently exist and perpetuate itself, could be found anywhere in Central Africa.”⁵³⁴ British policy was in accord with his assessment dissuading William Mackinnon, the future director of the Imperial British East Africa

⁵³² Marie de Kiewiet-Hemphill, “The British Sphere, 1884-1894” in *History of East Africa* Vol I Ed. Roland Anthony Oliver (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 393, quoted in Esmond Bradley Martin, *The History of Malindi: A Geographical Analysis of an East African Coastal Town from the Portuguese Period to the Present* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973).

⁵³³ Kirk’s continual efforts (serving 1866-1887 as British consul) were to build up the Sultan as a way for the British to control the east African coastline without the demands of direct control. See Wolff, 36.

⁵³⁴ Sorrenson, 31.

Company, from purchasing land on the coast as late as 1877.⁵³⁵ While the British were content to impose restrictions on the slave trade, they felt their political and trading position was secure via their proxy ruler.⁵³⁶ In many ways their actions fulfill the apt description of the British Empire given by Robin Butlin as “a mixture of deliberate policy and pragmatic reaction to events, opportunities and perceived threats.”⁵³⁷ The tipping point which led to active British colonization on the East African coast came from two “threats,” the Berlin Conference of 1884 and the aforementioned efforts of Carl Peters. Peters’ expeditions began to threaten positions felt to be British preserve and the strictures of the Berlin Conference demanded a new British policy in order to secure their position.

Once “effective occupation” was the rule for European colonization it was necessary for the British to move beyond coastal influence into active engagement with the interior.⁵³⁸ As the “Scramble” progressed the additional fear was that losing their position in eastern Africa would lead to German dominance of the Central Lakes and, by

⁵³⁵ P.L. McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA: A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1893), 3. Mackinnon had an interest in the area as his British India Steam Navigation Company already operated a regular line between Zanzibar and India. However, the Foreign Office stepped in and exerted pressure to dissuade Sultan Bagrash from giving over control of the territory. See Maj. E.H.M. Leggett, “The Economic Development of British East Africa and Uganda,” in *Royal Society of Arts* 63, no. 3246 (Feb 5, 1915), 209.

⁵³⁶ Lt. Lloyd Matthews R.N., later retiring a general in the service of the Sultan, commanded a force of 300 in 1877 which would grow to 1,300 men in 1880. L.W. Hollingsworth, *Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office 1890-1913* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1953), 15-16.

⁵³⁷ Butlin, 53.

⁵³⁸ Earlier, in 1880, Sir John Kirk had suggested extending a series of fortified positions from Bagamoyo, which is well south of the eventual border between British and German East Africa, to Tabora 120-miles inland in an effort to extend the Sultan’s territory, but was overruled by the Foreign Office. Hollingsworth, 16.

extension, the headwaters of the Nile. As Egypt and the Suez Canal had become the main artery of the British Empire this threat was extreme. Lord Salisbury referred to this strategic picture to Parliament in February, 1895:

“Four, if not five, Powers are steadily advancing towards the upperwaters of the Nile. There will be competition – I will not use a stronger word – for the advantages which predominance in that region will confer.”⁵³⁹

In response to these perceived threats the British government turned to the previously spurned William Mackinnon and pressured him to take control of the coastal strip out of a mixture of capitalist enterprise and patriotic duty.⁵⁴⁰ After the Sultan had signed an agreement in December, 1885 with Germany, the Sultan became “free” to grant a concession to the British East African Association which would later become the Imperial British East Africa Company.

The competition between the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and German East Africa Company (DOAG)⁵⁴¹ was supremely motivated by the map. As indicated earlier the blanks on the map under the gaze of the Discoverer had motivated explorers to push outward and conquer territory for Western scientific knowledge. This motivation was little different from Joseph Conrad’s protagonist Marlow noting as “a

⁵³⁹ Sorrenson, 9.

⁵⁴⁰ McDermott, 8. As the Company would later declare in a letter to the Foreign Office they “were prosecuting national purposes in deference to the declared policy of the State,” pg. 75 of FO 2/58, PRO.

⁵⁴¹ For ease of space I will often use these abbreviations in place of the full name of each company. At any point that I use the capitalized form of Company, following a convention often used in conjunction with the British East India Company, I will be referring to the IBEAC.

little chap” that “When I grow up I will go there.”⁵⁴² In contrast to personal quests for fame and scientific glory, the post-1884 expeditions were rife with nationalist import. Explorations, where “national flags flew aloft above travelers’ camps,” became intertwined with the motives of political and economic leaders in Europe.⁵⁴³ To take just one example the explorer Sir H.H. Johnston, in September of 1884, had concluded treaties around Taveta near Mt. Kilimanjaro.⁵⁴⁴ By way of intersection between the gaze of the Discoverer and the gaze of the Despot it is important to note that his “British Kilima-njaro Expedition” was sponsored by the British Association and the Royal Society and he presented a report of his expedition to the Royal Geographic Society.⁵⁴⁵ He later gave ownership of these treaties to John Hutton, a Manchester merchant and President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, who helped found the IBEA.⁵⁴⁶ To

⁵⁴² Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, 132. This near youthful desire to claim territory can also be seen in Map 2.3 in Chapter Two.

⁵⁴³ Carruthers, 965. Her narrative tracing the mapping of the Transvall, serving first as a threat to British hegemony and then transformed, post-annexation, into a clearly colored part of the British Empire, is a fascinating illustration of the power of maps to make a political case for existence. To underscore how geographers fostered this nationalist drive even the geographical publications of each country were drawn into the cartographic feud. While Jeppe’s maps had been featured heavily in *Petermann’s Geographic Mittheilungen* in establishing Dutch claims in opposition to the British, post-annexation these maps, heretofore seen as a threat to British influence, were featured in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*.

⁵⁴⁴ For his treaties see “Agreement between Henry Hamilton Johnston, conducting the Kilima-njaro Expedition, September 27th 1884” pg. 39 in FO 2/141, PRO.

⁵⁴⁵ By Royal Society he is indicating the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, see H.H. Johnston, “The Kilima-njaro Expedition,” in *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and the Monthly Record of Geography* 7, no 3 (March, 1884), 137. For an even more detailed recounting of this expedition see his book H.H. Johnston, *The Kilma-Njaro Expedition* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886). As a further intersection between the gazes H.H. Johnston would join the British Consular Service in 1885 and served as special commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate from 1899-1901.

⁵⁴⁶ We leave aside, for now, the entire issue of transferring “ownership” of entire native tribes via this method. See Hill, 8. To see the documentation of the transfer from Johnson, to Hutton, to the Company see

bring some semblance order a multi-national commission was established whose report of June 9, 1886 laid the ground work for a delineation of spheres of influence.⁵⁴⁷ That these spheres had to be marked is a sign of how great a change had occurred in eastern Africa. The German threat had transformed a territory with which the British had possessed commercial treaties since 1839, and a good relationship with the ruler, into a land in flux in need of political definition. What changed was not merely German action but a shift in gazes. The territory was now a known geographic quantity and possessed blanks of a political nature which needed to be filled in.

With the spheres of influence defined the Germans and British began to carve out their holdings on the coast. In the end the Sultan Seyyid Khalifa sold his holdings to the Germans and signed a concession to the IBEA which reduced his claims to a small 10-mile coastal belt.⁵⁴⁸ The agreement with the IBEA provided a 50 year concession from the River Umbe to Kipini giving the company the right of “levying taxes, collecting the customs, disposing of public lands, administering justice and government generally.”⁵⁴⁹ This was in line with the traditional British model which preferred to protect local interests and go about imperialism “in ways which would as far as possible spare the

“Collection of letters relation to the transfer..” marked pages 43-69 in FO 2/141 as well as “Letter to Col. Euan-Smith, Consul General in Zanzibar” dated 15 December 1888 marked page 41 in FO 2/141, PRO.

⁵⁴⁷ This commission was made up of Col. (later Lord) Kitchner, the German Consul in Cairo and the French Consul in Zanzibar. Hill, 8. See also Leggett, 210.

⁵⁴⁸ Hollingsowrth, 20. For a general history of the Arab State of Zanzibar see Robert Bennett Norman, *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar* (London: Methuen, 1978).

⁵⁴⁹ McDermott, 9. For a copy of the Concession by the Sultan to the IBEA see TS 18/260, PRO.

government trouble and expense, by delegating the responsibility to others.”⁵⁵⁰ This transfer of authority was so great as to draw criticism from Parliament. Reflecting on the creation of separate spheres of influence Sir J. Campbell, in 1890, described England and Germany as “akin to two robbers who, ‘having stripped a man of all that belonged to him, discussed who should protect him..’”⁵⁵¹ While the Sultan had granted leases to the coastal territory, and there had been some semblance of demarcation to the respective spheres, the real competition was about to begin. The competition centered on which company could press into the interior more quickly in order to assert their claim to it. As soon as the coastal lease was granted the IBEA established their headquarters in Mombasa and began sending caravans to establish their claims to their sphere of influence.⁵⁵² In 1887, the IBEA was able to conclude 21 treaties with indigenous tribes which pressed their claim 200 miles into the interior.⁵⁵³ The inducement to push further inland was as much motivated by politics as business. The same year that IBEA caravans were pushing inland the DOAG, by propping up the Sultan Simba of Witu who opposed the Sultan of Zanzibar, created a German Witu Company with claims to the interior and

⁵⁵⁰ Bernard Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004* 4th Edition, (Harlow, England: Pearson Longman, 2004), 110. As the “anti-imperialist Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Harcourt” was alleged to have said in 1892, “even Jingoism is tolerable when it is done ‘on the cheap’.” A.G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt* (Constable, 1923), ii, 199 quoted in Porter, 111.


⁵⁵¹ Quoting Sir. J. Campbell in *Hansard Parliamentary Debates* Vol. CCCXLVII (1890), 1105 in Hollingsworth, 48.

⁵⁵² This lease was granted in 1886 to the British East African Association. For the sake of clarity I have chosen to refer to all previous iterations of the Imperial British East Africa Company, only granted a royal charter in 1888, as the IBEA. See BT 31/5594/38949 for details on the name changes of the Company.

⁵⁵³ These were treaties made with the Wagalla, Wadigo, Wakamba, Wateita, and others. McDermott, 10. They would eventually sign 92 treaties with tribes in the interior before the company disbanded.

the island of Lamu. Sultan Simba of Witu quickly claimed German protectorate status when, in response to this threat, the Sultan of Zanzibar prepared a military force to oppose him. Once the Witu Company was formed it pressed its claim to the port of Lamu to solidify commercial activity in the territory.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵⁴ McDermott, 33.



Map 6.1: East Africa showing the recently-arranged Political Boundaries. 1:8,000,000.

London: Edward and Weller, 1887. JRL

Another image of the map featured in Chapter Four underscores the problem this advance posed to the IBEA. Mackinnon clearly saw this expansion into Witu as a threat since it would squeeze the territory between two German possessions. Before returning to the interactions between the respective companies and governments, it is important to note how these conflicts were due in large part to the map. The approximate lines of demarcation, established by agreement with the Sultan and arranged by the 1886 commission, still left many “blanks” on the map. The Witu holdings were north of the given line and, thus, were “free game.”⁵⁵⁵ Carl Peters’ name should nearly always be written with the accompanying adjective rapacious, but in fairness to his efforts the logic of the map under the gaze of the Despot dictated such a move. Closed off from moving any further north by the reality of the British position he simply moved north to the next available land. Available, of course, was a nebulous term as this next step relied on the negation of the indigenous population. While tribes such as the Witu people, and the Galla on either side of the Tana River, were placed on the map they were not in any way shown to have a political reality.⁵⁵⁶ There was no boundary for their position as the map only recognized European claims. The map established the ground rules and Peters simply took the logical next step. Indeed, native claims of ownership were accepted only in the context of treaties in which they gave up territory to the protection of a European company. Part of the reason for Mackinnon’s fears were that he could read the map with

⁵⁵⁵ The German claim to the Sultan of Witu’s territory is labeled on the map “Wito”

⁵⁵⁶ See Map 6.1

the eyes of a Despot. The Witu territory on the above map would not be the end of German movement but a jumping off point to occupy the “depopulated” territory surrounding it. While the map’s title suggests stasis, “Showing the recently-arranged political boundaries,” it was simply the first shot in a barrage of actions as the DOAG and IBEA competed for unclaimed territory with feigned or actual indifference on the part of their respective governments.⁵⁵⁷ The IBEA, while trying to forestall any German position in Witu, began efforts with the Sultan of Zanzibar to acquire the territory north of Witu to cut off the German company in a similar maneuver. By August of 1889, the Sultan ceded territory up the East African coast, well beyond “Magadisho,” and the IBEA conducted negotiations with the Italian government to divide the land between them.⁵⁵⁸ The eventual agreement declared the port of Kismayu to be jointly administered and an Italian sphere of influence north of the Juba River which eventually formed the northern boundary of the colony of Kenya.⁵⁵⁹ This desire to circumvent the Germans led to a division of territory which would, by 1893, be formally conceded to Italy and administered by the V. Filonardi Company in an effort to develop the now-christened

⁵⁵⁷ It is arguable whether or not the German government cared for Peters’ actions, beyond aggravating the British, as they gladly gave away Witu, as documented in chapter 4, for the rights to Heligoland Island in 1890. In contrast, the IBEA felt nothing but abject hostility from the British Government feeling as though it received none of the support that their opposites in German East Africa did.

⁵⁵⁸ That a company was negotiating directly with a sovereign state lends further credence to the nature of the gaze of the Despot and the importance of boundaries as a preliminary to economic development.

⁵⁵⁹ McDermott, 97.

“Italian Somaliland.”⁵⁶⁰ Generals of any 19th century battlefield would commend the efforts of both companies to outflank their competitors and complete such “settlement-envelopments.”

While attempting to protect its flank - the actions discussed below and negotiations with the Sultan and Italy were concurrent - the IBEA contested German claims to the Witu territory. Mackinnon appealed to the British Government claiming to possess “documentary evidence of an ample and conclusive character” proving the Sultan desired to sell this area to the IBEA but the British turned the case over to an independent arbiter.⁵⁶¹ While the arbiter stated the Sultan was free to sell the land, the German Witu company set up a customs post and the IBEA was left to handle the issue on their own.⁵⁶²

⁵⁶⁰ Hollingsworth, 86. For a memoranda on the agreement, along with debates about the border west of the Juba River dividing line, see FO 403/130 (PRO) and a second copy, possessing the missing final two pages of the memoranda, FO 881/6001, PRO. The exact boundaries west of the Juba River would remain in flux, as documented in Chapter 7, with continual efforts to define the boundary between the Northern Frontier District and Abyssinia. The official demarcation line was of supreme importance to Italy since as “the British government having explicitly recognized that Abyssinia and all its dependences are to remain out of the sphere of British influence, and that Italy has the duty to protect the Empire of Ethiopia” this agreement on territorial lines was meant to preserve their protectorate over Ethiopia. The later debate over the nature of the Ethiopian-Italian relationship would lead to the Battle of Adwa. For a discussion of the nature of this debate over protectorate status and the resulting conflict see Chapter 7 (90-108) of Raymond Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2011).

⁵⁶¹ This evidence included draft agreements, telegrams of said negotiations between Mackinnon and the Sultan, and a sworn statement by the Sultan’s negotiator. McDermott, 36. In the IBEA mind the failure of the government to look out for their interests in any way underscored how the Company was forced to take on the duties of the state without any of the state support that was common to these ventures. This bitterness would spill out into a public relations campaign to defend the IBEA’s actions and demand a greater monetary return when the government bought out the IBEA.

⁵⁶² McDermott., 42. The German government claimed they had no authority and the British government refused to protect the interests of the Sultan and the Company. As for the Witu company, while the Sultan was free to sell the territory to either the IBEA or the German Witu Company it was proven that there was

Eventually the Company was forced to threaten military action, assembling a force of 150 men and a maxim gun, which prompted the Germans to withdraw the day before the invasion was to commence.⁵⁶³ The issues with Witu, prompted by the logic of the map, led to huge expenditures on the part of the Company to simply claim land that was promised to them by treaty. The unsettled position of the IBEA, and its huge cost overlays, is what led Lord Salisbury to oppose granting a royal charter to the Company in 1887.

Recognizing that more support was necessary to stabilize the position of the Company in East Africa, William Mackinnon embarked on a campaign to acquire the credit and influence necessary to assure the IBEA's existence. His efforts led to the forming of the British East Africa Company on April 18, 1888.⁵⁶⁴ This company was placed on much firmer footing as William Mackinnon was able to acquire initial capital of £250,000.⁵⁶⁵ Beyond money, and certainly of equal importance, were the luminaries he was able to have sign-on with his venture especially Sir John Kirk.⁵⁶⁶ Kirk joined as

no agreement between the Sultan and the German company. This lack of any formal agreement, in the end, doomed the German company.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁵⁶⁴ For ease I have referred to it consistently as the IBEA but it was, prior to this moment, the British East Africa Association.

⁵⁶⁵ While seemingly a great sum, money issues would hamper the Company throughout its short existence. After raising the initial capital a public subscription was opened for another £750,000 of which the company was only able to raise a third (£250,000) of the hoped for capital. Sorrenson, 12.

⁵⁶⁶ The list "carried many influential and well-known names" including R. Hon. Lord Brassey as former director of the North Borneo Company, and General Sir Donald Stewart the former commander of the Indian Army." See Marie Jeanne de Kiewiet, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company, 1876-1895" (Dissertation, University of London, 1955), 100-101.

founding member of the Company receiving 50 shares for his £1,000 investment.⁵⁶⁷ Beyond his monetary support Kirk was held in high esteem, having served as consul-general to Zanzibar from 1873-1887 and would even be sent as plenipotentiary by the British Government to the slave trade conference in Brussels in 1889-1890, and granted instant legitimacy to the company and Mackinnon's efforts.⁵⁶⁸ In response to these efforts the government granted a royal charter on 3 September, 1888.⁵⁶⁹ With government backing the IBEA had the solidified position and capita, necessary to push further into the interior and sign treaties with the indigenous kingdoms.⁵⁷⁰ As early as 11 October 1888, the IBEA sent Captain Swayne to the interior in order to sign treaties and "build stations from which further expeditions could be organized" and enabled the IBEA to gain a firm footing on the African interior.⁵⁷¹ In fact, the charter served to improve the level of control the IBEA deemed that it had over the tribes in the interior. This new sense of control was best reflected in the different language used in their treaties. A chieftain pledging fealty to the British East African Association would agree to have

⁵⁶⁷ For official charter and investment documentation, including the names of all investors, see BT 31/5594/38949, PRO.

⁵⁶⁸ Tying together the connections between the gaze of the Discoverer and the Despot Sir John Kirk accompanied David Livingstone on his second exploration of central Africa. See George Taubman Goldie, "Progress of Exploration and the Consolidation of the Empire in America, Australia, and Africa," in *The Geographical Journal* 17, no. 3 (March, 1901), 239.

⁵⁶⁹ Hill, 10-11 and McDermott, 10. As noted in a 30 May 1893 letter from Whitehall, "I am directed by the Secretary of State to acquaint you that he has no objection to the title "Imperial" being used in connection with the name of the Limited Company to which the accompanying documents relate." in BT 31/5594/38949, PRO. The announced charter can also be found published in the *London Gazette* in FO 881/5668X (PRO) while draft documentation for the charter is found in HO/45/9292/B4984, PRO.

⁵⁷⁰ 21 treaties were made by 1887 and 92 in total before the company disbanded.

⁵⁷¹ Low, 100.

“placed all his country and peoples...under the rule and government of the said Association, and I/We will hoist the flag of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar.”⁵⁷²

After the granting of the charter the greater control the Company possessed is shown in the change of wording which cut the Sultan out of any claim to authority. Under the new treaty a chieftain would place “Himself and all his Territories, Countries, Peoples, and Subjects under the protection, rule and government” of the IBEA and “hoist and recognize the flag of the said Company.”⁵⁷³ This political import can even be recognized on the map below.


⁵⁷² See Treaty No.1 “Treaty between British East Africa Association and Sheikh Mbaruk Bin Raschid Bin Salem Bin Hamed. 9th June, 1887” in FO 2/140, PRO.

⁵⁷³ See Treaty No. 23 “Treaty between the Imperial British East Africa Company and the Chief of the Ntima on the River Tana, March 20th 1889” in FO 2/140, PRO.



Map 6.2: *Caravan Route from Hameye to Mount Kenia (British East Africa) and back.*

1:633,600 London: Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1892, Kenya S.24, RGS



Map 6.3: Caravan Route from Hameye to Mount Kenia (British East Africa) and back.

1:633,600 London: Intelligence Division of the War Office, 1892, Kenya S.24, RGS

Made in 1891 this map documents a journey of a Commander Dundas, in the employ of the IBEA, along the Tana River.⁵⁷⁴ Having made this journey after the charter it represents the new reality of the company and its stronger position. This is clearly shown in the notation of the flag of the IBEA which also would be raised over the territory of any tribe that agreed to a new protectorate status.⁵⁷⁵ As reflected in the wording of the treaties, the IBEA expanded their claims of control once achieving the backing of an Imperial charter. The Company also enlarged their holdings. Recognizing the threat that the DOAG posed to their position, the Company rapidly increased their caravans.⁵⁷⁶ Of the 92 treaties made before the Company's liquidation, 77% (71 of the 92 treaties) were made *after* the receipt of the Imperial charter. While this flag seems like a minor detail it represents a sea-change in terms of the position of the company.

The flag represents the assertion of political control over the territory. It denotes

⁵⁷⁴ Map 6.1.

⁵⁷⁵ Map 6.2.

⁵⁷⁶ Dundas' caravan would be one of several that the IBEA would send out as part of a multi-pronged assault on the interior of eastern Africa. In addition to Dundas' caravan this chapter will also examine a caravan headed by Frederick Lugard and Frederick Jackson. However, there were two others that, for sake of space, I have chosen not to recount here. One was a mission by J.R.W. Pigott up the river Tana in 1899 where he established a station at the head of the river about 250 miles from the coast. See McDermott, 114, 209. For the RGS article he submitted in tracing his journey see J.R.W. Pigott, "Mr. J.R.W. Pigott's Journey to the Upper Tana, 1889," in *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 12, no. 3 (March, 1890): 129-136. The map made to accompany his article, E.G. Ravenstein, *Sketch Map of a Journey to the Upper Tana*, 1:2,000,000, G. Philip & Son, 1890, can be found at the JRL. The other caravan was led by Maj. Eric Smith and was sent in December, 1890 to the Victoria Nyanza for the purposes of assessing a future railway line. It is not noted on the map but it is likely some of his efforts found their way in to the last map of this chapter in Map 6.24 – 6.26. See McDermott, 209. His legacy was assured a place in Kenya's history as he built and designed Ft. Smith, named after him as its first commandant, in Kikuyu country. Hill, 74. Ironically, for a good summary of nearly all of these caravans (with the exception of Smith's) see the German map C. Schmidt & Dr. B.H., *Victoria-Nyansa und dem Kenia. Mit Benutzung der Routen-Aufnahme Dr. G.A. Fischer's nach den neustern Quellen gezeichnet von Dr. Bruno Hassenstein*. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1895, JRL.

transition from exploration to one of permanence, control, and stability. Not only does the flag suggest a shift to the gaze of ownership, it also is one of the clearest examples of Ian Barrow's concept of Associative History in the modern cartographic map. He suggests that dedications and cartouches helped instill a sense of ownership over territory.⁵⁷⁷ In the same way as with maps made by the British East India Company, those made by the IBEA were constructed to connect the identity of the territory with those who were administering it.⁵⁷⁸ Early Modern maps were rife with illustrations which led to Swift's quip about elephants in Africa.⁵⁷⁹ However, in the transition to the modern period cartographers abandoned these artistic licenses to better present a scientific imprimatur to their work. This flag is, in some ways, a hold-over of this older and more romantic method of depicting control which would occasionally reassert itself in the modern period.⁵⁸⁰ These notations ensure the map straddles the line between the gaze of Discoverer and Despot. In terms of detail, especially with only the route line depicted, the map seems quite exploratory. In fact, the surveyor who accompanied Dundas on his mission gave a report to the Royal Geographic Society on this mission.⁵⁸¹ Beyond the

⁵⁷⁷ Barrow, *Making History*, 9.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁵⁷⁹ See Map 3.1

⁵⁸⁰ See Map 6.21 for another example of using the flag in just such a way in the altitude map made of the extension to the Tanga Railway.

⁵⁸¹ See Ernest Gedge, "A Recent Exploration, under Captain F.G. Dundas, R.N., up the River Tana to Mount Kenia," in *Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 14, no. 8 (Aug. 1892): 513-533. The map presented to the RGS Ravenstein, E.G., *A Map Illustrating an Expedition up the River Tana and to Mount Kenia*, 1:1,000,000, G. Philip & Son, 1892, can be found at the JRL. Dundas himself would continue his exploratory efforts writing an article for the Royal Geographic Society

flag the title, suggesting that all was within the realm of “British East Africa,” denotes that while this venture was somewhat exploratory it was linked to the new gaze of the IBEA.

In order to bring this gaze to bear on the interior the Company needed to support caravan efforts. As far as the IBEA was concerned the land was “practically a *terra incognita*” in comparison to the more readily explored areas given to the DOAG as only the “rapid” and “superficial” exploration of Mr. Joseph Thomson had occurred north of Kilimanjaro.⁵⁸² After establishing the company headquarters at Mombassa they began to send out caravans to fulfill their “first duty” to the region:

“to open up this unknown region to commerce and civilisation [sic] by exploration, directed *not to purposes of scientific observation* but to the attainment of such knowledge of the geography and resources of the country...as would ensure the general results at which the Company primarily aimed.”⁵⁸³

This statement is extremely telling in terms of the shift from the gaze of the Discoverer to the gaze of the Despot. As has been noted, each gaze absorbs and appropriates what had come before in order to make use of it for new ends. This was the process that was borne

on his navigation down the Juba River, see F.G. Dundas, “Expedition up the Juba River through Somali-Land, East Africa,” in *The Geographic Journal* 1, no. 3 (Mar., 1893): 209-222.

⁵⁸² McDermott, 207. For the article see Joseph Thomson, “Through the Masai Country to Victoria Nyanza,” in *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 6, no.12 (December 1884): 690-712. For the map accompanying his journey see E. Weller, *Route map of the R.G. S. East African Expedition*, 1:1,500,000, London: Royal Geographical Society, JRL This map is intriguing because what is depicted in green on the map was the massive territory that was labeled “Masai Territory” showing that even during the period of exploration the Masai were feared enough to warrant special recognition on the map

⁵⁸³ My emphasis added. McDermott, 208

out during the exploratory efforts where previous explorations would be muted in order to draw attention to the most recent exploratory journey. However, from an even larger perspective all of those efforts were now for naught in terms of the new purposes of the gaze of the Despot. No longer were caravans necessary for mere exploration but also had the “duty” to unlock the necessary information for domination, and eventual development, of the interior. In the case of the IBEA, the dual purposes it was trying to achieve, both firm ownership of the territory *and* the development of economic resources, make them an interesting case and highlight that these gazes are not in hermetically sealed containers. However, in analyzing the maps made during the period the general progression of political control preceding economic development is borne out.

One of the first efforts was undertaken by Frederick Lugard in 1890. Frederick Lugard, later Lord Lugard, was a personalized fusion of government and private enterprise that typified British efforts during this period. While the *Wissmanntroup* was an ad-hoc creation separate from the German military, the British gladly allowed officers to stay on the rolls while serving alternative assignments. The experiences of Lugard exemplify this process. Appointed 2nd Lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Foot (East Norfolk Line Battalion) in May 1878 he served with distinction in Afghanistan becoming a 1st Lt. by 1 January 1881 and a Captain by 13 August 1885.⁵⁸⁴ He served in the Afghan War, where he received a medal, while being mentioned in dispatches for action in the

⁵⁸⁴ See Army List (October, 1913). 1980a, Army List (October, 1883), 644, and Army List (October-December 1885), 301, all at PRO.

“Soudan [sic] Expedition of 1885” and the 1886-1887 Burmese Expedition in which he also received the Distinguished Service Order medal.⁵⁸⁵ However, it is his non-military career that makes him an interesting case study of the fusion of military and civilian efforts in colonizing British Africa. With his extensive colonial experience, both in Asia and Africa, he was an attractive candidate and was hired by the IBEA to serve in “Special Extra-Regtl. Employment.”⁵⁸⁶ In fact, during his entire tenure at the IBEA Lugard was continually listed on the army roles but was listed in *italics* denoting that he was officially on duty but not with his actual regiment.⁵⁸⁷ This service was not separate from the Army but was seen by the government as furthering the goals of the state with soldiers receiving half-pay from their army regiments while serving in private capacity.⁵⁸⁸ Lugard was even awarded a medal by the IBEA during his employ which was noted in his service record.⁵⁸⁹ Indeed, during his later employment with the Royal Niger Company, when not officially with his regiment, he was promoted to major and inducted as a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of Bath (CB).⁵⁹⁰ Lugard was not the exception as a number of British officers, from line officers to royal engineers, parlayed

⁵⁸⁵ The Official Army List with an Index (October, 1890), 1441, PRO.

⁵⁸⁶ Army List (October, 1901), 2395, PRO.

⁵⁸⁷ This same distinctive *italics* would appear when he went into service with the Royal Niger Company on 28 July 1894. See Army List (October-December 1894), 34d, PRO.


⁵⁸⁸ Hill, 31.

⁵⁸⁹ One can only think of the rueful remark of Sir Charles Eliot, high commissioner to the British East Africa Protectorate, that “if there were no decorations there would be fewer of these little wars.” Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 145.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 301.


brief stints with private companies into promotions and knighthoods.⁵⁹¹ Lugard's first effort on behalf of the IBEA, after being granted permission by the War Office to serve with the Company, was an exploration of the Sabaki River. The map he made of his expedition is an amazing "missing link" helping to document the slow shift from the gaze of the Discoverer to the gaze of the Despot.

⁵⁹¹ This was quite a contrast with the German efforts as, despite the eventual linkages with ex-DOAG officials serving as *Schutztruppe* officers, there was no quasi-official relationship like the British possessed.



Map 6.4: *Rough Road Chart of Sabakhi Route from Makangeni to Machagos*. 1:255,440.

London: Intelligence Division, Aug. 1890, mr Kenya 5/57, RGS




Map 6.5: Rough Road Chart of Sabakhi Route from Makangeni to Machagos. 1:255,440.

London: Intelligence Division, Aug. 1890, mr Kenya 5/57, RGS.




Map 6.6: *Rough Road Chart of Sabakhi Route from Makangeni to Machagos*. 1:255,440.

London: Intelligence Division, Aug. 1890, mr Kenya 5/57, RGS.



Map 6.7: *Rough Road Chart of Sabakhi Route from Makangeni to Machagos*. 1:255,440.

London: Intelligence Division, Aug. 1890, mr Kenya 5/57, RGS.



Map 6.8: *Rough Road Chart of Sabakhi Route from Makangeni to Machagos*. 1:255,440.

London: Intelligence Division, Aug. 1890, mr Kenya 5/57, RGS.

There are many qualities that make this map exceedingly helpful in tracing the subtle, soon to be much more obvious, changes maps underwent as a new gaze fell across British East Africa. As shown in Map 6.4 the title does not, on its face, suggest the quality of ownership and seems more akin to an exploratory map. However, there is also a clear intersection of governmental and private operation as indicated in the map. While serving as part of the IBEA Capt. Lugard is listed as part of the Norfolk Regiment and the map was reproduced by the War Office. What makes this map distinct, and almost singularly the best example of the power of the paramap, was how the map was presented. In all of the images there appears to be fold lines intersecting most of the map. These were created as the map was designed to fold up into a roughly letter-sized leather-bound book emblazoned with IBEA in gold lettering. Thus, the very creation of this map was tied to the principle of ownership. What seemingly was an exploratory route in Africa was transformed, by nature of the paramap, into a route into the interior of the holdings of the IBEA. If this ownership was ever doubted it also is blessed with the imprint of the British War Office. These features are important to note as the map appears to be made under the gaze of the Discoverer. Map 6.5 shows how nothing was depicted beyond what Lugard could have observed personally. No boundary lines were noted and color was used to highlight his observations, not political holdings. Upon further inspection, however, a different picture emerges. It is only by assessing the interrelatedness of all of these symbols and make-up of the map that its true purpose is

unlocked. All of the notations along the route are far different from what one would expect on a map made by an explorer. While many explorers maps would note supplies of water and game in order to aid future explorers, Lugard noted many additional features suggesting the shift in focus to control and economics.

Lugard had two goals: first to assess the feasibility of the Sabaki⁵⁹² river as a route to the interior, second to record any observations that might benefit a company seeking profit. In terms of the use of color it is key that Lugard's observations, rather than the route itself, are highlighted in red. The route itself is starting to fade into the background, as it never would for any strictly exploratory map, as the *usefulness* of the river and path for achieving dominance in the region is more important. Forging the river was very important as, similar to explorers, companies tried to use the rivers to gain access to the interior. River access was preferred as it would make control of the interior far less costly than porter-laden caravans or road-building. While there were several rivers in British East Africa it was the consensus that, similar to German East Africa, they were not suitable for easy transportation. The Juba River served as a demarcation line between Italian and British holdings and, therefore, would be of little use. The Tana River was "ill-adapted for navigation," and while the Company established several stations along it they were force to abandon them due to lack of any profitable trade.⁵⁹³

⁵⁹² While the map notes the river as Sabakhi I will use the common name Sabaki as was utilized in all subsequent British maps of the region.

⁵⁹³ E.H. Sadler, "Notes on the Geography of British East Africa," in *Journal of the Royal African Society* 11, no. 2 (January, 1912), 178 and Sorrenson, 12.

Lugard would find the Sabaki was also of little help for navigation but the foundations of that conclusion were built up by his observations. Along the route there are numerous observations as to the slope of the river, channels, and cataracts which would provide the company with a clear picture as to the suitability of navigation.⁵⁹⁴ His assessment would lead to the suggestion of a railway along his route.⁵⁹⁵ His different aims, therefore, lead to many observations that belie the look of an explorers map. In Map 6.5 Lugard notes dense jungle but also the appearance of “Black Cotton Soil” and that there was a “Very large plain several miles long. Soil good grass excellent.” Details like these are important in terms of a company seeking to learn about the land for future economic prospects. All along the route Lugard documented areas of timber, quartz, limestone, and even near Nzoia a point he believed gold could be found.⁵⁹⁶ He also noted areas of cultivation and villages which would be critical not only for supplying provisions for future caravans, but also areas that might provide labor for the Company.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁴ As seen on Map 6.5 on the far left he notes that the “River water much “harder” than at Makangoni” and the last bank was “low + sandy.” Near the end of the river he notes the conditions which would suggest the river was not the proper route: “The river here falls in cascades from a granite bed into a deep gorge or cliff. It is a series of cataracts with bed of solid granite.”

⁵⁹⁵ The Chief Engineer of the preliminary Uganda Railway route, J.R.L. MacDonald would conclude that the deep brush would make the route too difficult and chose the southern option which roughly followed the existing Swahili caravan route. Cynthia Brantley, *The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya, 1800-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 37. See also J.R.L. MacDonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa, 1891-1894* (Nabu Press, 2010).

⁵⁹⁶ This would prove incorrect. As Sir Charles Eliot, later High Commissioner of British East Africa from 1900-1904, would relate that the result of all investigations of mineral wealth “have been negative, or unsatisfactory.” Eliot, 158.

⁵⁹⁷ In Map 6.6 he notes how “Villages & Cultivation everywhere enormous flocks & herds, dense population” near Machagos. This would become, prior to the railway, one of the main supply depots for the British efforts in the interior providing nearly 400,000 pounds of food annually. See Charles H.

Beyond economic notations this map establishes the control of the IBEA making subsequent caravans into the interior far easier. The greatest indication of this control was the creation of permanent stations by the IBEA to solidify their hold over the interior. The stockades depicted on the map were established by Lugard as he trekked across the Sabeki and further into the interior of IBEA territory.⁵⁹⁸ The first stockade was build 40 miles inland from the coastal port of Malindi, and all of these stations served as a series of armed posts enabling easier penetration into the interior.⁵⁹⁹ Each stockade served, similar to the outposts of the DOAG, as a waypoint for European efforts and as a node of control in the region. There was even an effort by the IBEA, showing a connection to the wave thesis given in Chapter Three, to link the Company's expansion with the efforts of the Anglican Church Missionary Society. Lugard invited them to establish a station near Stockade 1 in the hopes that fugitive slaves who came to the mission would purchase their freedom by working for the Company.⁶⁰⁰ Thus, these stations were not simply edifices created to ease the movement of IBEA personnel into Africa but also enabled the control over the territory surrounding it. This goal of control also explains the proposed stockade along the Masai war paths in Map 6-4. The hope would be that in interdicting the Masai warpaths with a stockade the IBEA could bring this feared tribe to heel and

Ambler, "Population Movement, Social Formation and Exchange: Central Kenya in the Nineteenth Century" in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 18, no. 2 (1985), 219.


⁵⁹⁸ Kiewiet, 248.

⁵⁹⁹ Brantley, 37. See Maps 6.5 and 6.8.

⁶⁰⁰ Robert W. Strayer, "The Dynamics of Mission Expansion: A Case Study from Kenya, 1875-1914," in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 6, no. 2 (1973: 229-248), 241.

protect the route to the critical area of Machagos.⁶⁰¹ All of these features of the map signify the desire for control on the part of the IBEA. Two other early caravan efforts will lend credence to this push into the interior and how the race to Uganda would inadvertently lead to the end of the IBEA.

⁶⁰¹ The name of this station will change (Machakos, Machago's) throughout the paper. I have, for ease of connecting map to narrative, used the spelling indicated on the map referenced.



Map 6.9: *Imperial British East Africa Company's Uganda Caravan 1889-1890*. London: Intelligence Division, 1890. mr Kenya 5.39, RGS.




Map 6-10: *Imperial British East Africa Company's Uganda Caravan 1889-1890.*

London: Intelligence Division, 1890. mr Kenya 5.39, RGS.




Map 6.11: *Imperial British East Africa Company's Uganda Caravan 1889-1890.*

London: Intelligence Division, 1890. nr Kenya 5.39, RGS.



Map 6.12: *Imperial British East Africa Company's Uganda Caravan 1889-1890.*

London: Intelligence Division, 1890. mr Kenya 5.39, RGS.



Map 6.13: *Imperial British East Africa Company's Uganda Caravan 1889-1890.*

London: Intelligence Division, 1890. mr Kenya 5.39, RGS.

Frederick Jackson's caravan was sent nearly simultaneously with Lugard's as the IBEA engaged in a several pronged advance towards Uganda. A rather large caravan, nearly 700 men, it was also an act of appropriation. In a similar manner as explorers had relied on native guides, the route of the caravan followed a native trading route until Lake Naivasha.⁶⁰² Beginning with the title there are already changes noting the differences between a map made under the gaze the Discoverer and the gaze of the Despot.

Attaching the Imperial British East Africa Company's name to the caravan signified that this was no mere exploratory caravan but one designed to further the interests of the Company.⁶⁰³ Unlike exploratory maps this sense of ownership ensured that the information gathered was not for general public consumption as much as to aid the use of the company in its efforts to open up and occupy the interior. Similar to Lugard's map the permanence of the populations were negated in order to privileged the IBEA's understanding of the land. The broad lettering, at first glance, appears to show ownership on the part of the Kikuyu, however it merely depicts an area of occupation and lacks the indication of clear boundaries or territorial reality.⁶⁰⁴ Ironically, the IBEA's ownership of the territory also lacks a firm boundary but this is an instance of the bounding and title of the map serving the same purposes. Like an exploratory map the bounding served to focus the eye on the caravan and the information that it uncovered. No borders are given

⁶⁰² McDermott, 208.

⁶⁰³ And the government as noted in Map 6.7 as the Intelligence Office printed the map.

⁶⁰⁴ See Map 6.8

as they are “off map.” Like Lugard’s map the title indicates ownership by the IBEA. In contrast, the broad lettering of the tribes of the interior are written in such a way as to make the land appear open and ripe for occupation.

The one exception to this policy, making it as interesting as Joachim Graf Pfeil’s map in Chapter Four, is the indication of some boundary to the Maasai territory.⁶⁰⁵ As shown in Map 6.10 a dotted line, roughly following the Mau Escarpment, illustrates the border to Maasai land. The only rationale that makes sense, and will be illustrated in the next chapter more thoroughly, was the fear that motivated all British interactions with the Maasai until roughly the completion of the Uganda Railway. Feared for their fighting skill and aggressiveness, especially towards caravans, the IBEA saw the Maasai as a grave threat.⁶⁰⁶ As caravans were an incredibly costly for the company, and served as the only tenuous link between the coast and the interior of Uganda, it was in the company’s best interests to seek accommodation with the Maasai tribes in the central highlands. Indeed, the ability of the Maasai to hamper caravan trade had already been proven. The Maasai were able to keep Arab ivory traders from their territory for many years and had wiped out entire caravans as late as 1882-1883.⁶⁰⁷ Thus, this map does not undermine the gaze of the Despot but serves as a clear indication of a policy followed by the Company *and* the British Government until after the turn of the century.

⁶⁰⁵ See Pfeil’s map in Map 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.

⁶⁰⁶ Maj. E.H.M. Leggett, managing director of the later British East Africa Corporation, sums up most contemporary opinions of the Masai describing them as “blood-drinking.”

⁶⁰⁷ Beachey, 283.

Similar to Lugard, Jackson's notations show that the gaze of the Despot, and not the Discoverer, was at work. Along the route Jackson noted game and vegetation indicating that after crossing Kikuyuland that they were impressed by the fertility and beauty of the landscape.⁶⁰⁸ For example, while the Kikuyu were placed in big block lettering underneath it was the inscription "Country densely populated, rich soil, largely cultivated, food cheap and plentiful, People very excitable."⁶⁰⁹ These notations would be critical for assessing areas for future development and the nature of the resources in each region. Noting areas of settlement would become very important in terms of determining the viability of future labor supplies. However, it is the notations concerning the violence of the IBEA caravans which signal in stark terms the shift from exploration to occupation. As noted on Map 6.9 there were "Masai Cattle Grounds" and "Deserted Masai Kraals" suggesting that any future caravans would have to be mindful of the threat in these areas. Jackson's caravan itself faced a threat as the Masai demanded Kongo from the caravan by Mianzimi. At a later point the caravan fought "with the people of Sotik" and noted later that "Peace [was] declared." These types of notations are carried forward even to the end of Jackson's caravan as seen in Map 6.11. After noting that they "had a skirmish with Bourgankse who wanted to take cattle away," they also encountered trouble at Katch. While Jackson noted that the people were friendly he also indicated,

⁶⁰⁸ Hill, 32. The importance of game can be underscored as Jackson even lended his name to the "Jackson Hartebeest" which was first shot by him while on this caravan mission. See Sir Gerald Portal, *The British Mission to Uganda in 1893* (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 108.

⁶⁰⁹ The small lettering below Kikuyu seen on Map 6.8.

underscoring the importance of future use, that he “would not consider a small caravan safe with them.” It is these notations which separate Jackson’s from any mere exploratory map. While the map is designed to focus the eye on the caravan route, the notations indicate that the information given is important for *political* control. As the only access to the interior were via these tenuous caravan lines these notations, not only of where available game could be had but also what threats were posed by native tribes, would prove invaluable to the success of future caravans. As a side note Frederick Jackson, similar to Lugard, also benefitted from his experience in the IBEA. While not a military officer he did parlay his experience in Africa to a knighthood and posts as the Lt. Governor of East Africa from 1907-1911 and Governor of Uganda from 1911-1917.⁶¹⁰

However, it is to return to the title which illustrates the motivating force the gaze of the Despot wrought on the IBEA. The East African Protectorate extended from the coast only as far as the central highlands of modern-day Kenya. Thus, the caravan listed in the title was truly a “Uganda Caravan” as the areas of Kavirondo and Kosova were part of Uganda at this time. This, as will be documented in the next chapter, explains why the “Uganda Railway” would be built entirely within the colony of Kenya.⁶¹¹ What the title reveals is the focus of the IBEA was tied to the threat the DOAG posed to British interests in the competitive caravanning period of 1888-1890. As noted by John Kirk at

⁶¹⁰ Hill, 27.

⁶¹¹ It was not until 1904 that the two eastern districts of Uganda were transferred to the East Africa Protectorate. For documents relating to the transfer of these provinces, and control of the Uganda Railway, to the East Africa Protectorate see FO 2/786, PRO.

the beginning of the chapter it was not felt that the East Africa Protectorate was the proper locale for any type of European settlement or development. Joseph Thompson, the first British explorer to cross the East African highlands, considered them “unfit for European colonization” and Sir Harry Johnson, as late as 1899, excluded the highlands from the regions of “Healthy Colonizable Africa.”⁶¹² This was certainly not the case with Uganda. The first European to reach Uganda and Lake Albert, Samuel Baker, “sketched, almost as a dream, the advantages to England if it were only possible.”⁶¹³ Catholic and Protestant missionaries, underscoring the wave thesis, established themselves and helped the Europeans see the value of the territory. The IBEA understood Uganda’s importance recognizing that the coastal lands, while valuable, “could be little more than a barren acquisition” without control of the valuable interior.⁶¹⁴ Uganda was reported to be “populous, productive, and highly cultivated...and by far the most civilized.”⁶¹⁵ More importantly, from the point of view of the British government, a strong British position in Uganda would ensure the protection of the Nile basin assuring that “the immediate interests of the Company were identical with those of the nation.”⁶¹⁶ Recognizing how important the connection between the coast and Uganda was the British government, while passing the responsibility of administering the territory onto the Company, dispatched a letter prior to the Company’s arrival in Mombasa from the Consul-General

⁶¹² Sorrenson, 31.

⁶¹³ Leggett, 210.

⁶¹⁴ McDermott, 104.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., 118.


at Zanzibar and the Sultan of Zanzibar attesting to the good nature of the IBEA and urging the tribes to work with the Company.⁶¹⁷ However, the Germans were not blind to the promises of Uganda and the German threat to British preeminence in this region was part of the reason for Jackson's caravan.

What Jackson's Caravan took part in could best be described as the "race to Uganda." Knowing that reaching Uganda would put the DOAG in a strong position Carl Peters began an expedition towards Uganda in 1889-1890. While the Company claimed that the diplomatic understanding between the DOAG and IBEA left Uganda in their control, "the obvious rejoinder was that the German public did not mean to respect that understanding and *that German maps coloured Uganda as part of the German sphere.*"⁶¹⁸ Thus, the Jackson caravan had not only the goal to push into the interior but to race ahead to prevent Peters from achieving a *fait accompli* and destroying the position of the IBEA.⁶¹⁹ These fears were only exacerbated upon receiving word that Emin Pasha had rebuffed the IBEA and had signed up to work with the DOAG.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 109 and Wolff, 47. The Buganda state seemed the most stable and was the focus of much of the treaty-making by the Europeans.

⁶¹⁸ McDermott, 113. Emphasis mine. While it is impossible to say what German map the author was referring to, the maps below (Map 6-14 and 6-15) do suggest the threat of German control of Pasha's dominions.

⁶¹⁹ For a good summary of the maneuverings described see John Gray and Carl Peter. "Anglo-German Relations in Uganda, 1890-1892," in *Journal of African History* 1, no. 2 (1960): 281-297. The authors do suggest that the role of Emin Pasha has been overstated, mostly from a hostile British press which assumed the worst about him when he rebuffed service in the IBEA, though they do emphasize the competition the DOAG and IBEA for the position in Uganda.



Map 6.14: *Das Mittlere Ost-Afrika*. 1:6,000,000. Glogau: C. Flemming, 1889, nr Africa G.51, RGS.



Map 6-15: J.I. Kettler. *Übersichtskarte des Mittleren Ostafrika*. In *Deutsche Kolonialkarten Nr 7*. Weimar: Geographisches Institut, 1885, JRL.

The exact details of this eccentric man are beyond the scope of this study, but his perceived threat was part of the reason that Jackson's caravan pushed so deeply into Uganda. Emin Pasha, born Edward Schnitzer, was a German explorer who entered Egyptian service and then was appointed by General Charles Gordon to govern the province of Equatoria giving him a position of influence over the region of southern Soudan and northern Uganda. He used his position to build relationships with the kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro, although he was cut off after the insurrection that led to the death of General Gordon. He then became the subject of another daring rescue by H.M. Stanley in 1888 that brought him safely to the coast at Bagamoyo in 1890.⁶²⁰ In the context of Uganda, however, news of Emin Pasha's employment, following on the heels of Peters expedition, rekindled the fears of the IBEA that they would be surrounded. If Peters was able to establish a position, strengthened by Emin Pasha's long-standing relationships in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, the Germans would have "run a ring around the small British sphere of influence" with a position in Witu and Uganda.⁶²¹ These fears are amply demonstrated on the map.

While it is not possible to know if the two maps above are those that McDermott was referencing, they do underscore the threat to the IBEA position. Map 6.14 shows

⁶²⁰ For a recent book covering the expedition see Daniel Liebowitz and Charles Pearson, *The Last Expedition: Stanley's Mad Journey through the Congo* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005).

⁶²¹ Leggett, 211.

why Pasha's position was so important.⁶²² If the Germans were able to lay claim to Uganda and Witu they would effectively encircle the IBEA and confine them to the, at that moment, undesirable and unprofitable section of eastern Africa. Additionally, Pasha's position would have undercut the entire premise behind British involvement, the protection of the headwaters of the Nile. Pasha's claim, if Peters was able to solidify that position in Uganda, was a dagger at the throat of the IBEA. If successful, the DOAG would have strategically and economically decimated their competitor. Map 6.15, if analyzed closely, appears to be laying the groundwork for just such a conquest. The second map, "Mittleren Ost-Afrika," was made by the Geographical Institute of Weimar. It was made as part of a small geographical booklet entitled "General Map of middle East Africa and the German Acquisitions."⁶²³ While not produced by the DOAG there was a close relationship between the company and publisher. On the back of the booklet there is a long quote taken from the "official organ" (*amtliche Organ*) of the DOAG the Colonial Political Correspondence (*Kolonialpolitisch Korrespondenz*). In it the DOAG recommends that any member of the DOAG, or even those who had a passing interest in the colony, should purchase this map.⁶²⁴ As for the map itself, the threat of a German advance into Uganda is quite clear. This map also suggests that the Germans were paving the way for this take-over through the map. While the British sphere of influence

⁶²³ *Übersichtskarte des mittleren ost-Afrika und der deutschen Erwerbungen*

⁶²⁴ *Wir können mit bestem Gewissen jedem Mitglied der Deutsch-Ostafrikanischen Gesellschaft sowie der Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation, überhaupt allen, welche an der Geschichte und den Aussichten unserer Kolonie ein Interesse nehmen, die Anschaffung dieses Buches empfehlen und anraten.*

was outlined in pink, the German sphere was outlined in Green. Emin Pasha's dominions, in contrast, were a band of pink *encircled* by green. While it may be an interpretive reach, the green encirclement does suggest the cartographer was helping make the leap to German ownership of the territory easier for the viewer. While the green on its own might be seen as an interpretive leap the above information, the paramap, does suggest the importance of this map in solidifying *German* claims to territory and the investment of the DOAG in spreading this map. This serves as another example of the importance of assessing all components of the map, including the paramap, to best discern its meaning.

Jackson's efforts were a short run thing. As one contemporary related in sporting terms Jackson, "raced him [Peters], keeping the intruder at arm's length but pushing him gradually away by the polo manoeuvre of 'riding him off' and thus enabled our Government to deny the German claim of the latter's effective occupation."⁶²⁵ This did not prevent Peters from claiming the area of Kavirondo⁶²⁶ in his memoirs but as Jackson related "This letter [treaty] I read out to Sakwa, who had not the remotest idea what it was."⁶²⁷ Jackson left Gedge, the author of the Royal Geographic Society report on Dundas' later mission up the Tana, in position with soldiers to stabilize his claims and did

⁶²⁵ Leggett, 211. This is not mere hyperbole as even a modern treatment of the affair labeled "the finish to the race was very close indeed." Gray, 288.

⁶²⁶ See Map 6.13. The region of Kavirondo is located on the far eastern edge of Lake Victorian-Nyanza and surrounds Port Florence, the future terminus of the Uganda Railway.

⁶²⁷ McDermott, 130.

dissuade Emin Pasha's expedition from pushing further north.⁶²⁸ Ironically, this entire race was a bit of a moot point. Even as Peters returned the coast with treaties signed with Buganda and Jackson attempted to solidify the IBEA claims, the British and German governments undercut all efforts by agreeing to a delineation between the two nations without consulting either company. This was the 1890 agreement which would solidify the southern border between German East Africa and British East Africa along with trading Heligoland Island for German renunciation to control of Witu.

Concurrent with these caravan exploits the IBEA was also supporting its position through negotiations with the Congo Free State.⁶²⁹ The fact these negotiations were going on at all, considering how far the territory was from the coast, illustrates that the IBEA saw Uganda as vital to their success. The delineation of boundaries between these two entities concerned areas that were far from the coast and, as illustrated in later Map 6.18, far beyond the capacity of the IBEA to properly administer. In these negotiations with the Congo Free State the IBEA was settling the western boundary of Uganda even as it was fighting the Germans to occupy the eastern section. However, these negotiations do illustrate the power of the political blank, created by the gaze of the Despot, to drive European efforts. While this seems a case of putting the cart before the


⁶²⁸ Gray, 283-284.

⁶²⁹ Sir William Mackinnon, general director of the IBEA, had a long-standing relationship with King Leopold. For much of the 1870s he hoped to found a syndicate to work with Leopold to connect East Africa, from Bagamoyo to Lake Victoria, with the Congo Free State. While these efforts were ultimately fruitless the good personal relationship between the two made this agreement easy to achieve. See John S. Galbraith, "Gordon, Mackinnon, and Leopold: The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1884" in *Victorian Studies* 14, no. 4 (June, 1971): 369-388.

proverbial horse, instead this should be seen as a wise move in terms of the map. By claiming a clear boundary between the Congo and the IBEA it would be establishing, both in agreement and on the map, the position of the company and make their claims to the whole of Uganda more real. Indeed, as they objected to the very principle of German encroachment into Uganda, as they read the spheres of influence agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar, it made perfect sense to occupy the whole of Uganda and ensure this territorial blank was occupied on the map. The political and cartographic reality of this agreement far outweighed any *actual* influence in the territory, but underscores how maps were used to depict the reality the colonizers wanted.



Map 6.16: Untitled map within “Agreement between King Leopold and the Imperial British East Africa Company” May 24, 1890. FO 2/986, PRO.



Map 6.18: Untitled map within “Agreement between King Leopold and the Imperial British East Africa Company” May 24, 1890. FO 2/986, PRO.

This map, more than any other, indicates the process of appropriating the previous gaze for a new purpose. As should be noted from the above three figures the map does not seem to possess a title, explorer/surveyor, or publisher. The reason for this is that those map details were not deemed important to include. While a legal agreement, with all of the pomp and circumstance of flowing signatures and wax seals, an exploratory map was literally ripped apart to help make this agreement real. As can be seen on the left edge, the map was ripped out of a larger one to localize the map on the area of negotiation.⁶³⁰ In the same way that the gaze of the Discoverer created territory that was then appropriated for political ownership, this exploratory *map* was appropriated for political ends. This appropriation can be shown in several ways. First, as noted the map was deemed immaterial to the actual political boundary making effort. In none of the documents accompanying the negotiations or formal agreement is the map-maker ever given any recognition.⁶³¹ This exploratory map symbolizes better than any other this cleaving of Africa and the utilization of the gaze of the Discoverer to make that possible. Second, this map illustrates how the knowledge gained by the explorer was appropriated to serve new purposes. The route that had been so carefully traced across the territory in building a knowledge base, written in red in order to highlight the importance of the route, was ignored entirely. Bright political lines were now all that mattered in sketching

⁶³⁰ Such is the importance of bounding a map! See the left edge in Map 6.17 and 6.18.

⁶³¹ In the documentation accompanying the negotiations it is simply referred to as “a map” or “the accompanying map” with no other details provided. My assumption, given the route, is that it is one of H.M. Stanley’s exploratory routes which, as he served King Leopold in service of the Congo Free State, would have been readily available, but that is no more than my educated guess.

over and, literally, “coloring in the map” to show ownership. The exploratory route can be traced through all that was colored in, suggesting that this journey helped establish the knowledge of the land that was being parceled out amongst European powers. As older routes had been written over by newer explorations, this journey was written over to document the claims of the IBEA and Congo Free State. Lastly, the signature on the map conveys that “there was no conflict of interests between two practicing sides if one of those sides was the colonialist and the other – his own map.”⁶³² It was the agreement between Europeans who were possessors of the map and the lands depicted on it which mattered. These political boundaries could be separating people groups or dividing trade routes but that is immaterial to the gaze of the Despot. In fact, it is impossible to know if such separation occurred as the indigenous populations were never depicted in any way to make it possible to assess such a question. Even the blank on the map shown in Map 6.18 served its motivating purpose insofar as it gave ample space to sign away the destiny land and people at a whim. The common connection between these caravan efforts and negotiations like these was how the gaze of the Despot drove all of the IBEA’s actions.

To return to the 1890 agreement, after it was signed the position of the IBEA was finally secure.⁶³³ In return for the island of Heligoland the German government affirmed the split between the British and German territories and that the Witu territory belonged

⁶³² Bialas, 172.

⁶³³ See *The London Gazette* announcement of the British-German agreement on pg. 39 of FO 2/57, PRO.

to the IBEA.⁶³⁴ This agreement would be followed up by a joint-survey delineation, which completed its work in 1892 as documented in Chapter Four. These agreements laid the ground work for the map below indicating the conquest of the IBEA of the future colonies of Kenya and Uganda.

⁶³⁴ For documentation of the IBEA assumption of control over Witu see pages 36-37 of FO 2/57, PRO.




Map 6.19: *Political Map of Equatorial Africa showing the Respective Spheres of Influence as defined under the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1890.* London: J.G. Bartholomew, 1890, FO 925/173, PRO.



Map 6.20: *Political Map of Equatorial Africa showing the Respective Spheres of Influence as defined under the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1890.* London: J.G. Bartholomew, 1890, FO 925/173, PRO.



Map 6.21: *Political Map of Equatorial Africa showing the Respective Spheres of Influence as defined under the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1890.* London: J.G. Bartholomew, 1890, FO 925/173, PRO.



Map 6.22: *Political Map of Equatorial Africa showing the Respective Spheres of Influence as defined under the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1890.* London: J.G. Bartholomew, 1890, FO 925/173, PRO.



Map 6.23: *Political Map of Equatorial Africa showing the Respective Spheres of Influence as defined under the Anglo-German Treaty of July 1890.* London: J.G. Bartholomew, 1890, FO 925/173, PRO.

This political map emphasizes all of the qualities of the gaze of the Despot and is the end result of all of the previous efforts by the IBEA. Published by the Company, the title emphasized that it represented their claim to a permanent place on the east African coast. The entire purpose of the map was to indicate the political presence of the IBEA now that its borders were assured against its competitors. This control is shown in several different ways. The use of color indicates not only the areas of active control, but also the areas of future expansion. Pink highlights the British Sphere of Influence and the hopes of the Company to expand across it. The smaller block text near the coast indicates the Company's holdings while the larger letters IBEA indicate their planned future holdings.⁶³⁵ Considering these letters covered territory that would become three British colonies these grand schemes seem the height of fancy. Yet, the power of the map compelled the IBEA to press their holdings to the limit in order to offset any of the same issues they had faced with the DOAG. Adding credence to their claims was the use of color to show the creeping hold on territory via treaty. While the claims of the block lettering appear fanciful, the use of red and blue, and blue hachuring, suggests that the planned expansion of the company would be successful and a relatively easy process. The map even helps illustrate the driving motive force that led to negotiations with the Congo Free State.⁶³⁶ In order to claim the entirety of the British sphere of influence, and bar the

⁶³⁵ Map 6.20.

⁶³⁶ Map 6.21. It is also helpful to compare Map 6.21 and 6.16 as it illustrates the clear connection between negotiated border agreements and how they were later represented on political maps.

way to the DOAG along the western edge of the Victoria Nyanza, the IBEA stretched their caravans to the limit to secure this frontier.⁶³⁷

Another sign of control, to come full circle back to Map 6.3, was the indication of stations using flags. The map depicts that it was not simply the treaty agreements that secured the territory colored in on the map, but the control exerted by IBEA stations. Each red flag, as seen in Map 6.23, depicted a station established by the IBEA which legitimized the expansion. These stations followed in the footsteps of the caravans. For example, the most inland flag depicted is at Machagos which was the end point depicted on Lugard's Sabaki map earlier in the chapter. In the same way that explorers trod the same routes in order to push inland, the Company established greater control through routes they dotted with stockades. The map even indicates the stations created by Pigott's IBEA caravans up the Tana River. These early maps were instrumental in creating the political reality as depicted on the map. After the Berlin Conference of 1884 it was no longer enough to simply have treaties over territory but Europeans had to have "effective control" over the land. These flags were not merely decorative flourishes but a commitment to the territory and proof of their dominion over the land and peoples. The map even suggests where future stations would be built as they roughly follow inland from the coastal enclaves at Malindi and Mombassa to Machagos. If the existing stations paralleled the expansion given in red and blue it is clear the next stations, as was proven

⁶³⁷ Additionally, there was some hope that this would leave open a corridor for the often-hoped Cape-to-Cairo railway. Galbraith, 386-387.

true by later events, would follow further inland along the blue hachuring until reaching the Victoria Nyanza and Uganda.

The map also continues the process of appropriation and conceptual conquest of the land and people. The title and color are used to privilege the position and expansion of the Company. For example, there is no suggestion of tribes lying between the lands held by treaty bordering the Congo Free State and the soon-to-be solidified holdings along the Victoria Nyanza⁶³⁸. In fact, the only ownership given is that of the pink color of the “British Sphere of Influence.” This suggests that the only thing barring the Company from pushing further inland is a question of effort, money, and commitment. There is no recognition that anyone lives in that territory or that anything is needed beyond British pluck to connect the coast to the Congo Free State. This use of color continues the process of naturalizing the indigenous tribes to force them into the background. While people groups were indicated in lettering it is almost impossible to see as the eye is drawn to the color which privileges a European understanding of ownership. Even if a reader was to focus on the written word the larger and darker text of the IBEA dwarfs any of an indigenous kingdom suggesting great power and permanence to what the IBEA was doing.⁶³⁹ Even using the title “Political Map”

⁶³⁸ See Map 6.20.

⁶³⁹ This would be an example of what J.B. Harley terms “Representational Hierarchies” where the size of signs and words on the map signifies meaning. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” 69.

suggests the European attitude that as colonizers they were on a higher plane of governmental authority than the indigenous tribes.

The “Political Map of Africa” is also very helpful in exposing one other feature, the ability of maps to lie to the audience. Mark Monmonier notes that all maps have to tell “white lies” and in this case it lied about the control that the Company had.⁶⁴⁰ While this lie, signifying the wide gulf between the depiction of IBEA control and reality, could hold true for nearly any political map made during colonialism it is quite evident in this case. The IBEA attempted to control a massive amount of territory and it is unsurprising that their hold over the territory was far less than the grandiose claims of the map. Indeed, even after the British state assumed control of the East African Protectorate they never had anything but the most tenuous control over the northern border region along the Juba River.⁶⁴¹ In fact, the hold was so tenuous in this region that the IBEA dispensed with all claims to stopping the slave trade, which they were tasked with doing as part of the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890.⁶⁴² Despite the claims of the map to be

⁶⁴⁰ Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, 1.

⁶⁴¹ As made clear in a 19 January 1894 letter the policy of the Company provided arms and support to Watoro (runaway slave) tribes along the River Juba as a buffer between the Somalis of the interior and the coast, “recognising [sic] the value of such a powerful and independent settlement...as a buffer between the lawless Somali tribes and the coast belt.” See pg. 50 FO 2/73, PRO.

⁶⁴² This is most clearly shown in their treaty with the Ooguden Somalies which stated “That no one shall interfere with the Slaves at present in the possession of the Somalies represented by the above Chiefs; and the Company are not to believe runaway Slaves to be free, until the Company have seen or communicated with above Chiefs.” See pg. 199 in FO 2/140, PRO. Even further south, where the Company should have had greater control, they provided troops to the Mazuri in raiding “runaway” communities in the Sabaki Valley. See Brantley, 36. This Company support proved of little value to the Mazuri themselves in the end as the British Government, in 1895, crushed Arab-Swahili agency on the coast in the Mazrui War. See Wolff, 41.

“Imperial British East Africa Company Territory” it was never truly controlled by the Company. Beyond this overreach there also was a clear lack of control over areas that appear demarcated as “secure” by treaty. This is evident by the violence that pervaded the interior of the territory.

Far from the contrast often presented, of heavy-handed Germany and the light touch of Britain, the IBEA faced nearly constant opposition to their presence in Africa. The “Correspondence of the IBEA,” held in the National Archives and covering the years 1890-1985, is littered with examples of violence and the increasingly heavy hand required in controlling the interior.⁶⁴³ While any recounting of the successive acts of violence would be a book in and of itself, a few scattered incidents should suffice.⁶⁴⁴ At the port of Kismayu, the Company officials faced such opposition that they felt they “were little better than prisoners” in the Company station following the actions of a Mr. Todd in punishing the Somalis of the region.⁶⁴⁵ After planning an abduction of the “disturbing chiefs” Mr. Todd was stabbed in the head which led to a skirmish between

⁶⁴³ To take just one example, from September 1891 to November 1892 the IBEA imported 250 rifles, 4 maxim guns, 275,000 rounds of ammunition, and 150 War Rockets for pacification efforts. See “Africa: Imperial British East Africa Company January to May 1893” pg. 26 of FO 2/57, PRO. The full IBEA Correspondence are held in the following Foreign Office files at the PRO: FO 2/57, 2/58, 2/59, 2/73, 2/74, 2/75, 2/96, 2/97, 2/953.

⁶⁴⁴ The British Government retained all of these records because of their eventual assumption of control over the entire region. These records contain everything from reports from Company officers at the respective stations to correspondence between government and IBEA officials on import/export duties.

⁶⁴⁵ This is extremely telling in that the Kismayu garrison was the largest concentrated force of the IBEA outside of Uganda consisting of 423 irregular and 46 Regular troops. See FO 2/59 23 August 1893 and Kiewiet, 237.

Company Askaris and the native Somalis.⁶⁴⁶ The station of Hameye, in November 1892, assured adequate stores of food by inducing the Wapokomo to “sell” rations by seizing the food first and then paying for it.⁶⁴⁷ In the central Kikuyu region, in a district named Chamvu, there was an uprising against Company rule in 1894. As this uprising closed off the road to the only adequate source of food for passing caravans a punitive expedition was sent out. At the cost of 2 killed and 3 wounded, nearly 90 of the Chamvu people including their chief were killed. Francis Hall, the acting superintendent, related he did not fear this uprising would spread provided “they think we are strong enough to hold our own.” To ensure this perception he recommended a further punitive raid, “to settle the matter definitely” once he could adequately capture or destroy the Chamvu livestock.⁶⁴⁸ All of the above examples belie the nice neat demarcation of control the legality of the treaties and the flags the map indicated. This contrast between illustration and reality echoes what John K. Wright noted in Map Makers are Human, “The trim,

⁶⁴⁶ Pages 141-143 of FO 257, PRO. This led to punitive expeditions where the IBEA commander “started firing the native town” and did so at intervals for roughly a week.

⁶⁴⁷ See Imperial British East Africa Company’s Station at Hameye November 28th, 1891 in FO 2/57. As a side note on how maps can lie the letter relates how Lieutenant von Höhnel discovered a discrepancy in Commander Dundas’s map(See Figures 6-2 and 6-3) and that the “Galla Bug” and “Friedrich Franz Raj” mountains indicated by Dr. Peters did not exist. In this regard it echoes the mythical mountains of Kong in West Africa. In terms of the connection between the Royal Geographic Society and later colonial efforts the Company official, William Astor Chanler, urged the IBEA to “communicate the above facts to the Royal Geographical Society.”

⁶⁴⁸ See 167-169 in FO 2/73. This violence was not out of keeping as Hall had waged a punitive campaign against the Kikuyu in 1899 and would be killed during a later expedition in 1901. His death in action would lead the station of Mbirri to be renamed (Fort Hall) in his honor. This also suggests a further connection between Company and Governmental service as he transitioned from Company to government service quite easily. See Sorrenson, 23.

precise, and clean-cut appearance that a well-drawn map presents lends it an air of scientific authenticity that may or may not be deserved.”⁶⁴⁹

A good encapsulation of the Company’s weaknesses can be summed up by Sir Gerald Portal’s journey from Mombaassa to Uganda which began on 1 January, 1893. Upon reaching the first IBEA station inland from Mombassa, roughly 140 miles inland, instead of finding an edifice of Company control he found, “that the post consisted of nothing more than a mud house surrounded by a rough stockade of logs, in a dismal spot on the banks of the clear quick-running Tsavo river.”⁶⁵⁰ His disappointment would only be furthered by several other incidents showing a clear lack of control over the interior. At one point, in order to resist Masai raiders, they had to form a “boma” to protect their caravan while they found that the station at Nzoi “consisted of a small hut, inhabited by an elderly Swahili, who was assisted in his duties by a small boy.”⁶⁵¹ Even where there was a more substantial presence of Company troops there were no assurances as during his journey there was a mutiny of Company troops in Kikuyu country who murdered their captain.⁶⁵² The only station of any real presence was Machakos, 300 miles from the coast, which makes sense due to its critical importance in providing food to caravans.⁶⁵³

⁶⁴⁹ Quoted in Monmonier, *Maps, Distortion, and Meaning*, 43.

⁶⁵⁰ Portal, 56.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 67, 70.

⁶⁵² Portal, 58.

⁶⁵³ Machakos is an alternative spelling for the previously noted Machagos. He describes Machakos as “a strong well-built fort and stockade, surrounded by a ditch and wire entanglement enclosing a well-arranged collection of good buildings and an orderly garden.” Portal, 72. Machakos was the first real station that

Upon arriving at Machakos the reason for the mutiny was clear as a state of war existed between the Company and native tribes in Kikuyuland. Upon arrival at Ft. Smith, near the future city of Nairobi, the Company representative described how they were “surrounded, day and night” by Wa-Kikuyu and that “to wander along more than 200 yards from the stockade was almost certain death.”⁶⁵⁴ This was not much of an improvement from the earlier position of the Company. Dagoretti station, established prior to Ft. Smith, immediately led to conflict with the Kamba and Kikuyu. Eventually the station, 30 miles inland from Machakos, had to be evacuated and Fort Smith, which Portal found nearly under siege, was established in 1899. That the only assessment for future policy in the region was “to shoot on sight” any Wa-Kikuyu, Portal’s mission belies any sense of superiority of the British mission or methods over the equally violent actions of the German state.⁶⁵⁵ Indeed, the violence against the native populations would only grow, as documented in the next chapter, as the native tribes were subdued in order to make them useful for agricultural labor. However, the larger point remains that the map dictated these violent responses. The map depicted a far greater level of control than the IBEA had and so justified the use of violence to assure what the map depicted. In

could provide food for caravans coming from the coast and pushing through the barren Taru desert. Sorrenson, 13.

⁶⁵⁴ Portal, 89-90. Mr. Purkiss, the Company representative, also related how 8 soldiers had been massacred the night before Portal arrived when foraging for food. For Portal’s reports, many of which were copied into his published narrative of the journey, see FO 2/60, PRO.

⁶⁵⁵ Both Machakos and Ft. Hall were epicenters of violence and the British only “gained the upper hand” after “four years of intermittent fighting” which involved using “Company caravans for punitive campaigns.” See Sorrenson, 15.

sum, the conceptual conquest of the interior by this map *demand*ed that reality “fall in line” with this vision.

Unfortunately for the IBEA they could not make economics “fall in line” no matter what force they brought to bear. The “Political Map” was the high-water mark of the IBEA but also prefigured its downfall. While in strong possession of the coastal region the hold on the interior, as shown above, was tenuous at best. Even the coastal region was not providing sufficient income and so the future of the Company depended on the interior.⁶⁵⁶ Unfortunately, creating routes of communication and transportation were extremely expensive. Even along the coast the construction of a telegraph line from Mombasa to Lamu proved to be “one of the most expensive engineering projects” for the Company and the 125-km road between Mombasa and Malindi was, at best, simply usable.⁶⁵⁷ While roadways were built into the interior they were of little value and “the Company remained dependent upon porters for communication” with any interior station.⁶⁵⁸ As porter-driven caravans were expensive and slow the Company realized early on the need for a railway. It was in pursuit of this railway that would lead to the end of the IBEA and the assumption of control by the British Government. Therefore, these last two maps serve as a transition between the dreams of the IBEA and the reality of the British rule.


⁶⁵⁶ Kiewiet, 229.

⁶⁵⁷ The road was “a difficult eight-day walk” as “much of the road was loose sand or rough coral.” Martin, 68.

⁶⁵⁸ Kiewiet, 250.



Map 6.24: *A Sketch Map of IBEA showing Stations of the Imperial British East Africa Company, Proposed Railway and Routes of Capt. Lugard 1891-92.* 1:5,000,000 London: Royal Geographic Society, 1892, JRL.



Map 6.25: *A Sketch Map of IBEA showing Stations of the Imperial British East Africa Company, Proposed Railway and Routes of Capt. Lugard 1891-92. 1:5,000,000 London: Royal Geographic Society, 1892, JRL.*

This first map brings us back to Frederick Lugard via another despotic map. The title solidifies the belief that the territory was the IBEA. Color is used to indicate control over the land. Red is used to outline the firm boundary of the IBEA and red dots are used to demarcate the stations established to legitimate and perpetuate the control of the interior.⁶⁵⁹ One other note about color is that it shows how the borders of the tribal kingdoms are presented as being permeable. The indigenous tribes, such as the Kikuyu or the Galla, were merely written into the landscape as one might the name of a desert. In naturalizing the indigenous peoples it implied the lack of permanence, or even reality, of the borders of the tribal kingdoms. In contrast, Lugard's party in red scythed through the territories of indigenous tribes privileging the ability of the Europeans to conquer the interior of Africa. Lastly, this map connects the earlier efforts of Lugard, and the future development of the colony. The red dots mark most of the stations Lugard built as noted in Map 6.5 and 6.8.⁶⁶⁰ While the level of control was less than the Company might have hoped, Portal himself described IBEA administration as an "absolute fraud," this map does show how those early efforts paved the way for the planned railway.⁶⁶¹ The route of

⁶⁵⁹ Stations are scattered up along the coast and into the interior along the primary caravan route. The location of these stations also indicates the early competition for Africa territory. During the period of exploration Sir Harry Johnson had secured land concessions on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro whose legacy was in the older stations shown in what would become German East Africa. The lack of stations further inland by Kismayu and the Juba River also underscores how tenuous the hold on the northern areas of the colony was. It was only in the southern section of IBEA that the Company had the ability to move into the interior.

⁶⁶⁰ It even indicates the Dagoretti station which, as noted previously, was eventually abandoned in favor of Ft. Smith.


⁶⁶¹ To give his condemnation its full weight his full quote was: "I never quite realized what an absolute fraud the whole thing [IBEA] is – not a single shadow of an attempt at administration, an improvement of

the railway roughly parallels Lugard's route along the Sabaki River and into the interior. Thus, these stations were red beacons indicating a pacified interior that only required a railway to be productive.


If the previous map returned us to the beginning of this study, this last map serves as the transition to the gaze of the Developer. In the previous map red was used to brightly mark the boundary between German and British East Africa. Considering the lengths to which the Company went to assure its position in eastern Africa it is unsurprising that they would emphasize it. However, in this map the color is not used in this manner and the political boundary fades into the background.⁶⁶²

the country or protection of natives anywhere." However, he does in a very blunt way lay out the issues with caravans and the need for a more reliable method of transport. In this same letter he remarks how valuable his caravan's doctor was in patching up "ulcerated, dysenteric, syphilitic, and fever-stricken porters." See FO 2/60, PRO.

⁶⁶² Figure 6.27.



Map 6.26: *Index Plan of the IBEA Railway Survey*. 1:2,191,400. London: Intelligence Office, 1893, nr Kenya S.29, RGS.



Map 6.28: *Index Plan of the IBEA Railway Survey*. 1:2,191,400. London: Intelligence Office, 1893, nr Kenya S.29, RGS.

Politics, the realm of the gaze of the Despot, has begun to fade in importance as the Company transitioned to economics and the beginning of the gaze of the Developer. The title even indicates this as it is the IBEA railway survey of territory. No longer is the map concerned with proving the territory was IBEA, the mad had succeeded in that, the concern now was what to *do* with the land. The map takes as a given the political ownership of the land and is now drawing the eye to an economic venture under the auspices of the Company that owned the land. The lack of color for political boundaries matters as it uses color to draw the eye to what is deemed important. On the surface the privileging of slave caravan routes seems out of place. Instead of highlighting the IBEA stations it is drawing the eye to something that, as far as Europeans were concerned, represented the opposite end of the civilized spectrum. However, a map is designed in terms of its purpose and what is depicted is a decision made to further its usefulness. In this case, the map was made to highlight these slave trading routes in order to show how they would all be drawn into the nexus of the railway. Recognizing the need for the railway to make the territory productive the IBEA appealed to the government for funds. The Company correctly gaged the attitude of Parliament and realized the only way to gain any funds would be by claiming the railway would end the slave trade. The color drawing the eye to these slave routes was a very necessary part of a public relations campaign to force the government's hand and gain financial backing.

The ultimate irony is the appropriative element of the map. The very first explorers had used the advice of native guides and pre-existing slave routes to help move into the interior of eastern Africa. After their initial use these routes became associated with the European explorers. Indigenous knowledge, once taken over and utilized for European purposes, disappeared from the map in order to create the knowledge necessary for European political dominion. However, these caravan lines that proved so useful to Company officials in penetrating the interior - one can trace Lugard's route along one of these slave caravan paths - were now being appropriated again. These routes were brought back to the forefront not to privilege indigenous knowledge, but to use it to serve European ends. If there is any satisfaction that can be gained from this process it was that the Europeans also did it to themselves. Another sign of the appropriation in Map 6.28 is the passing away of the importance of Machako's. As has been evident throughout the chapter this was a critical station for the development of the IBEA and was one of the chief supply depots for caravans. This railway plan makes clear this station, which had served as the capital of the province, was about to be eclipsed.⁶⁶³ As the focus shifted away from unreliable caravans to the stability, and profitability, a railway afforded the map documented this shift. In Map 6.28 Machako's fades into the background of the map and there is no indication of its prior importance. What would matter for the future was the clear dark line indicating railway stations, as yet unnamed, which were the future

⁶⁶³ Eliot, 69.

of the IBEA. This planned railway could be likened to a highway which, when built, would bypass the old roadways and their stops. What happened with Machako's serves as a fitting symbol of the IBEA. Machako's, like the Company, was a necessary prerequisite but it would simply fade away once it had served its purpose.

Chapter 7: The Uganda Railroad

The railway is the beginning of all history in Kenya...and it is the railway which created Kenya as a Colony of the Crown.⁶⁶⁴

The Uganda Railway was the turning point in the creation and development of what would become the Kenya Colony.⁶⁶⁵ Echoing Sir Edward Grigg, Sir Charles Eliot, the later Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, would assert that “this line has literally created a country.”⁶⁶⁶ The railway was seen as critical to achieving the economic goals of the IBEA. In consequence, the railway was directed to end at the Victoria Nyanza and thus link Zanzibar and Uganda.⁶⁶⁷ Uganda was believed to have the potential for European agriculture, and according to Frederick Lugard, also possessed a stable and useful indigenous kingdom with which to work.⁶⁶⁸ In contrast, the territory that would

⁶⁶⁴ Sir Edward Grigg quoted in, Hill, 244.

⁶⁶⁵ While the East Africa Protectorate was not officially named Kenya until 1920 I have used the term Kenya to describe the protectorate for the entirety of this chapter. I have done so not only for ease but also that, as the chapter heading quote indicates, the development of the Uganda Railway was the beginning of the creation of Kenya.

⁶⁶⁶ Eliot, 208.

⁶⁶⁷ See Map 6.27.

⁶⁶⁸ Brantley, 37.

become Kenya was an afterthought. Part of the reason for the necessity of a railway was seen in the very problems that doomed the Imperial British East Africa Company.

While the IBEA succeeded in solidifying their claims to Uganda their effort would prove to be a pyrrhic victory.⁶⁶⁹ Lugard's actions did win Uganda "for the Empire under the auspices of the Imperial British East Africa Company" but the "side-effect was the ruination of the company."⁶⁷⁰ Uganda was already a tinder-box with the British navigating their position between the two rival nations of Buganda and Bunyoro. However, this situation was made worse by sectarian divisions, brought about by competing missionary efforts, between Catholic and Protestant Europhiles in Buganda.⁶⁷¹ Lugard succeeded in dividing and conquering Uganda by first supporting Buganda against Bunyoro and then the Protestant faction within Buganda against the Catholic. While Lugard returned to the coast in April, 1892 with treaties extending IBEA influence the costs were prohibitively expensive. The massive outlays meant that the only hope for

⁶⁶⁹ The extensive details of the collapse of the Company, and the very public fight between Mackinnon and the government over the sum to be paid when their rights were bought out, is beyond the scope of this study. The best source in covering the "rise and fall" of the IBEA is Marie Jeanne de Kiewiet's unpublished dissertation "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company, 1876-1895."

⁶⁷⁰ Goldie, 240 and Porter, 115.

⁶⁷¹ This typified a trend where a "Scramble" for souls by missionary organizations in Africa closely paralleled the political scramble. The Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) became so competitive in central Kikuyuland with the Italian Consolata Fathers that a British official was forced to arbitrate. The resulting agreement called for no missionary station to be located within a "one hour's walk of each other." This was not simply a nationalist issue as the CMS also became embroiled in Kenya with the Presbyterian Church of Scotland Mission. While not resorting to governmental arbitration the two societies created "spheres of influence" with an "imaginary line between the Ngong hills and Mount Kenya." See Strayer, 242-243.

recouping these costs was either by the creation of a railway or government subsidies to continue their work.⁶⁷²

Until the railway was built the only way to access the interior of Africa was through the caravan which, for all of the IBEA successes presented in the previous chapter, created many problems. First, the caravan was not a very practicable method of transportation. No caravan was guaranteed to succeed whether because of climate, such as the inhospitable Taru desert, or because of problems with the caravan itself.⁶⁷³ The problems were only magnified once the caravans reached the interior. Food and supplies were never guaranteed and the populations of the central highlands were feared. All of these obstacles in time and risk would be born in the higher costs to transport anything along the caravan routes.⁶⁷⁴ The caravan was not the proper vehicle for a claim of “effective occupation” and hindered any future plans for developing the colony.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² The Company’s hope was that the government would not make it an either/or choice but do both. In both cases their hopes would be baseless.

⁶⁷³ The Taru Desert starts 44 miles inland from Mombasa at Samburu and ends at the town of Voi 104 miles inland. A waterless area caravans were forced to push forward and, barring success at water holes near Mongu, would have to make the entire trip based on what water they could carry. The desert was so formidable that even after the construction of the railway the trains were limited to twelve cars and each train was forced to haul its own water supply. See Foran, 60-61 and Sadler, 179. Caravans themselves were no guarantee as one of the railway survey parties came across abandoned goods for an IBEA station as the porters had simply deserted. See Hill, 71.

⁶⁷⁴ A caravan from the coast to Nairobi would cover the 330 miles in 28-30 days while, in contrast, the the trip would take 24 hours on the railway. Additionally, the costs of transporting anything by porter meant an increase in 3 pounds per porter and thus “the Uganda Railway materially reduced the cost of living up-country.” Foran, 73.

⁶⁷⁵ Based on his travels to Uganda Sir Gerald Portal believed that Mombasa could never be the outlet for commerce if the porter remained the basic form of transportation. Portal, 47.

Beyond the practical concern was a moral one that was of supreme importance for the politicians in London. The chief evil of caravans was seen in the use of porters and the relationship between the caravans and the slave trade. One of the chief arguments of proponents of the Uganda Railway was its ability to bring an end to the slave trade.⁶⁷⁶ As Lord Salisbury noted in Parliament:

I believe it is felt that the construction of such a railway would be the most fatal blow to the slave-trade which could possibly be delivered - because all slaves are now conducted to the coast by caravans. It is needless to say that if this railway be made, slaves will not be conducted by it. But the railway will have a much more important effect than that. It will dry up the supply of caravans and the trade which supports them. Caravans will cease to be profitable and therefore will cease to be used.⁶⁷⁷

This was, as indicated in the last chapter, the argument the Company attempted to use. Indeed, it would be what the politicians would claim, but the gaze of the Despot was what provided the true impetus for the Uganda Railway. Fearing the push of other powers into Uganda the British government sought to protect the headwaters of the Nile by effectively occupying the area via a railway. Regardless of these initial beliefs, what is critical is the way in which the railway transformed the British view of Kenya and, in the process, enabled its development.

⁶⁷⁶ Leggett, 210. This echoes the earlier arguments of the IBEA justifying their position and the even earlier arguments of explorers like Livingstone who felt that the best policy against the slave trade was “legitimate, that is European, commerce.” See Wolff, 36.

⁶⁷⁷ Hill, 137. This view was shared by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. J. Lowther who argued that, “The locomotive, in fact, by means of competition will kill both the caravan and the kidnapper.” Hill, 63.

One of the most important artifacts in documenting the shift to the gaze of the Developer is the railway. The railway is an imposition on the land as well as on the people. In the case of the colonies the railway served as a visible reminder of the dominance and power of the colonizers. Not only did the railways serve as vehicles of dominance, by serving as the transport system of colonial troops, but they also drew the colony into the imperial web of trade and governance. It was not merely that the Europeans had the Maxim gun; it was that they were able to rely on a system that would enable them to continually call on the power of the European nation state and industrial system.⁶⁷⁸ The railway was not only an imposition of physical power but also of conceptual power. In this way the railway served, to adapt a term from Wiebe E. Bijker, a technological frame which constrained all thinking concerning Kenya along a certain developmental path.⁶⁷⁹ In this case, the development path *was* the path of the railway. As Sir Charles Eliot would later relate after the completion of the Uganda Railway, “it changed the centre of gravity; it became at once the natural and only road up country.”⁶⁸⁰ Once the railway was built it was impossible to conceive of development along any other

⁶⁷⁸ A good example of the use of the Uganda Railway for the British Empire relates to the Fashoda incident. In 1898 the British government planned on sending Sudanese troops along with Maj. J.R.L. MacDonald to push up from the south and march on Fashoda. In addition, as MacDonald had served as the primary surveyor of the Uganda Railway, this mission was also to gain “a more accurate knowledge” of the territory and secure “British interests up to the Ethiopian border.” See James Barber, “The Moving Frontier of British Imperialism in the Lake Rudolf Region, 1890-1919,” *Ethnohistory* 53, no. 1 (Winter 2006), 147. However, the Sudanese troops accompanying MacDonald mutinied and threatened the entire British position in Uganda until Indian troops were ferried, via the same railway, to suppress the mutineers.

⁶⁷⁹ See Bijker’s discussion on 122-123, including Table 3.1 on 125 in Wiebe E. Bijker, *Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995).

⁶⁸⁰ Eliot, 51.

avenue than the one the railway created. These multitudinous effects of railways have been well documented in other contexts as well. When first appearing in Europe the railway changed European attitudes towards space, time and conceptions of what constituted “home.”⁶⁸¹ In Kenya what changed was not a sense of “home” but what Kenya was. Rather than a simple obstacle to be overcome it became the focus of British developmental efforts. Railways are more than a method of transport and its conceptual power is critical if the frontispiece quote is to be understood.

As the tracks of the railway were steadily laid out they had practical and conceptual effects which reshaped British attitudes towards Kenya.⁶⁸² Some of the conceptual effect of the railway was related to the previous gaze of the Despot. The railway was a physical declaration that the occupier had quelled indigenous resistance and was drawing the colony into the European economic system. As seen in German East Africa the rails of the Tanga railway were laid in tandem with the success of the *Schutztruppe* in the Usambara region.⁶⁸³ In Kenya most of the conflicts occurred after the railway was constructed. However, these conflicts were a natural outgrowth of the railway and what it implicitly represented. From the standpoint of the Europeans if the

⁶⁸¹ See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

⁶⁸² Commissioner Eliot believed as much in that “a civilized territory and a possible residence for Europeans” gradually emerged “at exactly the same rate as the rails advanced.” Eliot, 208.

⁶⁸³ See Chapter 5

land was conquered it stood to reason that the population should submit as well.⁶⁸⁴ The railway created a new environment that brought the British into greater conflict with the African people. When the British relied on caravans there was a transitory nature to the relationship, but the railway led to new levels of interaction, and. potential conflict, with Great Britain.

Much of this conflict was prompted because of the nature of the map. The railway did not simply replace caravans as a means of transport but created a new way of thinking about each mile of territory the railway crossed. While the interior had simply been a hostile area to cross its importance was negligible. All the IBEA maps in the previous chapter, while documenting what might be of economic interest along the way, had largely been concerned with getting *through* Kenya to reach the more profitable Uganda. The construction of the railway, as depicted on the map, demanded that the Europeans ‘do something’ with the land. In a similar way that the blanks of the map helped drive exploration the dark line of the railway drove the gaze of the Developer. There were also practical motivations. All of the moralizing in the world about the effect of the railway on the slave trade could not prevent criticism over its cost.⁶⁸⁵ In strident opposition to the entire endeavor in East Africa the radical MP Henry Labouchère noted:

⁶⁸⁴ Echoing the White Man’s Burden a contemporary would comment that nine years after the first track had been laid,” already, as was plain to see, a good start had been made with bidding ‘the sickness cease’ and filling ‘full the mouth of famine.’” Foran, 126.

⁶⁸⁵ In total the Treasury sunk £5.5 million into the construction of the railway or roughly £9,500 per mile. Gann and Diagan, *The Rulers of British Africa*, 282.

One of his reasons for opposing annexation was that he knew perfectly well that directly they annexed some wretched miserable jungle in the centre of Africa they would be called upon to build a railroad to it...[noting the excessive per annum costs] to keep going a railway that nobody wanted. It started from nowhere and nobody wanted to use it. It went nowhere and nobody wanted to come back by it.⁶⁸⁶

Faced with these costs it was clear the railway, and the colony of Kenya, had to pay.⁶⁸⁷

This process, turning Kenya from the lesser-partner in an imperial venture to one of the chief settler colonies, was a process facilitated by the map and the creation of the Uganda Railway.

This critical railway began with the somewhat comic attempts by the IBEA to build one. As documented in the previous chapter the monetary commitments of the Company far outstripped what they could recoup through trade caravans to the interior. The IBEA was stuck in an Malthusian iron law where their fiscal position was unsustainable without the cultivation of the interior *but* the only way to cultivate the interior was through a railway they could not afford. In an effort to pressure the British government to provide funds for such a railway the IBEA created the ignoble “Central

⁶⁸⁶ Hill, 135. This was somewhat of an improvement over his earlier pithy condemnation of the railway: “What it will cost, no words can express; What is its object, no brain can suppose; Where it will start from, no one can guess; Where it is going to, nobody knows. What is the use of it, none can conjecture; What it will carry, there’s none can define; And in spite of George Curzon’s superior lecture; It clearly is naught but a lunatic line.” Quoted in Gann, L.H. and Peter Duignan. *The Rulers of British Africa*, 280. He even went so far as to decry the very legality of the railway as he felt the government had no right to drive a railway through country belonging to the Maasai. Hill, 63.

⁶⁸⁷ The great costs of the railway would far exceed the naïve pronouncement of *The Times* on September 28, 1891 when it argued that it was not “a very serious matter to build four or five hundred miles of railway over land that costs nothing.” Quoted in Hill, 60.

African Railway.” As William Mackinnon noted in a letter to Lord Salisbury of 17th December 1890, the Company,

“Already anticipated the engagement of the Brussels Conference to a certain extent by erecting a land telegraph-line to connect the coast towns; by providing for the construction of 60 miles of narrow-gauge railway into the interior”⁶⁸⁸

However, while the directors laid the first seven miles of this railway, the end result was not equal to the initial fanfare. Three years after the beginning of this railway Sir Gerald Portal was sent on a mission to Uganda and commented that the “little 24-inch tramway” was never used “except for occasional picnic parties from Mombasa”⁶⁸⁹ From such an inauspicious beginning would come the key to the development of the colony of Kenya.

The costs of subduing Uganda, and the flimsy hold on the interior, led the Company to offer their concession to the government for a suitable sum. By 1893, Sir Gerald Portal felt that as a “political corporation” the IBEA could be “looked upon as ended.”⁶⁹⁰ The Company ended with a deficit of £193,757 and relinquished their rights to the government in April of 1893. The final collapse of the Company came in March of

⁶⁸⁸ Hill, 47. The mention of the Brussels Conference refers to the agreed upon conventions by the European powers to help put an end to the slave trade in Africa.

⁶⁸⁹ Portal, 28-30. His account of his experience on this tramway is nothing if not entertaining. The railway consisted of open-bed trollies which meant that passenger luggage had an unfortunate habit of falling off in transit. The “end of the line” was not so much a station as a pile of loose luggage and boxes of unopened materials intended for the extension of the line.

⁶⁹⁰ Quoted in Hill, 119. On his journey he noted how the only posts held by the IBEA was the fort at Kikuyu “where constant difficulties with the natives have hitherto prevented the introduction of any real administration” and Machako’s but neither station was “of any commercial or political value except as a station on the road to Uganda.” Hill, 117.

1895.⁶⁹¹ While the Company faded into history the gaze of the Developer would enable the development of Kenya. A clear example of the shift to this gaze is the response of the engineers and surveyors of the proposed line. In a speech to his shareholders on 18 May 1892, Sir William Mackinnon indicated that because of the Company's caravans that "almost every mile of the country between Mombasa and the lake is...well known."⁶⁹² He stated that these efforts by the Company "so facilitated [the surveyors] work" that this enabled them to quickly chart 400 miles inland from the coast in only three months.⁶⁹³ However, the Consulting Engineer for Railways to the Government of India Sir Guilford Molesworth, who was appointed by Parliament to estimate the cost of the Uganda Railway, had a much different interpretation. As he noted in an article for the International Engineering Congress in Glasgow in 1901:

"The problem was very difficult. I had never been in the country which was then very little known...None of those who had traversed the district had *viewed it with the eyes of an engineer* looking to its possibilities for railway communication."⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹¹ Hill, 127 and Porter, *The Lion's Share*, 116. The consensus of many contemporaries echoed Hill who felt that the IBEAs work "was widely recognized as one of the greatest philanthropic achievements of the latter part of the nineteenth century."

⁶⁹² McDermott, 210.

⁶⁹³ McDermott, 210.

⁶⁹⁴ This statement echoes the necessary change in vision the Company noted for their own caravans in the last chapter. Sir Guilford Molesworth, "The Uganda Railway" in *International Engineering Congress*. (Glasgow, 1901), 1-3. Emphasis mine.

While the practical issue of what is deemed important to note on a map by an explorer compared to an engineer is significant, what is more telling is how indicative this comment is in terms of a shift in gaze.

Sir Guilford Molesworth was quite correct to use the words “eye” and “vision” because the next stage of colonial development would require a wholly different attitude towards the colony. In the case of the Company most of their caravans were sent for the purposes of exploration and limited control.⁶⁹⁵ The reason why Molesworth felt that the previous surveys were of little use to the new crop of engineers and surveyors was that they were speaking fundamentally different languages.

These different languages were simply a matter of a new gaze being applied to Kenya and the need for entirely new maps to facilitate new goals. The most obvious difference undergirding these maps was the approach to land itself. Using a map covered in the previous chapter will help illustrate this difference. The IBEA Sabaki River map was designed to increase the territorial grasp of the Company. Captain Lugard’s map was perfectly in line with his effort to note the navigability of the river as a means of opening a trade route to the interior.⁶⁹⁶ The map was concerned primarily with the route itself. What lay outside Lugard’s route was of little importance beyond how it would

⁶⁹⁵ McDermott, 212. Another example of this shift can be noted in the numerous treaties made by the IBEA with the indigenous tribes. Totalling 97 in all, what makes them distinctive was that they gave *no* land rights to the IBEA. The British government would eventually solve this issue by declaring all Kenyan territory “Crown Land” and make the indigenous population near aliens in their own land. See FO 2/139 (PRO) and FO 2/140 (PRO) for the treaties themselves and Sorrenson, 46.


⁶⁹⁶ McDermott, 122. This map was shown in Map 6.4 – 6.8 in Chapter Six.

affect either the movement along the river or the establishment of further company stations. Even its construction, the map having been folded inside a hardbound volume, was designed around the portability needed by officials pushing into the interior. From the standpoint of the gaze of the Despot the river was important primarily for how it could enable the penetration and conquest of the interior.


In contrast, the maps of the Developer are concerned with usefulness. This is the natural evolution of the gazes as the stability of political control leads to the predictability necessary for capital investment. This process echoes H.M. Stanley's vision for Africa which, in a speech to the Manchester Geographical Society in 1885, he:

portrayed the world as a huge market place, it's ports just 'so many stalls,' it's people 'so many vendors and buyers.' Stanley's geography was a science of action, dedicated to the subjugation of wild nature; its books and maps were weapons of conquest rather than objects of contemplation. One of the prime functions of geographical knowledge, he insisted, was to clear the path for capitalist enterprise.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁷ Driver, 126.



Map 7.1: *Mombasa-Victoria Lake Railway*. 1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1892, JRL.



Map 7.2: *Mombasa-Victoria Lake Railway*. 1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1892, JRL.

This first map was made to document the 1892 survey commissioned by Parliament and suggests several key themes of the gaze of the Developer.⁶⁹⁸ First, and this will be indicated in subsequent maps, is that ownership is assumed. Under the previous gaze the purpose of any map was to indicate ownership. The title of the map, or color, substantiated claims to respective territories and isolated the eye on that component. The title of this map, Mombasa-Victoria Lake Railway, suggests that British ownership is assured. What needed to be indicated now was the development occurring *within* British territory. As far as the makers of this map were concerned that ownership was as self-evident as the map pointing north. This was such a strong assumption that there was *no* indication of a border even though it should be demarcated within the area indicated on the map. Second, the construction of the map is geared towards isolating the eye on the developmental goal over any other aspect. This map appears similar to many maps made under the gaze of the Discoverer in that anything outside the purview of the journey, or in this case the survey, was left blank. With the maps of the explorers this was often due to a lack of knowledge. In contrast, this lack of detail was a conscious decision to isolate the eye on the development of the railway. Exploration privileged the land because it was what was being discovered. The isolation of the land to only that which related to this surveying project is because the land was

⁶⁹⁸ For a summary of the survey see Hill, 61-82. Considering the costs of the survey of the railway amounted to £19,710 it is apparent that there was no hope for the railway as long as the IBEA was in charge of Kenya.

now being inscribed upon. Previous information was dismissed because the effort of the developer was to create *the* road which would create the new reality of Kenya.⁶⁹⁹ Lastly, this map in particular shows several connections across gazes that are typical of the British colonial process. One of those was the clear connection between early discovery efforts and these later stages of colonialism. A line at the bottom of the map, which was printed by the War Office, notes that it was based on a map published by the Royal Geographic Society.⁷⁰⁰ Additionally, Captain Pringle, who later would gain a knighthood and become Inspecting officer of Railways for the Ministry of Transport, even wrote an article recounting his journey for *The Geographical Journal*.⁷⁰¹ This map also highlights the connection between the military and British colonial effort. The entire party was made up of Royal Engineers supported by Indian draughtsmen and Indian soldiers.⁷⁰² This force was needed as the tenuous control the IBEA had on the interior was evident to all. On the return journey to the coast, the Company requested their survey caravan make a “demonstration” against a village in the central highlands after a Company caravan had been attacked and taken casualties.⁷⁰³


⁶⁹⁹ As noted in an article based on an interview with a Kikuyu chief, “but, for the native, imperialism means a way of life – *the* way of life - new, confusing, contradictory and often relentlessly brutal.” Ralph J. Bunche, “The Land Equation in Kenya Colony (As seen by a Kikuyu Chief)” in *Journal of Negro History* 24, no. 1 (January, 1939), 34.

⁷⁰⁰ The full inscription: “From the map published by the Royal Geographic Society in the *Geographical Journal*.”

⁷⁰¹ J.W. Pringle. “With the Railway Survey to Victoria Nyanza.” *The Geographical Journal* 2, no. 2 (August, 1893): 112-139.

⁷⁰² Hill, 61.


⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*, 79.




Map 7.3: *Map Showing the Route of Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza (Uganda) Railway.*
1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1893, CO/700 EastAfrica10,
PRO.



Map 7.4: *Map Showing the Route of Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza (Uganda) Railway.*
1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1893, CO/700 EastAfrica10,
PRO.



Map 7.5: *Map Showing the Route of Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza (Uganda) Railway.*
1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1893, CO/700 EastAfrica10,
PRO.



Map 7.6: *Map Showing the Route of Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza (Uganda) Railway.*

1:1,000,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1893, CO/700 EastAfrica10,

PRO.

This next map helps document how the gaze of the Developer progresses.⁷⁰⁴ Following the trend of the first map there is an assumed ownership and, in fact, most of the map is a direct copy of the first. Similar to the maps of the explorer the previous depictions served as the basis for future maps. In this case the previous survey was used to document the newly adopted route of the railway in red. This follows the pattern where previous journeys were supplanted by the newest route. In this case the previously explored routes were pushed aside in favor of the easiest and most direct route to the Victoria Nyanza. The route of the railway also indicates the appropriation of indigenous knowledge for European purposes. The railway was not simply dropped into the colony of Kenya but followed the main caravan lines that had been used by Arab slave traders.⁷⁰⁵ Another clear indication of this shift in gaze is the changing nature of rivers. Lugard's effort on the Sabaki River was made because rivers had long served as conduits of expansion. However, what once was a hoped for avenue of transit was reduced by this map to a mere alternative route.⁷⁰⁶ The clear red line of the railway marks the British intention to break free of the shackles of nature, whether in dependence on riverine

⁷⁰⁴ For an alternative map, which also illustrates the old division of the EAP and Uganda Protectorates see the similarly titled map in FO 925/346, PRO.

⁷⁰⁵ See Sadler, 178 and T. Wakefield, "Routes of Native Caravans for the Coast to the Interior of Eastern Africa," in *Journal of the Royal Geographic Society* 40 (1870): 303-339.

⁷⁰⁶ See Map 7.4 where the words "Sabaki Alternative Line" are listed over the route and stations that Lugard and the IBEA had created at great cost and effort. The surveyor of the preliminary line, Maj. J.R.L. MacDonald, chose the southern route because he felt the river and dense brush surrounding it would make construction too difficult. Brantley, 37. See also, Hill 87. For MacDonald's own recollections see Chapters I-VII in J.R.L. Macdonald, *Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa, 1891-1894* (London: Edward Arnold, 1897). This echoes the fading of the Machako's station which Lugard established along this very route.

access or on caravans. However, what is most telling in terms of the gaze of the Developer is in Map 7.5 and Map 7.6 where the relationship between the land and map changes completely.⁷⁰⁷ Depicted in the lower corner of these maps were altitude cross-sections showing the slope of the railway line. This is a radical change from the relationship between observer and land that underlay the previous gazes.

What had been the case in almost every map under the gazes of the Discoverer or Despot was the immutability of the land. In the case of the explorer, land was the business of the discoverer. What was malleable for the despot, and which consequently led to the rapid pace of the “Scramble,” were borders. The great effort during this period of colonization was to draw into these malleable borders certain unchanging geographical realities. While the old saw that Queen Victoria allowed Germany to have Kilimanjaro because “Wilhelm like everything that is high and big” is entertaining, it does contain a certain kernel of truth. Whatever the efforts of the colonizers they could not simply pick up and move the mountain of Kilimanjaro and the borders had to adjust around it. Previous gazes had placed land and man on a level playing field. Observations were made at eye level and were depicted in the same way on the map; many of the explorers’ maps were left vague on distant objects because they could not be seen. The gaze of Developer changed this relationship by placing land beneath the aims and goals of the developer. Land, not borders, was made malleable to serve the ends of utility. No longer


⁷⁰⁷ For additional examples of this change see maps MPK 1/391, MPG 1/1055 and MR 1/750.

was the topography something to be discovered or occupied but to confront and force to conform to economic prerogatives.

The surveying of the railway line began this conversion of Kenya but it was carried forward in maps made during its construction.



Map 7.7: *Map Shewing the Uganda Railway & Road Communication from Railhead to Mumia's*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1898, FO 925/290, PRO.



Map 7.8: *Map Shewing the Uganda Railway & Road Communication from Railhead to Mumia's*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1898, FO 925/290, PRO.

The first is a map made in 1898 entitled “Map shewing [sic] the Uganda Railway & Road Communication from Railhead to Mumia’s.” Like all maps of this period the ownership of the area is taken as a given. Compare the bold black line of the railway seen in Map 7.8 with the border marking the beginning of German East Africa at the bottom of the map. What had once been so important to document and fight over in terms of the border faded into the background. The eye is drawn to the railway. The distinctiveness of this map lies in its incorporation of some elements of the old ways of thinking. Mumia’s is located in what would become the Colony of Uganda. Mumia’s also signified the hopes that the railway would make Uganda productive as it had been identified, as early as Lugard’s expedition in 1890 for the IBEA, as a suitable location for European settlement.⁷⁰⁸ Later an IBEA station was established there and the town served as an important way point into central Uganda.⁷⁰⁹ Therefore, the title still emphasizes the goal of connecting Uganda to the coast. However, the map also illustrates how the railway was beginning to redefine the land. The Mackinnon & Sclater roads are muted in comparison to the bright markings of the railway.⁷¹⁰ The roads were investments by the IBEA in order to make the interior more accessible.⁷¹¹ However, these roads represented

⁷⁰⁸ Lugard described Mumia’s as an area which, “produces a very large surplus of food beyond the wants of its population, and being well watered, and with rich soil, it is capable of producing very much more.” Hill, 42.

⁷⁰⁹ Portal 128.

⁷¹⁰ The Mackinnon Road can be seen in Map 7.8 though both it and Sclater roads are depicted the same way on the map.

⁷¹¹ The Mackinnon Road was funded wholly by Sir William Mackinnon and built by IBEA official George Wilson who, in yet another connection between the Company and state, would become an Assistant


the old methods of caravans that the railway was going to supplant.⁷¹² An obstacle to those caravans, the Taru desert, is almost written over with the line of the railway and the black dot of a station.⁷¹³ Considering what an imposing obstacle the desert was for caravans this was an early indicator of how the railway would reshape attitudes towards Kenya. If the Taru desert was no longer an obstacle the gaze of the Developer was free to conceive of exploiting the interior areas of the central highlands.⁷¹⁴

Administrator in Uganda in 1896. Sclater's road was built by Captain Sclater of the Royal Engineers who used it to connect Kibwezi in the central highlands with Uganda. See Portal, 53 and Hill, 151, 156.

⁷¹² See also map MPK 1/386 (PRO) for another depiction of this process

⁷¹³ See the 3rd station from the coast in Map 7.8.

⁷¹⁴ If the reader wishes to trace the evolutionary process of railway construction and map illustration please refer to the map in folder MPK 1/386 at the PRO which was made between the map depicted above and the one depicted in Maps 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11.



Map 7.9: *Map Shewing the Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1900, MFQ 1/665, PRO.



Map 7.10: *Map Shewing the Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000.
London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1900, MFQ 1/665, PRO.



Map 7.11: *Map Shewing the Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000.

London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1900, MFQ 1/665, PRO.

Another map, made in 1900 and illustrating the progress of the railway, entitled “Map Shewing [sic] the Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway” shows the continued process which helped to create Kenya.⁷¹⁵ The title itself shows a change in attitude. The title has eliminated all mention of Mumia’s, and the associated connotation with caravans, from the title.⁷¹⁶ Additionally, there is no mention of the Mackinnon or Sclater Roads. Map 7.10 overlaps some of the area depicted in Map 7.7 and yet there is no indication a Mackinnon road ever existed. The changes indicate how the railway was becoming *the* way for understanding the colony of Kenya. It was not simply older transportation systems that were being absorbed by the railway but even alternate routes. At the top of Map 7.10 is one of the earlier survey routes of the railway made by Major J.R.L. Macdonald. However, his alternate route into Uganda is receding in the same way as Lugard’s route along the Sabaki. Bold lettering and markings are given to the planned railway route, with the words “New Route” written along it, while Macdonald’s efforts are given smaller writing and a smaller line. This map documents how the railway was reshaping the opinion of Kenya. The railway had been designed solely as a means of connecting two critical imperial possessions and thus was named after the territory of

⁷¹⁵ This map became the basis for nearly all maps relating to the construction of the railway and many copies can be found in the PRO. See also MPK 1/391 (PRO) and CO/700 EastAfrica21 (PRO). This map was even written over, showing the continuing appropriation of knowledge, to demarcate a planned mineral concession in MPK 1/431, PRO.


⁷¹⁶ The construction of the railway was the real end of the importance of Mumia’s. While there was pressure by some government officials for a survey and extension line up to Mumia’s prior to the First World War, the abandonment of these plans after 1918 signified a pro-settler bias in favor of the central highlands. See. R.M. Maxon, “African production and support of European settlement in Kenya: The Uasin Gishu-Mumias Railway Scheme 1911-1914,” in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*. (1985), 61.

Uganda. In contrast, the title of the map suggests that what was considered important was no longer the destination but what the railway was crossing.⁷¹⁷ This is one of the more important shifts as it indicates how the railway was transforming the land both physically and conceptually. No longer was Kenya a barrier to be crossed but fertile soil for development. As for the construction itself the map documents the creation of numerous new stations including the establishment of Nairobi as a headquarters station. These stations, as had been the case with those of the IBEA, were bastions of political and economic power and the chief means by which the settler economy was promoted. While the stations had ensured the tenuous IBEA hold, it was only after the construction of the railway that it was possible to envision a settler culture. As Sir Harry Johnson's final report to the Foreign Office noted:

One becomes familiar with such names as Ndi and Machakos, and cannot help but think that they represent towns, or at any rate a considerable number of houses. As a matter of fact the localities so designed are composed of one or two Government buildings erected on the plains or in the bush. It is *only with the arrival of the railway* that anything has been constructed that can be called a town.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁷ This would be made "official" in 1902 when the borders of Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate were finalized. This agreement ceded the two eastern provinces of Uganda and definitively placed the entirety of the "Uganda" railway outside the borders of Uganda Protectorate. Hill, 219. This led to the slightly odd arrangement where the "Uganda Railway" was completely within the bounds of the East Africa Protectorate. Commissioner Eliot would humorously note the development was, "as if the line from Charing Cross to Dover were called the French Railway." Eliot, 209


⁷¹⁸ Hill, 222. Emphasis mine.




Map 7.12: *Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1909, CO/700 EastAfrica53, PRO.




Map 7.13: *Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1909, CO/700 EastAfrica53, PRO.




Map 7.14: *Mombasa-Victoria (Uganda) Railway*. 1:1,584,000. London: Intelligence Division, War Office, 1909, CO/700 EastAfrica53, PRO.



Map 7.15: *Uganda Railway: Plan of Proposed Wharf at Port Florence. 1 = 100' MPGG*
1/130, PRO.



Map 7.16: *Uganda Railway: Plan of Proposed Wharf at Port Florence. 1 = 100' MPGG*
1/130, PRO.



Map 7.17: *Uganda Railway: Plan of Proposed Wharf at Port Florence. 1' = 100' MPGG*
1/130, PRO.

These last two maps document how the Uganda railway served as the catalyst for further growth. The last railway map, made in 1909, depicts the reality of the border divisions as the eastern provinces of Uganda had been transferred to Kenya in 1902. One of the effects of the railway reaching the Victoria Nyanza was the ability for the British to tap into the trade around the lake itself. The newest feature, the railway having been completed in 1901, is the steamer routes on the lake depicted in red. Echoing the newest explorer routes, and even the established railway lines in earlier maps, this color focused the eye on the possibilities created by the railway. Therefore, the railway should not be seen as the completion of the gaze of the Developer but merely the foundation for all future efforts in Kenya. Thus, while the railway was completed in 1901, a mere five years later detailed plans were made to expand the facilities at Port Florence.⁷¹⁹ This expansion had been thought out as soundings had been made of Port Florence and Victoria Nyanza, as part of the Uganda Railway survey.⁷²⁰ The “Plan of Proposed Wharf” map is also important in illustrating that the same operating principles of cartography apply at the lowest levels. The Uganda Railway is depicted in black and fades in order to show the railway extension and planned wharf in red. The railway and wharf facilities were built in order to maximize the utility of Port Florence.⁷²¹ The map,

⁷¹⁹ See Map 7.16 and Map 7.16.

⁷²⁰ See maps CO 700/East Africa 17 and CO 700/East Africa 47 at the PRO.

⁷²¹ A similar process occurred at the other terminus of the Uganda Railway. As documented in maps contained in folder FO 2/786 (PRO) new railway and wharf facilities were built at the port of Kilindini and Mombasa in order to maximize the volume of trade. As a contemporary would note in 1912, Kalindini (an


in Map 7.17, even illustrates at the smallest level how land was malleable under the gaze of the Developer with a swampy area designated to be filled in. These maps, therefore, show how the gaze of the Developer was always encompassing new areas of Kenya. Once the railway achieved its end of being *the* main artery of Kenya it became simply that - a method of transport that demanded the utilization of the interior to be worth the cost. In this way these maps indicate the new motivating blank the gaze of the Developer created. No longer were maps needed to fill in the gaps of knowledge or polity, but instead the landscape was barren and in need of a capitalist reexamination. In the case of the 1909 map, written underneath Port Florence are the words “Railway inlet” indicating the wharf was completed successfully and enabled the penetration of the Victoria Nyanza by British steamers. Though these steamer routes, which had been started in 1909, the railway acted as a magnet to draw trade from around the Victoria Nyanza. This draw was so pronounced that, as indicated in Map 7.12, it was not only the northern part of the lake that was drawn into this nexus but the south as well. This means that German ports, such as Mtoa, were being drawn into the British trade network. It was not simply the lake where this power operated but also on land.⁷²² The railway station of Voi was connected by land trade routes to the border town of Taveta and into the Usambara highlands and

old Swahili term for “the deep place”) Harbor possessed a “deep-water pier, with which the railway immediately connects, affords facilities for the rapid loading and unloading of ships.” Sadler, 183.

⁷²² In a similar manner as the steamer routes grew out of the railway, so a road network was planned jutting out from all directions along the central artery of the railway. For the planned roadways see “Index Map to Road Reports” in MR 1/751, PRO.

the German station of Moshi.⁷²³ Under the gaze of the Developer it appears the British were succeeding at “conquest” far better than they had under the gaze of the Despot.

⁷²³ Map 7.14.



Map 7.18: *Map of East Africa Protectorate made by the Public Works Department. 1' = 54 miles. London: Stanford's Geographic Establishment, CO/700 EastAfrica34, PRO.*

Another way of illustrating the wide-ranging effects of the railway is by examining the northern half of the colony that did not possess its practical and conceptual effects. Map 7-18 was made by the Public Works Department to depict the provinces of the Kenya Colony. As can be noted the southern portion of the map is heavily developed having been divided into administrative provinces. What is clear from the outset is the utter lack of development, whether administratively or otherwise, in the northern section of the colony of Kenya. This vast untapped region was called the Northern Frontier District (NFD). A “harsh and arid region,” there was continual debate in Britain, even as late as the 1960s, over whether the British government should even attempt to develop the area.⁷²⁴ Little seemed offered by the region as it was not suited to settlement and simply “created chronic security problems.”⁷²⁵ The NFD was unsettled even at the coast as the port of Kismayu continued to demand a heavy commitment of force to keep the peace. The “Ogaden Somalis” gave the British “considerable trouble” and two punitive expeditions against them in 1900, at a cost of £140,000, achieve only a moderate level of success.⁷²⁶ Beyond security problems there was also the issue of transportation. Caravan routes had long passed far south of this region and there were no rivers beyond the

⁷²⁴ Barber, 143

⁷²⁵ Barber, 144. In 1963 the Earl of Lytton in an address to the House of Lords, described the NFD as “virtually a desert. . . This desert is so poor and so unimportant that it is called a District only. It is not even a Province. The Province of which it is a part is so unimportant that it is not given a separate map in the Kenya atlas.”

⁷²⁶ Eliot, 121. It is telling Governor Eliot thought the best policy was one of containment: “Our real task at present is rather to see that they [Ogaden] do not encroach to the south, and to prevent them from raiding the Tana River and the Lamu Archipelago.”

limited navigability along the Juba River. The nearest body of water to the coast was the Lorian Swamp.⁷²⁷ For all of these reasons the IBEA and the British government focused their efforts south of the NFD. Beyond these physical obstacles a larger problem for the region was the lack of defined borders.⁷²⁸ While the borders south of the NFD were clear to such an extent that interior provincial borders could be created, that was not the case with this region. Not only are there no provincial boundaries, the red dotted-line denotes only an “Approximate Boundary.” Accords were signed as to the borders between the British and their European neighbors but the boundary between Abyssinia and Kenya was imprecise.⁷²⁹ As evidenced in the map below the border between Abyssinia and British East Africa was open to interpretation.⁷³⁰

⁷²⁷ It is the small kidney-shaped blue body of water along the northern edges of the Kenya and Tanaland Provinces.

⁷²⁸ Commissioner Eliot described the “line drawn on most maps” as “quite imaginary.” Eliot, 183.


⁷²⁹ Barber, 145.

⁷³⁰ Map 7.19



Map 7.19: *Map of the Basin of the Juba River and of the Countries to the North.*

1:5,977,382. Intelligence Division, War Office, 1897, MFQ 1/816, PRO.




Map 7.20: *Map of the frontier between British East Africa and Abyssinia.* 1:1,000,000.

Topographical Section, General Staff, 1907, CO/700 EastAfrica42, PRO.



Map 7.22: *Map of the frontier between British East Africa and Abyssinia. 1:1,000,000.*

Topographical Section, General Staff, 1907, CO/700 EastAfrica42, PRO.



Map 7.23: *Map of the frontier between British East Africa and Abyssinia. 1:1,000,000.*

Topographical Section, General Staff, 1907, CO/700 EastAfrica27, PRO.



Map 7.24: *Map of the frontier between British East Africa and Abyssinia.* 1:1,000,000.

Topographical Section, General Staff, 1907, CO/700 EastAfrica27, PRO.

Map 7.19 was made utilizing the dispatches sent by Maj. J.R.L. MacDonald to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁷³¹ The map documents the competing border claims along the border. This lack of clarity meant that the gaze of the Despot was still engaged with the northern part of the colony hindering any real growth. Contemporaries were even aware of this issue as Commissioner Eliot felt that “the delimitation of the Abyssinian frontier” could “precipitate” the settlement and development.⁷³² The lack of control, let alone clear borders, made it susceptible to Abyssinian raiders. The map clearly denotes this threat.⁷³³ Raids marked in red were common and occurred over successive years. The last raid, in 1897, shows how little the border mattered as it penetrated further south than even the extent of Emperor Menelik’s territorial claim.⁷³⁴ This lack of clarity, with so much meaning bound up in the word “supposed,” led to real violence.⁷³⁵ The map even indicates that the threats caused the British to abandon a station.⁷³⁶ The situation remained a problem as it wasn’t until 1907 that there was even a proposed border delineation.⁷³⁷ A survey expedition along the boundary was undertaken in 1902-1903 under Philip Maud but it was not until 1907 that a draft treaty was

⁷³¹ His notes were written up as the red-markings over a map entitled “A Map of the Basin of the Juba River and of the Countries to the North and West”

⁷³² Eliot, 121.

⁷³³ Map 7.19

⁷³⁴ These continued as Governor Eliot’s memoirs, published in 1905, that the “previous six years” had seen a steady rate of Abyssinian raiding. He feared that if they continued at their present pace they would, by 1911, “be on the Uasin Gishu plateau and the slopes of Mount Kenya.” Eliot, 184.

⁷³⁵ Referring to the “Supposed southern limit of Abyssinian Occupation April 1897” which was the northernmost red boundary line on the map.

⁷³⁶ See the far left of the Map 7.19

⁷³⁷ See Map 7.20 – 7.22.

prepared.⁷³⁸ To indicate how far behind the NFD was from the rest of the colony, the Uganda Railway had reached the Victoria Nyanza in 1901. Rather than red being used to demarcate railway lines or plantations it was used to denote a proposed boundary and territorial swap.⁷³⁹ Therefore, even at this late a date there was concern over the nature of the border itself. Beyond the border issues many other notations on the map indicate the unsettled nature of the NFD and indicate the land was not ready for the gaze of the Developer. The key notes that there are a few “Well defined main roads” but most of the indicated routes are the small dotted lines of “other routes.” Most significantly, along these “other routes” are written small notations indicating “marches.”⁷⁴⁰ In contrast, the areas around the Uganda Railway were given in miles. While it appears a minor difference it signifies a completely different conception of this area of the Protectorate. Miles suggested orderly transport at a steady rate of speed and the assumption that there would be no disruption in transit or loss of goods. Marches suggested an entirely different situation. This term signified a “step back” to caravans which were being left behind by the development of the railway. More significant is the connotation between

⁷³⁸In fact, the administration of this territory was so porous that the initial survey was completed only when Archibald Butter, leading a private expedition to southern Ethiopia, allowed Philip Maud to join him. This treaty would prove unsatisfactory leading to a further delineation mission sent under Maj. Charles W. Gwynn. See Gwynn, Charles W. Major. “A Journey in Southern Abyssinia.” *Geographical Journal*. 38 (1911) 113-139, and Gwynn, Charles W. Major “The Frontiers of Abyssinia: A Retrospect.” *Journal of the Royal African Society*. 38. (1937) 150-161.

⁷³⁹The British would receive the land colored red while the Abyssinians would be compensated by the land colored green.

⁷⁴⁰In Map 7.24 the notation is that it would take 7 marches to travel from El Wak to Bardera. As noted in the citation for the maps I have used a separate copy of Maud’s survey for indicating these wells. The reason is that this map was the base for the border negotiations but the notations made to set the border made it difficult to see these other, equally important, notations.

marches and military units. This is why, for example, many of the villages written along these paths denote the number of wells that could be found in each location.⁷⁴¹ These wells would be critical for the success of any caravan or military campaign. Even amidst the diplomatic wrangling depicted in Map 7.22 the British were keen to note, with blue Xs, the wells they would gain as part of the agreed boundary. In contrast to the south the north is depicted, even in the smallest details, as being militarized, undeveloped, and uncontrolled. Even at the southern-most edges of the NFD, which was within range of the Uganda Railway, the British were unable to adequately control much beyond the railway line.⁷⁴² The largest repulse of British colonial troops occurred during just such an attempt to advance into the southern section of the NFD.⁷⁴³ These problems only escalated prior to the First World War. Col. Thesiger, commanding a King's African Rifles (KAR) detachment in the NFD, warned action had to be taken "unless we are

⁷⁴¹ Map 7.23. For example, El Bai is said to possess 4 wells while Sadi possessed 30. The route line that these wells are indicated is part of a route 13 marches inland to Afmadu (off map) which itself is 70 miles northwest of the port of Kismayu.

⁷⁴² The paucity of the border enabled Africans to assert economic agency against the best efforts of British officials. These were not seen as mere economic violations, though the officials did want the revenue, but as affronts to the authority of the British government. See Beachey, R.W., "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," in *Journal of African History* 8, no. 2 (1967): 269-290; Peter T. Dalleo, "The Somali Role in Organized Poaching in Northeastern Kenya, 1909-1939," in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 12, no. 3 (1979): 472-482; Michael L. Stone, "Organized Poaching in Itui District: A Failure of District Authority, 1900 to 1960," in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5, no. 3 (1972): 436-452; and George L. Simpson, "Frontier Banditry and the Colonial Making Process: The East Africa Protectorate's Northern Borderland prior to the First World War," in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 29, no. 2 (1996): 279-308.

⁷⁴³ David M. Anderson, "Massacre at Ribo Post: Expansion and Expediency on the Colonial Frontier in East Africa," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 37, no. 1 (2004): 33-54. The massacre referred to in the title of this article concerns the subsequent British response. This punitive expedition "was among the most brutal in the colonial history of East Africa." Even then, however, the British were unable to control the territory.

going to be content to sit on a powder magazine and smoke pipes until something happens.”⁷⁴⁴ With the illness of Emperor Menilik II the Abyssinian control over the southern regions deteriorated even further leading to “a spate of bandits and ivory hunters” crossing into the NFD.⁷⁴⁵ While diplomatic efforts continued, the violence in this region led to the deaths of several European officers. The conflict was grave enough that one officer, William Lloyd-Jones, received the last Distinguished Service Order given before the Great War.⁷⁴⁶ These losses pushed the British government to consider severe commitments in order to rectify the breakdown in government they saw across the entire border region.⁷⁴⁷ Taken as a whole the contrast between the NFD and the rest of the colony illustrates the practical and conceptual power the map and the railway, through borders and predictable transport, afforded.

While the railway facilitated the development of Kenya there was no clear agreement on how it would be developed. Initially, there were hopes that the railway would be able to pay for itself based on unrealistic expectations in the ivory trade.⁷⁴⁸ These hopes were proven wildly optimistic and, as the British increased their efforts to

⁷⁴⁴ Simpson, 290.

⁷⁴⁵ Ibid., 279.

⁷⁴⁶ He was wounded in action and recounted his exploits in a post war memoir. See William Lloyd-Jones, *KAR: Being an Unofficial Account of the Origin and Activities of the King's African Rifles* (London: Arrowsmith, 1926).

⁷⁴⁷ While the war put a stop to these plans the problem was so grave that at a meeting in Nairobi in 1914 it was decided to triple the strength of troops in the Northern Frontier District as well as creating two flying columns to better handle the mobile raiders. They also suggested purchasing vessels to patrol the Juba river and improving roads in the NFD at an initial cost of £64,017 and annual expenditure of £45,261. Simpson, 305.

⁷⁴⁸ The explorer Joseph Thompson described “dead ivory” littering the ground in the forests of the highlands. Beachey, 271.

control the trade, it moved incrementally into the untamed NFD. After ivory, there were hopes that mineral deposits would be found and attempts were made to find them along the railway.⁷⁴⁹ However, these hopes were dashed as well. A humorous anecdote concerning the search for minerals concerns Robert Foran stumbling on what he believed as a vein of coal suitable for fueling the railway. The coal was eminently suitable, though that was because it was Welsh coal. The coal he had found had fallen off a locomotive and been covered by earth until he discovered it.⁷⁵⁰ With every search for minerals being either “negative or unsatisfactory,” the British government agreed with the assessment of Sir Charles Eliot that “it is in the vegetable rather than in the mineral kingdom that the strength of East Africa lies.”⁷⁵¹

The Uganda Railway proved the key tool to facilitate the creation of the “White Highlands.” The railway provided the predictability necessary to make the colony attractive for settlement. The railway also served as the main causeway for military power to travel the length of the colony. The connection between military force and development echoes the same process that took place in German East Africa. The first avenue of expansion was the creation of the stations themselves along the railway. These stops were not simply way-points for the railway but a physical representation of the political and military power of the colonizer. The power of stations was recognized by

⁷⁴⁹ See mineral concession granted on map MPK 1/431, PRO.


⁷⁵⁰ Foran, 295.

⁷⁵¹ Eliot, 159-160. Even where there were suitable deposits, Eliot notes the large soda deposit at Magadi, the East Africa Syndicate was unable to profit sufficiently from it. For a map of the proposed Magadi soda facility see MPGG 1/87, PRO.

both the IBEA and even missionaries.⁷⁵² The penetration of the railway enabled the development of “normal” provinces, in contrast to the NFD, with clear borders and administrative hierarchies that made the southern area of Kenya attractive to settlers.⁷⁵³ These provinces were not merely political divisions placed on a map but a process enabled by a greater sense of control and more detailed surveying.

⁷⁵² Strayer, 231.

⁷⁵³ See Map 7.18 and Map 7.29.



Map 7.25: *Map of Part of the Ukamba Province*. 1:500,000. London: George Philip & Son, 1900, CO/700 EastAfrica12, PRO.



Map 7.26: *Map of Part of the Ukamba Province*. 1:500,000. London: George Philip & Son, 1900, CO/700 EastAfrica12, PRO.



Map 7.27: *East Africa Protectorate*. 1" = 54 miles. Nairobi, British East Africa: Survey Office, MPG 1/1092, PRO.

The stability provided by the railway also enabled a greater penetration by surveyors which allowed for more detailed mapping and consequently more development. What was colored reddish-pink in Map 7.22 was land believed to be “practically under our influence.” That area, unsurprisingly, followed closely the line of the railway and the main area of settlement in the central highlands. Additionally Maps 7.23 and 7.24 also indicate how that control translated into greater surveying and more detailed knowledge of that area.⁷⁵⁴ “When the boundaries of settlement were finally established,” as indicated in the detailed maps above, “then the farmer took over from the frontiersman.”⁷⁵⁵ The connection between surveying and settlement is exceedingly clear as the *lack* of surveying is what Commissioner Eliot asserted led to the failure of the first settlements in 1904. He claimed Foreign Office parsimony meant “that the staff of the Survey and Land Department was totally inadequate for the work thrown upon it,” and asserted the “first essential” to economic development was a survey that would enable the Government to know “the amount and quality” of available land.⁷⁵⁶ As can be seen the Government took his advice and the detailed surveying done in the years after 1904 assured the development of land along the Uganda Railway.

⁷⁵⁴ They also provide yet more proof of the striking disparity between the surveyed south and almost untouched Northern Frontier District. For another example indicating this lack of surveying see the visual catalog of systematic surveys in Figures 1 and 2 of Gerald McGrath, *Cartographica: The Surveying and Mapping of British East Africa 1890 to 1946*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976).

⁷⁵⁵ Sorrenson, 3.

⁷⁵⁶ Eliot, 175-176.

The question for the British was who was to develop this newly wrought interior. At first, the hope was that East Africa could become “India’s America.”⁷⁵⁷ The belief was that the interior was unsuited in climate and environment for European settlement so it was better to look to a more accustomed race. The hope was that many of the Indians who worked on the railway would settle Kenya. In fact, very few exercised this option. Those who did tended to set up shop as traders in either Mombasa or at stations along the railway. Not only were there too few to make the colony self-sustaining they also would not provide the raw material export believed necessary for a proper economy. The initial help to British prospects would come from an unexpected quarter. A large number of South Africans immigrated to the colony and were some of the more successful settlers within the region. However, this influx was not enough leading to more bizarre schemes including settling a large number of Zionists within the Central Highlands.⁷⁵⁸ This plan was quickly abandoned but did signify the beginning of settler hostility to the actions of the British government.⁷⁵⁹ Governor Eliot believed that “we have in East Africa the rare

⁷⁵⁷ This was Sir John Kirk’s opinion as the British consul in Zanzibar. Sir H.H. Johnson echoed the sentiment in suggesting that “East Africa is, and should be, from every point of view, the America of the Hindu” in his report to the Foreign Office. The IBEA report of 1892 felt that the climate and soil of East Africa was “admirably adapted to the Indian agriculturalist.” Sorrenson, 35 and Hill, 217, 254.

⁷⁵⁸ See Hill 277, and Sorrenson, 39. For the article documenting the work of the Zionist Commission see Maj. A. St. Hill Gibbons, “British East African Plateau Land and Its Economic Conditions,” in *The Geographical Journal* 27, no. 3 (March, 1906): 242-257. For the map documenting the expedition see Maj. A. St. H. Gibbons, *Sketch map of the Guas Ngishu Plateau to illustrate the work of the Zionist Commission*, 1:750,000, London: Royal Geographic Society, 1906, JRL. The Zionist proposal did at least make more sense than the Foreign Office’s plan to settle a group of Finns in the Central Highlands. See Wolfe, 52.

⁷⁵⁹ Some of this hostility could be a result of the South African influence on settler attitudes towards Africans and the British government. David M. Anderson, “Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya,” in *Journal of African History* 41, no. 3 (2000), 462.

experience of dealing with a *tabula rasa*” and suggested all manner of agricultural products that could be exported.⁷⁶⁰

Eliot’s statement was very telling. As these efforts at settlement continued unabated it is important to note how the gaze of the Developer enabled this process. When reporting to the Foreign Office Sir H.H. Johnson noted that “the country in question [Kenya] is either utterly uninhabited for miles and miles.”⁷⁶¹ Commissioner Eliot felt that the district of Kikuyu would be perfect for European settlement as “there are gaps where there is no native population, though the land does not seem inferior.”⁷⁶² The reason that all these schemes were so readily conceived was that the previous gazes had depopulated the interior of any African peoples. The conceptual power of maps to create this distorted reality would ensure that the settlement of Kenya would bring about the most violent confrontations between colonizers and colonized. The settlers and the British government were of the same mind in desiring cash-crops.⁷⁶³ The problem for the settler community, ironically considering the above pronouncements, was a lack of labor.

⁷⁶⁴ The labor concern had been noted by the British government as early as the

⁷⁶⁰ Hill, 263. A wide variety of crops were considered and tried and promoted by settler and government alike during this period to find what would work. See Wolff, 71-85.

⁷⁶¹ Ibid., 221.

⁷⁶² Eliot, 104.

⁷⁶³ As the Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Alfred Lyttleton would later state about the railway: “I want traffic for the railway – something that the world wants and which will be a stable, reliable and increasing traffic.” Wolff, 85.

⁷⁶⁴ For a good example of this see Justin Willis, “‘Men on the Spot.’ Labor, and the Colonial State in British East Africa: The Mombasa Water Supply, 1911-1917,” in *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 25-48. This article indicates that British control over the coastal


construction of the Uganda Railway. While there had been hopes that the British government would be able to conscript labor from along the route, they found the opposite to be true.⁷⁶⁵ This lack of labor was largely a result of a series of devastating events in the central highlands which decimated the populations and economies of the Maasai and Kikuyu kingdoms. Map 7.29 hints at the tragic relationship between the native tribes and the demands of the gaze of the Developer to utilize the land and labor.

regions was so poor from a labor standpoint that after twenty months of work the British had not managed to lay a single piece of pipe to alleviate the water supply issue.

⁷⁶⁵ In reference to Eliot's assurance of land in the District of Kikuyu he also asserted that it would be best to allow the native villages to remain so they could supply laborers for European estates. It appears the *tabula rasa* was selective in where it was blank. Eliot, 104.



Map 7.29: *East Africa Protectorate. General Plan (Provisional)*. 1:1,500,000. Nairobi: Survey Department, Cadastral Branch, 1912, MR 1/765, PRO.



Map 7.30: *East Africa Protectorate. General Plan (Provisional)*. 1:1,500,000. Nairobi: Survey Department, Cadastral Branch, 1912, MR 1/765, PRO.



Map 7.32: *East Africa Protectorate. General Plan (Provisional)*. 1:1,500,000. Nairobi: Survey Department, Cadastral Branch, 1912, MR 1/765, PRO.

To utilize the land best, and acquire the labor necessary for that task, the British seized on the Native Reserve System to make Kenya pay. This General Plan map, made in 1912, divides the colony between settler and native.⁷⁶⁶ Even nature was utilized with the forest reserves colored green. They were not being set aside as a preserve but as an area of future exploitation.⁷⁶⁷ The connection between the Uganda Railway and settlement is obvious by tracing the route of the railway and the land alienated for settlement.⁷⁶⁸ The connection between the areas in blue (Alienated for Settlement) and pink (Land surveyed for alienation) indicates the power of the blank to be filled in.⁷⁶⁹ As land became alienated they became spring boards for further expansion. For example, the Sabaki River, passed over as an alternate route was now “rehabilitated” by yellow hachuring which indicated its suitability for irrigation.⁷⁷⁰ The only issue was that the Giriama lived there. As the only *proper* use of the land would involve European ownership, this map led to an attempt to forcibly move the Giriama which led to a

⁷⁶⁶ By its very definition alienated land was given only to the settler as he was able to acquire the proper legal title while Africans were shuffled onto tenuous reserves or left to be illegal squatters on European land.

⁷⁶⁷ As noted on the map near Fort Hall in the Kenya Province was a massive forest reserve. This was the same reserve which a government forestry expert estimated “fourteen millions pounds sterling worth of timber awaits exportation.” Anderson, 26-27

⁷⁶⁸ Map 7.29.

⁷⁶⁹ Comparing the above to Map 7.27 and 7.28 the connection between surveyors and colonial growth is clear..

⁷⁷⁰ In Map 7.27 a written notation indicates: “An area of 20,000 acres could be put under perennial irrigation here by a simple canal project” This echoes the plea of C.W. Hobley, another IBEA official who ended up in government service in Kenya, who urged the Europeans to push out the Giriama as “full value can only be got out of the Sabaki valley by irrigation works carried out by European capital.” Martin, 78.

rebellion in 1914.⁷⁷¹ The British responded with overwhelming force. Four KAR columns descended on the Giriama and pushed them to “the edge of ‘an inhospitable foodless country’” in order to bring them to terms.⁷⁷² The British killed 150, burned 5,000 houses and succeeded in forcibly moving the tribe.⁷⁷³ As punishment for rebelling against the logic of the map the Giriama tribe were assessed a 100,000 rupee fine and forced to serve as porters during World War One.⁷⁷⁴

What is important about the Giriama example is how conceptual violence by the gaze of the Developer led to actual violence. All of the above actions were legitimized by the map:

“The confrontation of British and Giriama was no mere cultural misunderstanding. Nor was it simply a direct and immediate attempt to round up labor and clear off land for European occupation. Officials were trying to make the map of the coastal region and the activities of its people conform to their concept of order.”⁷⁷⁵

It is under this gaze that the violence of the colonial period is best hidden. The British response to the Giriama was not violent “enough” to warrant much contemporary or historical scrutiny, but the costs were high for the Giriama. Much of the literature of

⁷⁷¹ The Giriama had found the most successful plants to grow in the region were maize, beans and potatoes. However, these were unacceptable to the British as they wanted the production of cash crops such as coffee and cotton. Brantley, 59. In this regard the growth of the plantation cash-crop system should be seen as a form of “Ecological Imperialism” coinciding with the gaze of the Developer. For a good overview of this idea see Crosby, Alfred. *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

⁷⁷² Brantley, 101.

⁷⁷³ Ibid., 116-117.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid., 124.

⁷⁷⁵ Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 220.

colonial development leaves out the importance of force for economic success.⁷⁷⁶ As in German East Africa, “the necessary precondition for establishing any form of export production and of self-financing administration was effective authority over the African population.”⁷⁷⁷ In the case of Kenya that was achieved through the Native Reserves. It is important to keep in mind how the two previous gazes depicted the indigenous population. Early on the explorers would mark the locations of friendly and hostile tribes as a way of providing crucial information for future explorers. The gaze of the Despot was concerned with political boundaries but only those that could be delineated between Europeans. Both these gazes, therefore, never afforded these kingdoms definable borders. In the same open script that would have written “Taru Desert” you would also have the names of native tribes. This process naturalized, as much as it de-personalized, the indigenous population and pushed them into the background. Under the gaze of the Developer, the British finally deigned to give Africans some measure of identity. However, these assigned reserves were created by the Europeans to isolate and contain the indigenous population in order to facilitate colonial development.⁷⁷⁸ The Native Reserves were used to solve issues of land and labor. As it concerns land the reserves

⁷⁷⁶ Reading a conventional history of colonialism, one would be surprised to know that over the first nine years nearly a third of the East Africa Protectorate’s budget was consumed by military costs. Lonsdale and Berman, 496.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁸ As should be recognized as a theme by now, European recognition on the map often carried an ulterior motive.

helped clear desirable land for British settlement. The two best examples of this process can be seen in the Maasai and the Kikuyu people groups in the Central Highlands.⁷⁷⁹

The Maasai were viewed as the biggest threat to efforts in the Central Highlands by the IBEA and British government.⁷⁸⁰ However, the great irony was that those the British feared most would be the greatest agent of British efforts. The reason for this can be summed up, as it is in Maasai lore, as simply “The Disaster” or “When the Cattle Died.”⁷⁸¹ These terms are given for the decade of 1884-1894 when the Maasai were hit by a series of catastrophes that devastated their society. Considering the pastoral basis for all of Maasai society the greatest of these was the rinderpest epidemic of 1891 which some estimates suggest had a mortality rate of 90% among their cattle.⁷⁸² These environmental crises were combined with a very poor political situation. In the 1870s success in the *Iloikop* wars won the Maasai far too much land than they could successfully control. This left them overexposed and vulnerable to encroachments by the

⁷⁷⁹ For reasons of space I will only examine the Maasai but there are a number of sources which document the British efforts against the Kikuyu. See the following: Wolff, 65; M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968); G.H. Mungeam, “Masai and Kikuyu Responses to the Establishment of British Administration in the East Africa Protectorate,” in *Journal of African History* 11, no. 1 (1970): 127-143; Peter Rogers, “The British and the Kikuyu 1890-1905: A Reassessment,” in *The Journal of African History* 20, no. 2 (1979): 255-269.

⁷⁸⁰ The Maasai were described as “blood drinking” by contemporaries with Commissioner Eliot suggesting “Maasaidom” was a “beastly, bloody system.” See Legget, 212 and Sorrenson, 76.

⁷⁸¹ Richard Waller, “The Maasai and the British, 1895-1905, the Origins of an Alliance,” *Journal of African History* 17, no. 4 (1976), 530.

⁷⁸² The epidemic was so bad that tradition suggests that the Maasai “were reduced to eating donkeys and even hides.” Waller, 630. After the rinderpest epidemic the Maasai faced the drought of 1891 and then a small pox epidemic, in 1892-1893, which “reduced the Maasai population by at least half.” Sorrenson, 191.

Kamba, Kikuyu and Kelenjin from the 1880s onwards.⁷⁸³ The Maasai, correctly, saw the Europeans as a way to protect their position and use the British to help them resist their stronger enemies in the region. The Maasai parlayed the military weakness of the Company and British Government, many local officials being dependent on local auxiliaries, as a way to rebuild their shattered herds.⁷⁸⁴ The British dependence on the Maasai was so great that during the construction of the railway the British countenanced raids against Europeans in order to keep the peace.⁷⁸⁵ The British fostered a close relationship with Leana who they designated as “the paramount chief of all the Maasai” in order to create good will with the entire kingdom.⁷⁸⁶ However, while the Maasai were able to rebuild during the 1890s, it was the railway that started to doom their comfortable arrangement.⁷⁸⁷ The irony of the entire situation was that the Maasai helped enable

⁷⁸³ By the 1880s some Maasai were in such a weak position they were hiring themselves out to Kikuyu leaders. However, this did predispose the Maasai to seek an accommodation with the British when they arrived in force. Waller 532.

⁷⁸⁴ In the Central Highlands between 1893-1895 the British conducted 10 raids which gave the Maasai “some 500 head of cattle and 18,000 goats” as spoils. Waller, 537.

⁷⁸⁵ In 1895 there was a Maasai attack on a large government caravan in the Kedong valley and the famous “Trader Dick” incident the very next day. Rather than confront the Maasai the officials on the spot did all they could to calm the situation. As John Ainsworth wrote in his diary, “I think we can fairly let the Masai [sic] alone and make peace, the more so is this necessary for the fact that if we wished to we could not take actions against them. We, in our present position, are not strong enough.” Waller, 543. Ainsworth pardoned the Maasai by indicating they had acted in self-defense. See Mungeam, 130 and Sorrenson, 276.

⁷⁸⁶ The irony of the entire situation being that never in Maasai custom had such a position existed. Lenana played into it as a way to gain British protection against a rival and was happy to see his power-base increase. Sorrenson, 191.

⁷⁸⁷ Foreshadowed by a private letter written by Commissioner Eliot who noted that “We should face the undoubted issue – viz. that white mates black in a very few moves... There can be no doubt that the Masai [sic] and many other tribes must go under.” Sorrenson, 76. Granted, Eliot was not the most neutral of observers as he stated of the Maasai: “but it can hardly be denied, that they have hitherto done no good in the world that any one knows of; they have lived by robbery and devastation, and made no use themselves of what they have taken from others.” Eliot, 143.

British control when they were best served by the lack of it. The construction of the railway lent a new order and predictability to the interior which reduced the “freedom of action” which the Maasai had been granted “based on the uncertainties of the 1890s.”⁷⁸⁸

As the chief proponent of European settlement, Governor Eliot argued:

I cannot admit that wandering tribes have a right to keep other and superior races out of large tracts merely because they have acquired a habit of straggling over far more land than they can *utilize*. The customs of the Masai [sic] may be interesting to anthropologists, but morally and *economically* they seem to me to be all bad, and it is our duty to change them as soon as possible⁷⁸⁹

With the arrival of the railway the British were forced to confront the “incompatibility between nomadic pastoralism and settled administration.”⁷⁹⁰ The increase in military power available to the state also made them unnecessary as auxiliaries.⁷⁹¹ The development of the colony led the British to move the Maasai onto native reserves in 1904.

Pushing the Maasai onto a reserve grew out of the growing issues the government had with them and a desire to open up other areas for European settlement. While

⁷⁸⁸ The Maasai had also benefited from the lack of a single administration. As Maasai land, as of 1902, was split between the territories of Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate the Maasai were able to play British officials off one-another. Waller, 547-548.

⁷⁸⁹ The emphasis is mine as it underscores the gaze of the Developer as a concern for utilizing the land can only exist with that gaze present. Hill, 262. As Eliot wrote of the change wrought by the railway the Maasai had “not the qualities which offer much promise of progress and increase in the future.” Eliot, 133.

⁷⁹⁰ Waller, 538. Additionally, the British began to regret their alliance as Maasai raids started to draw the British into punitive expeditions, to support their Maasai auxiliaries, which the British did not intend or initiate.

⁷⁹¹ The use of levies was formally banned in 1908 partly out of utility and “partly to moral qualms over ‘barbarous acts being performed under the shelter of our flag’.” The order imposed by the railway demanded that in every way, including military force, the colony operate on rational and European lines. Waller, 549.

Governor Eliot might state that in making European interests “paramount” he did not mean “any violence or hostility should be shown to natives,” that is exactly what happened.⁷⁹² The Maasai were given one reserve on either side of the Uganda Railway with a small strip connecting the two, which were to endure “so long as the Maasai as a race shall exist.”⁷⁹³ What was critical about this arrangement, however, was that there was never a survey of these reserves until 1911.⁷⁹⁴ This meant that whenever there was settler pressure to open up more land the Maasai would be pressured to give in.⁷⁹⁵ The lack of a true survey denied the reality of the borders of the Maasai and led credence to the opinion that the “decision whether a treaty should be taken into consideration was ultimately a European one.”⁷⁹⁶ The 1904 move greatly undercut the power of their “Paramount Chief” Lenana, but that was of little concern as he had outlived his usefulness. While this seemingly settled the Maasai issue, the pressure of increasing numbers of settlers led to a new push to move the Maasai completely off the northern

⁷⁹² Eliot, 104. He did not note the irony of his statement as the second half of his sentence, after claiming no hostility to African natives, stated his belief that “we must not allow nomadic tribes to monopolise huge areas of which they can make no real use.” The gaze of the Developer demanded that land be properly utilized and, in the British mind, that meant *only* by European settlers.

⁷⁹³ Sorrenson, 204. If you look closely at Map 7-35 you can see that the British abided by this for roughly 8 years.

⁷⁹⁴ For an interesting example of how the lack of adequate surveys was used as a pretext for European expansion not simply against colonized people but even against the recognized state of Liberia see Yekutiel Gershoni, “The Drawing of Liberian Boundaries in the Nineteenth Century: Treaties with African Chiefs versus Effective Occupation,” in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*. 20, no. 2 (1987): 293-307.

⁷⁹⁵ For example, an area that had been promised to the Maasai for circumcision ceremonies and even marked on Land Office maps as such, were leased to European settlers. Sorrenson, 197.

⁷⁹⁶ Saadia Touval, “Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa,” in *Journal of African History* 7, no. 2 (1966), 287.

reserve onto a single southern reserve. This second move was largely the initiative of Governor Girouard.⁷⁹⁷ Sir Percy Girouard's efforts for this later move are near comic as he had to both deceive London of the planned move and convince a hostile Maasai population to consent. He single-handedly restored Lenana to a position of prominence claiming that upon Lenana's death his "dying injunction" was for the Maasai to agree to the move south. He even sent a group of settlers to survey the new Maasai land who reported that the land was so good for grazing that "from a settlers' point of view it was sad to see it pass into the hands of natives."⁷⁹⁸ While Gioruard was not successful during his own tenure, the Maasai were eventually moved to this southern reserve in 1911. These moves occurred because of the pressure of the gaze of the Developer. Fundamentally, there was no "rational" reason to allow them to stay. Critically, from the standpoint of future threats, the new treaty made no mention of the borders existing as long as the Maasai race did. Eventually, the Maasai brought suit against these forced relocations, but had them dismissed on a legal technicality.⁷⁹⁹ The end result of the gaze of the Developer was the 1921 court ruling which stated that all native owned land

⁷⁹⁷ Girouard had a clear understanding of the importance of railways to colonialism having constructed railways under Lord Kitchener in Sudan and managing the South African railways during the Anglo-Boer War. He was appointed governor of the East Africa Protectorate in 1909. Sorrenson, 117.

⁷⁹⁸ The skeptical Colonial Office noted in the margin of the report that the party "seems to have inadvertently dropped into paradise." This skepticism was warranted as the Trans-Mara area of the enlarged southern reserve was not only already occupied by another tribe of the Maasai but was rampantly infested with the Tsetse fly. Sorrenson, 206.

⁷⁹⁹ The Court argued that as the Maasai and Protectorate created a compact between sovereign states that was outside its jurisdiction. This enabled the Protectorate government to always hide behind this legal qualification of "Acts of State." See Mungeam, 134, and Sorrenson, 209. Like the reserve system itself the Europeans were more than happy to give the indigenous population borders and sovereignty provided it furthered colonial ends.

actually “remained Crown land,” and by extension all natives “remained tenants-at-will of the British Crown.”⁸⁰⁰ The gaze of the Developer, using the power of the map, began by denying indigenous tribes their natural boundaries and completed its work by the right of ownership itself.

While desire for land led to the forced removal of the Maasai in 1904 and 1911 the other reason for the development of Native Reserves was the need for labor. From the very beginning one of the stated goals of British intervention in Kenya was bringing an end to the slave trade. This was part of the rationale for the construction of the Uganda Railway and was a necessary condition of British imperialism in order to fulfill the dictates of the Brussels Convention that they signed with the other European powers.⁸⁰¹ However the corollary to this was that the British sought to replace a slave economy with a “rational, controllable economy” of wage labor.⁸⁰² The problem that the British faced was trying to succeed in that transition. While wanting to grant legal freedom to slaves they did not wish to give freedmen economic freedom.⁸⁰³ They approved of plantation agriculture, as the British pinned their economic hopes on

⁸⁰⁰ Wolff, 65.

⁸⁰¹ Leggett, 212.

⁸⁰² Cooper, 6. While Cooper restricted his analysis to the coastal Arabic plantations the same issues of labor applied to later British attempts. In fact, the British pinned their hopes on the settler economy about the time plantation agriculture collapsed on the coast. See Cooper, 175.

⁸⁰³ Cooper, 37.

agricultural exports, but wanted to do away with the slave element.⁸⁰⁴ The problem was once Africans were freed from plantation slavery they desired the economic freedom the British did not want them to possess. The bizarre situation led to diminished rights for freed slaves. If they remained on their plantations they would be classified as squatters, giving them no legal protection against being thrown off their land. This led some to *resist* being freed by the government in the hopes of being manumitted by their owners.⁸⁰⁵ The most common response by freed slaves would be to flee outside the direct control of the British and establish farms of their own.⁸⁰⁶ Taken together all of these issues led to fears that no adequate labor would be available for British Agriculture. The solution to this labor problem was the Native Reservation system. Not only would it quarantine Africans in certain areas, it would also provide the means to enmesh the local population into a wage economy. It is this motive that helps explain the hut tax ordinances of 1897 and 1902. While they did produce some revenue, and some in the government believed it was a just cost for abolishing the slave trade and bringing peace, the larger goal was to use it as a vehicle for building a labor force.⁸⁰⁷ Forced to pay this tax in monies, Africans would be force to become part of the British economy to allow them to pay the tax. The legal system also served to channel Africans into the colonial

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid., 35. "The slave trade...created the kind of disorder that was irreconcilable with the advance of capitalism. Economic progress and civilization required the regularity, predictability, and absence of fear which only the Pax Britannica could provide."

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid., 76.

⁸⁰⁶ The best example of this was previously mentioned Giriama people who established a large farming area of ex-slaves on the northern bank of the Sabaki River.

⁸⁰⁷ Wolff, 98-99. This was recognized as early as 1903 by Governor Elliot. See Rogers, 266.

labor force. The labor laws exacted heavy penalties and was designed to bind unfamiliar laborers to British plantations.⁸⁰⁸ In terms of the true opinion of the settlers towards the indigenous population the labor ordinance of 1906 did not possess a single clause which protected the worker.⁸⁰⁹ However even these efforts were not enough with the settler community complaining to the government in 1904 and 1908 that the government was paying Africans too much and hindering the development of a labor force.⁸¹⁰

The gaze of the Developer sought to fully transform the land and peoples to make it useful for European purposes and this occurred on a colony-wide and local scale. The city of Nairobi is the best case study of the gaze of the Developer operating on the smallest scale. From the standpoint of appropriating indigenous knowledge Nairobi certainly was an example of that process. Nairobi station was erected on a caravan stop located halfway between the coast and the Victoria Nyanza. Nairobi was entirely a creation of the colonizers as it “was not even a native village” when, on the 31st of May, 1898, the Uganda Railway reached mile 327 and construction began.⁸¹¹ The city had

⁸⁰⁸ Anderson, 461-462.

⁸⁰⁹ In fact, while the Ordinance of 1910 did set down “basic requirements to be met by employers” it also established a racial bar which prevented Africans from benefitting from this change in the law. Anderson, 462.

⁸¹⁰ The labor situation became so bad that the many settlers made illegal squatter agreements with Africans in order to preserve some labor force. Recognition of the failure of British dreams can be seen in the Resident Natives Ordinance in 1918 which, finally, gave legal recognition to squatters. See Wolff, 101, 104.

⁸¹¹ Foran, 72. And C. Blevin and J. Bouczo, “Nairobi: A Century of History 1898-1997,” in *Les Cahiers de l'IFRA* (1997), 30.

been sighted for its convenient open plains and plentiful water.⁸¹² Nairobi also met Lugard's suggestion that colonial governance could only be possible in the highlands if a station was built in the center of the region.⁸¹³ While Nairobi needed to be built from the ground up as it was "327 miles from the nearest place where even a nail could be purchased" its creation reflected the goals and mission of the gaze of the Developer.⁸¹⁴ The movement of the colony's capitol from Machakos to Nairobi signified the solidification of the gaze of the Developer as it represented a shift from a caravan dependent governmental center to one defined by the railway.⁸¹⁵ Centrally located in the highlands of Kenya, the city became the nexus of all political and military power. Despite these positives the site selected for Nairobi was a very poor choice.⁸¹⁶ Nairobi was sited to suit the needs of the railway. Numerous later observers would comment on the exceedingly poor placement of the town as it grew.⁸¹⁷ Maps 7-33 – 7-38, are the very first blueprints of the town.

⁸¹² Even the name of the station, Enkare Nairobi (Cold Water in Maasai), referred to these water sources. Blevin, 31.


⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ Blevin, 34-35.


⁸¹⁵ Ibid. Echoing the very fading first indicated in Map 6.26.

⁸¹⁶ Blevin, 33, 35. While the town was well placed for the railway its land was less than ideal due to flooding.

⁸¹⁷ As late as 1906 there were debates on moving the town as much as 10 miles up country to a more suitable location. See Blevin, 35 and Foran, 122.



Map 7.33: Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings. Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.



Map 7.34: *Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings.* Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.




Map 7.35: *Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings*. Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.



Map 7.36: *Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings*. Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.



Map 7.37: *Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings*. Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.



Map 7.38: *Plan of Nairobi Town Showing Proposed New Sites of Military Lines and Other Government Buildings*. Mombasa, Public Works Department, 1902, MPK 1/74, PRO.

The development of the city also underscores the importance of the gaze of the Developer. It is evident the railway was critical to the creation and growth of Nairobi. First, blueprints are an expansion of made under this gaze.⁸¹⁸ The gaze had penetrated the colony to such an extent that maps could be made with the emphasis on construction rather than marking areas of control. The blueprints illustrate the planned growth of governmental offices and shops next to the main line of the railway.⁸¹⁹ They also show how important the railway was for populating the town as it brought an influx of officials to run the railway necessitating the construction of a European Bazaar.⁸²⁰ Maps 7.36 and 7.37 provide the proof of the importance of the use of force in the gaze of the Developer. While Indian laborers, labeled as “coolies” in the map, were brought in to build the railway they were separated by the police station from the European section of town. The massive barracks built to house the KAR was to not only protect the town but provide the force necessary to control the surrounding area. The barracks, while being built outside the central area of the town, was close enough to a main road that would be able to bring troops quickly to the city center. The key also lays out the importance of force with over 22 buildings built to facilitate military control compared to 15 other government buildings.⁸²¹ Lastly, the same process of creating a “rational” European settler state can

⁸¹⁸ It also highlights the level of detail, at a scale of 400 feet to an inch, which is only possible once political control is assured and the land can be examined in such detail

⁸¹⁹ Map 7.34. See also map MPKK 1/40 for the importance of this map with plans for water development noted in red over the same blueprints.

⁸²⁰ Map 7.35.

⁸²¹ Map 7.33.

be illustrated in the small grid of offices with accompanying green spaces to remind the settlers of home.⁸²² This also signified a growing desire to separate Europeans from other races as the settler zone was west of town and far from the railway and the Indian laborers. All of these were outgrowths of the railway as, without it, the entire city of Nairobi would not have existed.

What is most important about this map, and the development of Nairobi in general, is that it indicates the larger trends of development in microcosm. Despite being the central area of settlement, Nairobi grew slowly and reflected the issues government officials faced in developing Kenya.⁸²³ City planners also sought to isolate and quarantine the other races separate from the whites. As indicated above, the Europeans and Indians were widely separated with both space and force to keep them distinct. What occurred on a city-wide scale echoes the efforts of the British in the Native Reserves. In both cases the goal was to quarantine non-Europeans and make the people, like the land, useable. The settlers had a dismissive view of the both the African residents and the Indian traders, seeing a risk of literal contamination if they were allowed near whites in the city. Sir Frederick Jackson, former Company caravan leader and Lt. Governor of the East Africa Protectorate from 1907-1911, objected to Indians living in Nairobi because:

These people, unlike the Indians of the coast, were not 'a wealthy and educated Indian community but a population of small tradesmen and

⁸²² Figure 7.38. The broad avenues and garden spaces were common as the Europeans attempted to recreate European settlements in the African frontier.

⁸²³ Sorrenson, 25. As late as 1902, Nairobi only had 30 European settlers.

shopkeepers, completely ignorant of hygienic principles and exceedingly opposed to their introduction in practice. Every consideration of health makes it imperative that these people should be segregated in one quarter, in order to lighten the labour of the Medical Officers, who, as it is, find it a herculean task to cleanse such an Augean stable as the present Indian bazaar.⁸²⁴

This condemnation is undeserved and should be laid at the feet of British surveyors. Hygiene issues were not due to any racial characteristics but to the faulty placement of the town. Indians were forced to live in an open plain next to a swamp created by the Nairobi River because it was necessary to keep them separate from Europeans.⁸²⁵ The engineers dominated the initial city planning and thus placed the housing of the railway and government officials on the “Hill” while segregating Africans and Indians to the less fertile “Plain.”⁸²⁶ This fits with the common effort of colonial cities around the world with a plan “aimed at protecting (in the sense of isolating and separating) the European from other inhabitants.”⁸²⁷ This social stratification was not localized to Nairobi as the town of Kisumu, on the Victoria Nyanza, divided Indian communities amongst the “Poorerclass” “Betterclass” and “Middleclass” Indians.⁸²⁸ In Nairobi, even Europeans faced a stratified cultural hierarchy.⁸²⁹ This same sense of identity also led to the huge

⁸²⁴ Jackson serves as another figure connecting the gazes as he was an early explorer and official for the IBEA in Uganda. He eventually served as the Governor of Uganda from 1911-1917. Sorrenson, 171 and Hill, 27.

⁸²⁵ Sorrenson, 171.

⁸²⁶ Blevin, 36. The engineers were able to dominate this initial planning because of the lease which gave the railway ownership of land one mile to either side of the constructed line.

⁸²⁷ Blevin, 42.

⁸²⁸ See Kisumu Township map in MR 1/765, PRO.

⁸²⁹ Foran, 116-118. Originally arriving as a hunter Robert Foran was welcomed on the “Hill” (the highlands above Nairobi) but was dismissed from that social stratum as soon as he assumed a position as a

outry by the settler community against the scheme to bring Zionist settlers into the region.⁸³⁰ Nairobi, like all other stations, served as a catalyst for further growth in the city and the entire Highlands region.⁸³¹ Indeed, the growth was so fast that the overwhelmed survey department simply issued applicants certificates of occupation contingent on a later survey.⁸³² And in Nairobi, as elsewhere, the settlers' rights were privileged and with such great confusion "African rights to land were likely to be ignored."⁸³³ The most telling example of this process was from an interview with a Kikuyu Chief in the 1930s. He was informed by a district commissioner that it was his job to provide labor for the settlers as "many more European farmers were coming." Later he was told that the government had determined there were too many chiefs and some would be removed from the area. "I was told that since I was on European land I must be paid by the European farmers and not by the Government," he related, "*this was the first time I knew that the land belonged to the Europeans and not to me.*"⁸³⁴ This ownership was driven by the gaze of the Developer and the ability to project settler

police officer. As he noted, "A man might belong to the leading Clubs in London, be a member of the British aristocracy, have been presented at Court, hold His Majesty's commission, be University or Public School, but if serving as a subordinate official in British East Africa the social bars were rigidly raised against him." 118.

⁸³⁰ Sorrenson, 39. The settlers formed an "Anti-Zionist Immigration Committee" and criticized the government for the potential "Jewish invasion."

⁸³¹ Foran, 82. Upon arrival Robert Foran commented that, "The township practically ended with the police barracks, jail, Lands and Survey office, native hospital and dispensary, and the Indian assistant surgeon's bungalow. Beyond was virgin land." Later serving as police officer it was ironic that he identified all the forceful elements that would be necessary to subdue the land and its peoples.

⁸³² Sorrenson, 70. This led to the problematic situation where settlers tried to apply for the same land as titles would only be given once the land had been surveyed.

⁸³³ Sorrenson, 70.

⁸³⁴ Bunche, 40.

power through the KAR. In 1902, when there was only 30 European settlers in the city, the station at Nairobi gained two more companies of soldiers and the 3rd Battalion KAR was moved from the coast to Nairobi.⁸³⁵ This centralized military command was a far cry from the *ad hoc* protection, usually nothing more than a glorified militia, that had been organized by the IBEA to protect its caravans.⁸³⁶ These forces were critical in the planned expansion of political control and, by extension, development of the region around Nairobi. These new forces were “earmarked for further extension of control.” by Commissioner Eliot.⁸³⁷ Specifically to place these troops north of Nairobi at Ft. Hall in order to transform that post from “demarcating the limits of control to [becoming] a new centre of British power and resources.”⁸³⁸ The commitment to create this new center was also shown in the establishment of Kiambu station, 10 miles north of Nairobi, to control the road between Fort Hall and Nairobi and the reestablishment of a station at Dagoretti.⁸³⁹ It is this push that can be seen in the red-marked line demarcating a northern road branching off from Nairobi in Map 7-39 below.

⁸³⁵Rogers, 266-267.

⁸³⁶ Rogers, 265. Hardinge would later critique their efforts “as ‘an European administration with no visible force at its back.’” 266.

⁸³⁷ Rogers, 267. This would be carried even further by Governor Girouard who kept troops at Nairobi to appease the settlers even as the NFD degenerated into chaos. It was this lack of support that led to Col. Thesiger’s warning of being left to smoke on top of a powder magazine.

⁸³⁸ Rogers, 266.


⁸³⁹ Foran, 268.

All of these efforts were tied to the critical need by settlers for labor. The strong military presence was intended to provide the force necessary to enforce hut taxes which would force the indigenous population to work on the settler plantations. As noted in a 1907 report by A.C. Hollis the Secretary for Native Affairs, “At Nairobi...wherever labour was required and was not forthcoming, men were seized and sent to work.”⁸⁴⁰ However, the settlers were always pushing for more control and action on the part of the government. In 1908 the Nairobi settlers met and passed a resolution demanding the government “withdraw the impression that the government is against the settler and for the native.”⁸⁴¹ In 1913 the Labour Commission in the colony recommended the adoption of similar laws as had been passed in Rhodesia requiring all Africans to carry a card with their employment information.⁸⁴² The final map of the Nairobi Township shows the solidification of this social system and the ever greater imprint of the gaze of the Developer to remake the land. The stratification can be easily noted both in word and in the use of color.


⁸⁴⁰ Sorrenson., 150-151.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid., 151. This indictment would have come as a surprise to the surrounding tribes in the Central Highlands.


⁸⁴² Ibid., 153. The only thing which prevented this recommendation from being implemented was the coming of the First World War.



Map 7.40: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.



Map 7.41: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.




Map 7.42: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.



Map 7.43: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.



Map 7.44: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.



Map 7.45: *Key Plan of Nairobi Township*. 1:10,000. MPGG 1/89, PRO.

What is self-evident is the incredible growth of Nairobi from the first blueprints laid out in 1902 to this map made in 1919.⁸⁴³ As evidenced from the title the gaze is that of the developer with the very small scale of 1:10,000 along with the use of color to indicate property lines and public zoning of the town. These colors illustrate the strict stratification of social and economic spheres within Nairobi and the cadastral nature of the map.⁸⁴⁴ The “Hill” area is noted as the European Residential Area while other races are pushed into smaller areas of the town. The key also illustrates how zoning, echoing the Native Reserve system, was used to create strict divisions in town between races.⁸⁴⁵ This map fits with the description of the city plan of Nairobi being laid out with the main avenues serving as a “no man’s land” or a “neutral zone” to ensure there was no mixing between the races.⁸⁴⁶ This is not mere academic hyperbole as can be seen in Map 7.45 which clearly notes the written “Extension of Neutral Zone” in order to separate newly alienated European land from the high class Asiatic section of Nairobi. However, you also see the progressive impact of the settlers in their desire to create an entire European culture and remake the land. There is a race track, a polo ground, a YMCA sports ground,

⁸⁴³ While slightly outside the timeframe of this study, this map from 1919 shows clearly the effect of the gaze of the Developer had on the city.

⁸⁴⁴ Map 7.41.

⁸⁴⁵ This followed a tradition of British colonial towns segregating races from one another. See Odile Goerg, “From Hill Station (Freetown) to Downtown Conakry (First Ward): Comparing French and British Approaches to Segregation in Colonial Cities at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 32, no. 1 (1998): 1-31.

⁸⁴⁶ Blevin, 42.. “This ‘buffer zone’ can be marked by natural spaces (rivers, hills) or artificial land marks (public buildings, preferably the police station)” which again highlights the connection between development and force whether actual or threatened.

a European school and an educational reserve.⁸⁴⁷ Even as early as July, 1904 there was a “Race Week” in Nairobi with cricket matches, dinner parties, polo games, concerts, and other events.⁸⁴⁸ Nairobi became a boom town with new stores and shops being set up with the National Bank of India even establishing a small branch in the Treasury Office.⁸⁴⁹ By the completion of the railway the city had grown to such an extent that awards could be given for coffee production in the “Nairobi Show.”⁸⁵⁰ Schools were being built by the missions to serve both the indigenous population and the settlers in Nairobi and the Uasin Gishu plateau.⁸⁵¹ Prior to the First World War there were further developments including attempts to electrify the region and the creation of flour mills to make use of the local wheat production.⁸⁵² By the end of his tour in Kenya in 1908, Robert Foran would comment that Nairobi was “beginning to look like a real town.”⁸⁵³ However, the importance of force was still evident at this later date. Even the effort at electrification was dependent on the KAR as the Nairobi Electric Power Company

⁸⁴⁷ Map 7.43 and 7.44.

⁸⁴⁸ Foran, 151. There was even a push towards horse racing with, eventually, a Jockey Club of Kenya being established that was recognized by the Jockey Club in England. Foran, 154.

⁸⁴⁹ Foran, 129.

⁸⁵⁰ J.A. Kieran, “The origins of Commercial Arabica Coffee Production in East Africa,” in *African Historical Studies* 2, no. 1 (1969), 63. The award went to the Catholic mission station St. Austin’s which was producing 52,000 bushes by 1914. Thus, another example of the relationship between missionaries and the expansion of the colonial state.

⁸⁵¹ A.G. Anderson, *Our Newest Colony*. (Nairobi, BEA: The East African Standard, 1910) , 20.

⁸⁵² Anderson, 79. Written as a paean to the “newest colony” the flour mills were not as productive as were hoped. The first mill was erected in 1907 “and used almost entirely imported wheat until 1920.” See F.F. Pinto and E.A. Hurd, “Seventy Years with Wheat in Kenya,” in *East African Agricultural and Forestry Journal* 36 (1979), 6.

⁸⁵³ Foran, 307. He noted how shops were beginning to pop up all over town including a safari outfitting company and a photography studio.

utilized a station along the Ft. Hall road and brought the electricity from 20 miles away.⁸⁵⁴ The KAR barracks are still placed within the town with an additional section of protected area set aside for a rifle range.⁸⁵⁵ The growth of Nairobi was a microcosm of the settlement of Kenya.⁸⁵⁶ The map had created a European zone for settlement and it drew the military and governmental power necessary to promote it. A map like this only furthered the conceptual control the government felt it had over the region. Everything on it indicated the successful control of the region and people to assure the success of British colonization. The fact that the town looked like a European town “should” was just a further confirmation to the settlers that they were right to control the colony the way they did. Much of this social stratification, seemingly so orderly on the map, formed the basis for the 1920s policy of “separate but parallel” development in Kenya.⁸⁵⁷

Kenya was “not conquered by force of arms,” said Sir Edward Grigg at a speech in Falmouth, “it was conquered by the greatest force of our modern civilisation: it was conquered by a railway.”⁸⁵⁸ While the role of the railway was critical, and a catalyst for settlement, it was only accomplished by the work of surveyors and map makers who

⁸⁵⁴ Foran, 269.

⁸⁵⁵ See Map 7.40 for the barracks are to the east below the center of town. For an example of how effective the gaze of the developer had been established in Nairobi one needs to merely compare the level of growth between Map 7.34 in 1902 and 7.40 in 1919 which is the same geographical area.

⁸⁵⁶ For another example of this process you can trace the same close development of the town of Kisumu (Port Florence) on the Victoria Nyanza. As the terminus of the Uganda Railway the town’s development was also critical to the success of the colony. The following maps from the National Archives in Kew depict very much the same process as was documented in Nairobi: MR 1/765, FO 2/786, CO 700/East Africa 45, and MPPG 1/130 all located in the PRO.

⁸⁵⁷ Sorrenson, 255.

⁸⁵⁸ Hill, 244. This echoes a similar sentiment of Teddy Roosevelt who felt that one of the greatest feats “to the credit of the white race” was the Uganda Railway. Foran, 86

enabled the progression to the gaze of the Developer. However, Sir Edward Grigg can be forgiven this opinion as Africans failed to see the importance of the surveyors as well.

As a Kikuyu chief recounted upon seeing European surveyors on his tribal land:

The people looked with curiosity on what they were doing and asked, 'What are these men doing and what are these strange roads (lines) they are making?' But they only said, 'Let them make their roads - the grass will grow over these European paths and no one will use them.'⁸⁵⁹


⁸⁵⁹ Bunche, 40.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The earth is a place on which England is found
And you find it however you twirl the globe round
For the spots are all red and the rest is all grey
And that is the meaning of Empire Day.⁸⁶⁰

The goal underlying this study has been to elucidate the power of the map and its role in the colonizing efforts by Germany and Britain in eastern Africa. Fundamentally, the map is what enabled Europeans to transform Africa from an unknown void to one where they could depict the continent as shown in Map 8.1 and 8.2.

⁸⁶⁰ G.K. Chesterton's "Songs of Education: 11 Geography" from *The Collected Poems of G.K. Chesterton* quoted in Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power," 76.



Map 8.1: *A Map of Central and Southern Africa: Prepared for the Zoutpansberg Company.* Stanford's Geographical Establishment, 1892, FO 84/2251, PRO.



Map 8.2: Carocacoethes. "Colonial Africa." Accessed June 11, 2012,
<http://cartocacoethes.deviantart.com/art/Colonial-Africa-159346737>.

An interesting question is why the 1892 map made for the Zoutpansberg Company looks “incorrect” while Map 8.2 seems proper. Considering both maps are creations the reason for this different response is due to the effectiveness of the map to define a relationship between territory and meaning. While the colonial empires have all fallen, the power of cartography means we privilege one invention over the other. The lines of company occupations do not appear correct because we have internalized the cartographic view depicted in Map 8.2. While historians may document of the activities of certain companies they still exist in the world of the French Sudan, German East Africa, and British Somaliland. Indeed, when documenting the actions of the Imperial British East Africa Company, there is still a sense a defined area which the IBEA could ever truly inhabit. The “natural limits” of these colonies are natural insofar as the map has indicated it and we have accepted its proposition. That these associations still resonate over half a century after the end of the European colonies underscores the vital role that maps play in creating and legitimizing political meaning. The goal of this dissertation was to trace, through a theoretical model of three gazes, how *both* of the above maps were inventions and expose the ways in which maps were used to conceptualize Africa, legitimize conquest and occupation, and enable the economic development of these newly created colonies.

The gaze of Discoverer helped to create a space suitable for colonization. While explorers crawled all over the continent, their maps served to prepare Africa for the gazes

that were to come afterwards. Modern geography is a skill which defines a territory not only in terms of what it is, but how it relates to the outside world.⁸⁶¹ The act of creating a map of Africa was not a situation where new data was added to indigenous conceptions. Through their mapping efforts the Europeans were creating “another *kind* of knowledge of space with its own classificatory systems, concepts, and mediating signs.”⁸⁶² These signs were critically important in preparing Africa for colonization:

Geographical information presented in this way was interpreted by readers as factual and indisputable. The process of codification concealed possibilities that the land might have alternative histories or could be interpreted through different ideological frameworks.⁸⁶³

The power of the map, in its signs and scientific imprimatur, helped create territory. By that I mean they transformed the “Dark Continent” into land that was legible to Europeans. As long as Africa was covered with “elephants for want of towns” it would remain mysterious and unknown. While many explorers pursued Africa for their own glory, the knowledge they passed on to the rest of Europe served as the catalyst for imperialism. The longitude and latitude lines that were laid across the continent helped create a “placelessness” which destroyed the history of Africa and made it suitable to occupy.⁸⁶⁴ It is not a coincidence that the political Scramble for Africa occurred after the period in which geography grew as a popularized and scientific discipline. It was just

⁸⁶¹ Winichakul, 31.

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸⁶³ Janda Gooding, “The Politics of a Panorama: Robert Dale and King George Sound,” in *Mapping Colonial Conquest: Australia and Southern Africa* ed. Norman Etherington (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2007), 67.

⁸⁶⁴ Noyes, 128

because of this strong connection between exploration and empire that the Royal Geographic Society was referred to as “Britain’s quasi-official directorate of exploration.”⁸⁶⁵ The gaze of the Discoverer led a scientific gloss to a process by which Africa was made into a legible void prepared for the imaginations of European audiences to color in.⁸⁶⁶

Next, the gaze of the Despot fell across this now blank space and saw that “it was good.” Viewing Africa as nothing more than a territory it was easy for a colonizing power to impose their will on the land. Colonial cartography did not simply misrepresent indigenous ownership of the land, it “obliterated it.”⁸⁶⁷ With Africa a blank political canvas men like William Mackinnon and Carl Peters were free to create a “projection of [their] wish-fulfillment” in their colonizing efforts.⁸⁶⁸ A political map is nothing more than a Rorschach test with the ink-blot nations, but the medium of the map allows for a reproducibility that convinces the viewer of its reality.⁸⁶⁹ In German East Africa the “plainest result” of all these efforts was creating “a geographical region bounded by arbitrary imperialist borders.”⁸⁷⁰ However, these declarations did cause competition. As the blanks of the map became filled in there were grave fears that Africa would be lost. It is only by exploring the power of the map to create motive force that much of the actions

⁸⁶⁵ Gooding, 22.

⁸⁶⁶ Carruthers, “Cartographical Rivalries,” 103.

⁸⁶⁷ Etherington, 9.

⁸⁶⁸ Bialas, 13.

⁸⁶⁹ Jacob, *The Sovereign Map*, 315. As Janda Gooding notes, it is “important for interpretation that the information conveyed in maps be codified and presented in a consistent format.” Gooding, 66-67.

⁸⁷⁰ Koponen, 559.

taken during the “Scramble” make sense. The advances by the DOAG and IBEA to unseat the position of the other were tied to an understanding of the map. Peters and Mackinnon knew that “maps facilitated the exercise of political power, giving conceptual hegemony even where real control might be lacking.”⁸⁷¹ This understanding of the map is what led to the “Race to Uganda.” That the IBEA nearly bankrupted itself through caravans suggests they understood the power of the map a bit more than the DOAG. The German East Africa Company’s attempt to exercise real political power, rather than conceptual power depicted on the map, led to the end of Peters’ dream for his Company in eastern Africa. However, both companies recognized that their cartographic efforts would bring political dividends. The reproduction of their maps were critical as with each printing “the more entrenched the depicted ‘reality’ became.”⁸⁷² The creation of German and British East Africa was the result of a “long and gradual inscription of the earth” whereby the presence of the colony was written down in a way to interpret this presence as possession.⁸⁷³

As both companies faded into memory it was the gaze of the Developer that attempted to utilize what was colored in on the map. In both German and British East Africa the previous gazes, which had destroyed all conceptions of ownership other than those of the European, created the precondition for the extractive economies put into

⁸⁷¹ Carruthers “Cartographical Rivalries,” 103.

⁸⁷² Carruthers “Cartographical Rivalries,” 107.

⁸⁷³ Noyes, 225.

place. This was the most different of the gazes as it involved not an appropriation of previous knowledge but a near ambivalence towards it. This gaze, more than any other, demanded “new eyes” and new maps which remade the land to serve developmental ends. Morton Stanley once suggested that the continent of Africa was, through the use of geographic knowledge, “being fettered to civilization by rigid bars of metal which form the all-conquering railway.”⁸⁷⁴ In both colonies the railways did fetter the land to “civilization” but in more ways than Stanley imagined. Not only did the Tanga and Uganda Railway connect the coasts to the interiors, it also fettered the land to a European mode of thinking. The railway, in both cases, helped to refashion the land into something the Europeans understood. To borrow a term associated with the gaze of the Discoverer, the railways made Africa legible to investors and settlers. Once the railway was laid down, Europeans could transform the land into one demarcated by the cadastral map of personal ownership. Beyond transforming the land, the gaze of the Developer also transformed the African people. Heretofore marginalized by the previous gazes, these new maps converted Africans into the means of economic growth.

The use of force, often ignored by military and economic historians was another point this study sought bring to light. As much as African historians have been at pains to expose the multi-faceted nature of resistance, this study has shown that violence was just as ever-present during the totality of the colonial project. When considering the forceful

⁸⁷⁴ From a speech by Stanley to the Manchester Geographical Society in 1885 quoted in Driver, 126.

conquest of almost an entire continent it is easier to be attracted to the battles and movements of European troops. In contrast, a simple surveying party with their theodolites and measuring tapes seem far more benign. And yet these surveyors served as the true “tip of the spear.” The problem for the indigenous peoples of Africa was that “in European history, annexations and wars were followed by peace treaties, boundaries, and maps” but during colonialism, “they started with maps and treaties and war came later, if at all.”⁸⁷⁵ Exploratory journeys, seemingly benign, encompassed the use of force on many levels. These expeditions were forceful in their own make-up. Despite the mythos of lone adventurers, the act of exploration was a huge investment of resources, manpower, and force.⁸⁷⁶ The act of exploration also did violence to the African sense of self and the relationship they had to the rest of the world. They were being forced into adopting a new “world view” by European cartography.⁸⁷⁷ Fundamentally, their land was being made unintelligible unless it was understood through the language of European cartography.⁸⁷⁸ This “obliteration” not only destroyed indigenous understandings of the land, it also was the conceptual foundation for colonization. Lost in all this was the utter dependence of European explorers on African support. Beyond the porters and guides, European explorers trod in the footsteps of those they did not deign to recognize on the

⁸⁷⁵ Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism*, 98.

⁸⁷⁶ Fabian, 29-30.

⁸⁷⁷ Winichakul, x.

⁸⁷⁸ Zbigniew Bialas, extrapolating from Foucault’s ideas on truth and discourse, suggests that, “In order to impose the ‘contours’ track ‘elevations’ ‘delineations’ etc. a whole set of minor, related ‘grammatical’ rules has to be accepted if the representation of the land is to be at all readable.” Bialas, 179.

map. The violence of exploration was two-fold: first, appropriating indigenous knowledge for European ends; second, using “their” knowledge to obfuscate or eliminate Africans.

Violence was not an aberration as it escalated in tandem with the demands for control of each subsequent gaze. While there is extensive literature on colonial warfare it suffers from a dichromatic schema similar to the earlier historiographical debate on African resistance. This schema, of violent warfare/rebellion or peace, discounts the violence inherent in the pacification efforts under the gaze of the Despot and Developer. These violent actions have been ignored for a variety of reasons. In the case of the despot, the initial historiography by European scholars was invested in suggesting the normalcy of colonial occupation as part of the “White Man’s Burden.” While uprisings, such as the Maji Maji revolt of 1905, could not be ignored, historians accepted the cartographic conquest of territory as complete. As such, violent revolts were aberrations and a pacified interior was accepted as normative. The DOAG and IBEA also had an incentive to deny violence as their control was tenuous and it was in their interests to depict their territories as stable. Second, later historiography did not want to examine these lower-order conflicts for different reasons. After decolonization much of the early Africanist literature was centered on passing judgment on Africans with either the approval of “resistance” or the condemnation of “collaboration.” The periods under study, where resistance and collaboration ebbed and flowed, would muddy the waters of

those striving to free Africa from European dominated history.⁸⁷⁹ The example of the Maasai, who both used and were used by the British, would have been quite disruptive to the new narrative. Only recently has the historiography advanced to the point at which nuanced responses to colonialism, underscoring the agency of Africans to respond to colonialism in varied ways, might open doors to a reexamination of this type of conflict.⁸⁸⁰ Underscoring all of this violence was the map. The gaze of the Discoverer had stifled indigenous understandings of the land and the gaze of the Despot negated their polities. These pacification efforts were linked with making reality accord with what the map had depicted. The numerous stations in the interior were permanent expressions of the cartographer's claims. This force was used to induce the indigenous populations to accept the European "world view" whether in politics or economics. By far the violence inherent in the gaze of the Developer has been most neglected. Economic development within colonies is generally taken as a given, with the application of force only seen in rebellions against the "normalcy" of colonial occupation. As this study has shown, however, violence was needed in order to provide the stability and labor necessary for the economic goals of the German and British governments.

⁸⁷⁹ For example, in the old dichotomy it would be hard to place King Njoya of the Bamum in western Cameroon who used maps to claim territory contested by rivals while also petitioning for British protection against German and French territorial claims. David Woodward, "Traditional Cartography in Africa," in *Cartography in the Traditional African, American, Arctic, Australian, and Pacific Societies*, ed. David Woodward and G. Malcom Lewis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 42-43.

⁸⁸⁰ For a good example of this new literature see Benjamin N. Lawrence, Emily Lynn Osborn and Richard L. Roberts, *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006)

German and British East Africa served as a perfect case-study for an examination of these gazes. First, the timescale of colonization lent itself to a study such as this. The German and British “Scramble” in this region afforded the chance to analyze similar maps over the course of decades rather than centuries. Second, this period was the zenith of cartography in its original form. Fundamentally, cartography had not changed much since the times of the Egyptians. While there were some technological advances, they produced a change in type, whether for greater ease or accuracy, than a change in kind.⁸⁸¹ I also wanted to emphasize the human vantage point in these gazes. After 1914 there were great changes to the art of cartography, from the use of photographic imagery to aerial observation. By focusing on this period I could explore the relationship between the individual gazes of European explorers and officials and the larger conceptual gaze created by the map.⁸⁸² In addition, this would allow a firmer connection to the period of exploration as many route sketches were simply what the explorer could “gaze” upon. Lastly, Germany and Britain represented two nations on the forefront of cartographic science. As the early exploratory efforts by German and British nationals crisscrossed

⁸⁸¹ The evolution from Egyptian Groma to the Roman Groma and then to the modern Theodolite is quite linear.

⁸⁸² As the explorer Cameron paternalistically related the relationship between mapping and European understanding, “[African’s] local knowledge is wonderfully good, but they seem incapable of grasping anything like a general idea. They stared at my map and thought it a most wonderful performance; and when I said that people in England would know the shape and size of Tanganyika, and the names and situation of rivers and villages by means of it, I am inclined to fancy they thought me a magician.” Quoted in Mbodj, 49.

the future political boundaries a comparison between the two colonial efforts would greatly expose any similarities or differences.

The conclusions of this project have numerous applications to the discipline in history. Fundamentally, historians must reacquaint themselves with the map. Sequestered in our minds and books as utilitarian tools serving the interests of our prose, we fail to recognize the map as a historical artifact in its own right. Even as historians have explored the benefits of analyzing art, film, political cartoons and other visual media the map remains overlooked. Largely, this is due to the effectiveness of the map. Historians ignore maps in the same way undergraduates do in their textbooks, both believing the map is only a cartographic representation of the reality of the prose. This study exposes that blindness and serves as a bridge to the fine work of cartographic historians. This work also exposes how European, Military, and Colonial historians can reexamine old questions through the addition of this new source base. In this study the maps have shown how important the colonial economy was. The critique that an economic rationale for colonial growth is false due to the small returns on investment fail to take into account how economic motives, regardless of outcome, drove the gaze of the Developer.⁸⁸³ This is a fundamental blindspot in the literature as it equates outcomes with motives.⁸⁸⁴ In the case of German East Africa it was the threat of disruption that

⁸⁸³ See Appendix E in Gann and Duignan, *The Rulers of German Africa* for signs of the small investment in German East Africa and the colonies overall.

⁸⁸⁴ As a military historian a good example of a similar misconception is on the efficacy of the bayonet. Often the military usefulness of the bayonet was dismissed because of the small percentage of casualties

held back the scale of development. As investors demanded reliability and predictability as barometers of success it is clear why the colony would not be an attractive outlet for funds before the end of the Maji-Maji revolt. As documented in Chapter Four, the Usambara region boomed after 1905 and became the chief area of settlement and expansion. Only the outbreak of war muted these efforts.⁸⁸⁵ That the British copied the German maps made of the region in 1915 suggested that they were keen on capitalizing on this lost opportunity as well as understood the importance of the map in a colonial economy. In the case of British East Africa the lack of success in business ventures should not suggest a lack of interest. In 1914, over 27,000 acres were under rubber cultivation in eastern Africa. That the 22 associated companies all failed does not suggest a lack of economic interest to develop crops for export.⁸⁸⁶ There certainly was a great deal of interest in developing a number of economic ventures in East Africa but since they did not come to fruition they are ignored.⁸⁸⁷ While it is true the Usambara Syndicate folded after a single year of operation, the fact the company existed at all still suggests an interest and effort developing the economy.⁸⁸⁸ Maps offer a fascinating

due to bladed weapons. However, these studies failed to note that the real motive of the bayonet was to drive an enemy from its position. A successful bayonet charge need not even involve a single death by bayonet if it succeeded in striking fear in the enemy force and making it break before contact.

⁸⁸⁵ One need only consider if, barring war, the development of the East Usambara region would be replicated along all of the planned German railways.

⁸⁸⁶ See Munro, 369-379.

⁸⁸⁷ See "Land, Mining and Rubber Concessions: 1899-May, 1902" in FO 2/805, PRO.

⁸⁸⁸ See BT 31/11774/91320, PRO. There are a number of companies in the Treasury files that indicate the desire to profit off Kenya. As a small selection see: British East Africa Investment Company (BT 31/21697/130984); British Trading Company (BT 31/12513/99590); British East Africa Land Development Company (BT 31/13944/123323).

glimpse into the hopes and desires of companies that never would make it onto the ledger. Thus, maps provide an alternate source base by which to analyze a number of colonial issues.

This study again illustrates the relationship between colonialism and science. “Colonial Science” as a historical term has been used by a number of historians but the resonance has not percolated into other disciplines. In the field of military history Donald Headrick’s Tools of Empire references a number of technologies, both hard and soft, that he feels were critical to providing the means necessary to colonize Africa. But, while he covers everything from quinine and the steamboat to communication technology he ignores the role the map played in the successful colonization of Africa. Similarly, the colonial monograph by D.A. Low, Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902, covers this same period and never mentions mapping.

Considering his title this omission is glaring as it was through the map that these empires were fabricated. The importance of maps to enable colonialism has been left to specialists whose work has not received as much attention as it should. Thus, I hope this study elucidates the way in which cartographic analysis can be of benefit to a wide range of disciplines. Additionally, I hope my study exposes the links between exploratory journeys and those made to serve the needs of the state. Often, cartographic analysis has been tied directly to state missions for increased control. What I have attempted to prove is the connections between the early exploratory journeys and later colonial success. Very

often these travel narratives are presented, even by historians, in a nearly romantic light. What bears emphasis is the relationship between these journeys and colonial success. Without the first wave of missionaries and explorers, often one in the same, the later waves of colonialists and industrialists would never have arrived.

Also exposed is the role of military force in state functions with applications far beyond the colonial context. While the “Military Revolution” is still hotly debated among military historians, it has atrophied in terms of its effects on other fields. In general, after the initial burst of interest the potential for the military to provide a unique insight into state functions has been forgotten. While it is true that military historians have sometimes ignored new disciplines to our detriment, it is no less true that other fields have suffered by their allegiance to ignorance of all things military. It was only through the application of force, whether troops employed by private company or state, that colonialism was possible. Often the violence and development of the colony was proportional; where violence was ineffective, such as the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, the colonial promise withered on the vine. The entire colonial economy, from transportation to labor, was dependent on the threat or use of force. While force has been acknowledged by historians in terms of the initial conquest of territory, it is this latent aggression that goes unnoticed. Recognizing violence as a hidden constant opens up new doors for analyzing colonization and the use of force in all manner of state functions. Military historians would benefit from this understanding as it opens up entirely new

realms for our discipline to study. Military History has branched out to touch on a number of emerging themes, including race, gender, and occupation, suggesting a greater awareness of the applicability of military history to work carried on in other fields.

While the power of the military is readily acknowledged during times of war this power nonetheless is readily available during times of peace. Shedding light on the nature of force in non-conflict contexts would be a great avenue of further research.

This work also exposes a number of related historical questions worthy of further analysis. One would be the intersection between the British experience in India and their work in eastern Africa. The British relied extensively on their experiences in India for guidance. The very inclination to use the IBEA to achieve imperial ends was influenced by the British success in India.⁸⁸⁹ The great project in Kenya, the Uganda Railway, was a product of Indian expertise as most of the surveyors came from posts in India, Indian labor built it, and a goal of its construction was Indian settlement. The close relationship between eastern Africa and India suggests British studies might gain new insights by analyzing colonialism in this broader context. As much as there have been great advances by the formation of “Atlantic World” studies, an “Indian World” perspective might reveal new insights into the colonization of east Africa. Further, a number of surveying parties relied on Indian draughtsman and Indian surveyors.⁸⁹⁰ It would be a

⁸⁸⁹ Gann and Duignan, *Rulers of British Africa*, 291

⁸⁹⁰ The Foreign Office suggested that a quick triangulation, similar to the one in India, should be performed to make governance of the colony easier. They even suggested training African topographers in India to assist survey efforts. McGrath, 10.

fascinating study to trace the experience of these colonized individuals serving in such a capacity, as they were helping to color in new territories of the British Empire. Another avenue of research is drawing the clear connections between the exploration of Africa and its governance. Throughout the study I have noted the great number of individuals whose actions crossed gazes. Hermann von Wissmann not only crossed the interior of central Africa as an explorer, he also served as Governor of German East Africa in 1895. Similarly, Sir John Kirk, whose actions as consul to Zanzibar did so much to solidify the indirect rule of the British, accompanied Livingstone on his explorations of Africa. These are just some of the connections as explorers and company officials merely “changed hats” as these territories went from the private to state-controlled entities. Beyond serving as interesting case studies on the relationship between private and state service during the Age of Imperialism they also serve as engaging links between each of the separate gazes. While tracing every possible connection across exploration and colony would be prohibitively large, doing so would better illustrate the evolutionary nature of colonialism and how colonial science was the handmaid of Empire.

Lastly, the map suggests new avenues of research in exploring the nature of German colonialism. One of the interesting aspects of comparing British and German efforts is the differing nodes of colonial power. In the case of Germany there were linkages between academic and business elites with a reluctant government in tow. In contrast, Britain illustrated a very strong link between business and government. Nearly

every colonial map, whether made under the auspices of the Royal Geographic Society or the IBEA, almost invariably was made or reproduced by the Intelligence Office Division of the War Office. Related to this was the much stronger “militarization” of British efforts. While German civilians were the driving force behind mapping eastern Africa most mapping for British territories was undertaken by KAR officers or Royal Engineers. This certainly was not the case after the collapse of the DOAG as the *Schutztruppe* became German colonial flying columns tasked with all manner of responsibilities from cartography to public works, but this initial contrast is surprising considering the stereotype of the militaristic Prussian. There is any number of hypotheses for this result.

In the German case the lack of military involvement might serve to underscore the reluctance of the government to be involved in the colonial game or simply the lack of colonial experience. All Germans soldiers who joined the initial *Wissmanntruppe* were required to resign their commissions in the army and sign a personalized contract with Wissmann.⁸⁹¹ It was only in 1891 that the *Schutztruppe* was officially recognized as part of the German armed forces.⁸⁹² While eventually the *Schutztruppe* was filled with ex-DOAG employees, there was no official way to serve both the company and state as part of the German military.⁸⁹³ The contrast could not be starker with the almost systematized way in which British officers could be seconded to government *and* private service. This

⁸⁹¹ Mann, 28.

⁸⁹² Ibid., 83.

⁸⁹³ Ibid.

suggests the British were much more eager to utilize military units to aid their colonial empire and does belie the claim the empire was acquired in an “absence of mind.”

Another hypothesis that might explain this discrepancy was the more advanced state of academic cartography in Germany. As noted in Chapter Four much of the push for colonies came from academics who were helping grow the geographic departments of numerous German universities. In Britain, by contrast, “there was no organized and independent teaching of geography in any university in Britain,” until 1887!⁸⁹⁴ Part of this lag may have been the early reliance on the military for mapping as part of the Ordnance Survey. The Ordnance Survey was a massive national survey of the south coast of England. While the official starting date is established in June of 1791, when the 3rd Duke of Rochmand authorized monies for a Ramsden theodolite, its genesis can be pushed back to the 1747-1755 mapping of Scotland to aid in the pacification efforts against the Jacobites.⁸⁹⁵ The importance of the military in propelling British mapping is quite clear as the reason for the 1795 survey of southern England “was evident enough,” with the threat of French invasion demanding “a need for maps for defense.”⁸⁹⁶ This Ordnance Survey was conducted by military officer, “partly because they were cheaper to

⁸⁹⁴ Bridges, “Nineteenth Century Exploration,” 9.

⁸⁹⁵ Richard Oliver, *Ordnance Survey Maps: a concise guide for historians* (London: Charles Close Society, 2005), 15.

⁸⁹⁶ Oliver, 16. Interestingly, these maps were held as a state secret illustrating the older conception of mapping and underscoring the stark difference in how maps were used in the colonial African context.

employ than civilians, but also because they were easier to control.”⁸⁹⁷ Therefore, the connection between the military and mapping might be so pronounced because the military served as the only institution which taught surveying adequately. For example, the great British explorers Burton and Speke had both been officers in the Indian Army.⁸⁹⁸ The Ordnance Survey does suggest one further avenue of research and that is the relationship between Irish colonialism and African colonialism. As noted the map was used to help pacify Scotland but also served to colonize Ireland. Surveying parties, as in Africa, were seen as a “nomadic, information hungry mechanism of empire.”⁸⁹⁹ Cadhla at one point even suggested that the Irish were “*Africanized*” as the British surveyors helped to successfully map the island.⁹⁰⁰ It would be quite interesting to see if a similar process of gazes occurred in Ireland as it was pacified and colonized for British purposes through the Ordnance Survey and what lessons, if any, were transferred to the British colonies in Africa or India.

It is fitting to end this study with a map; one that I feel illustrates the power and changing nature of the use of the map by the colonizing powers in eastern Africa.

⁸⁹⁷ Time Owen and Elaine Pilbeam, *Ordnance Survey: Map Makers in Britain since 1791* (London: HMSO, 1992), 27. As another interesting side-note in terms of mapping and economic development, railway companies were known to offer 3-4 guineas a day to tempt surveyors away from the Ordnance Survey to help map railway lines. Owen and Pilbeam, 37.

⁸⁹⁸ Ondaatje, 195.

⁸⁹⁹ Stiofán ò Cadhla, *Civilizing Ireland: Ordnance Survey 1824-1842* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 2. Early surveying parties had a similar unnerving effect with civilian in Derry fearing that a party, assembling on a hill to conduct measurements, was preparing to attack them with artillery.

⁹⁰⁰ Cadhla, 84. He also suggests that the Ordnance Survey acted like Foucault’s Panopticon because it served to discipline and survey Irish society. Cadhla, 34.



Map 8.3: *Sketch Map of Equatorial East Africa: Showing Principal Varieties of Big Game in Regions near the Uganda Railway.* 1" = 150 miles. 1909. Africa, East Africa (Region), LOC



Map 8.4: *Sketch Map of Equatorial East Africa: Showing Principal Varieties of Big Game in Regions near the Uganda Railway.* 1" = 150 miles. 1909. Africa, East Africa (Region), LOC.

This “Sketch Map of Equatorial East Africa” was made in 1909 to show the successful progress of the British colonial venture in eastern Africa. The map succeeds in documenting the political delineation of territory and the development of Kenya via the Uganda Railway. However, the details of the map illustrate the true nature of cartography in the colonial process. Fundamentally, colonialism was about knowledge. The subset of the map literally depicts Africa as the Dark Continent and how mapping was the light of civilization creating useable knowledge.”⁹⁰¹ But, that knowledge was always connected to the use Europeans had for it. As Henri Pirenne remarked about an earlier European exploration of a dark part of the map, “America (when the Vikings reached it) was lost as soon as it was discovered because Europe did not yet need it.”⁹⁰² In this last map it is telling what the map is designed to showcase. At the beginning of this study the critique of cartography by Jonathan Swift was how elephants were placed “for want of towns” as cartographers confessed their ignorance to anything but the barest knowledge of the interior of Africa. In this context the animals represented a wild frontier; a signpost from creation itself announcing that civilization was absent. The penetration of Africa was accomplished by the map. As explorers gradually did away with the “want of towns” it was the increase in knowledge that enabled each subsequent colonial development. In this map we see the fruition of that effort. Once the gaze of the

⁹⁰¹ Map 8.3

⁹⁰² Quoted in Charles G. Hunt, “Some Notes on Indigenous Map-Making in Africa,” in *Maps and Africa: Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Aberdeen April 1993*, Ed. Jeffrey C. Stone (Aberdeen University: African Studies Group, 1993), 33.

Discoverer had documented the land, and the gaze of the Despot conquered the territory, it was left to the gaze of the Discoverer to find uses for it. The subscript below the title indicates the purpose of the map: “Showing Principal Varieties of Big Game in Regions near the Uganda Railway.” As the Uganda Railway had been laid across Kenya it opened up entirely new possibilities for Africa and led to the increasing domination of the indigenous people as a source for labor. As the British had demarcated Native Reserves as a way of controlling the population, this map shows how they did the same with nature itself. Game reserves transformed what had been a marker of the wild into one a marker of civilization. Elephants, which had once been a sign of European ignorance, were now free to appear on the map as a commodity. This map was the end result of the progression of gazes in a common European declaration that Africa had been tamed. Yet, Africa was not tame. As Hans Spieer noted, “maps may give information but they also may plead.”⁹⁰³ The plea of the map was that its neat and orderly lines indicated the immortality of empire. Where once the map had helped create and solidify a colonial empire, reality would work to its depiction. The European claims would be burnt up in the various struggles and conflicts of the de-colonial period. But, even as the European colors receded from the map, the power of its conceptual gaze continued to wreak havoc on Africa.

⁹⁰³ Hans Spieer, quoted in, Carruthers, “Cartographical Rivalries,” 122.

Today, Africa possesses nearly 50,000 miles of international boundaries, “almost all of which were imposed on Africa by European colonial powers.”⁹⁰⁴ In an effort to stave off violent conflict the Organization of African Unity in July, 1964 called on all African states to accept these imposed boundaries.⁹⁰⁵ However, the legacies of these borders have been violent intrastate and inter-state conflict. President Chadly of Algeria described these imposed borders as, “delayed action bombs left by colonialism,” and they have been going-off all over the African continent.⁹⁰⁶ The Shifta War broke out in northern Kenya as ethnic Somalis attempted to secede from Kenya and join Somalia.⁹⁰⁷ In 1960-1961 Nigeria had to decide via plebiscite whether to accept the pre-Great War Anglo-German border or the Anglo-French border of 1919. Both of these lines had been designed for European purposes, avoiding both natural frontiers and social frontiers and the decision left simmering tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims.⁹⁰⁸ The most recent example of this colonial legacy was the 2011 division of Sudan into two separate

⁹⁰⁴ I.L. Griffiths, “Maps, Boundaries, Ambiguity and Change in the Gambia,” in *Maps and Africa: Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Aberdeen April 1993*, ed. Jeffrey C. Stone (Aberdeen University African Studies Group, 1993), 66.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid. 66.

⁹⁰⁶ J.R.V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 254. Echoing Benedict Anderson another reason for the acceptance of these borders were many early African nationalists had been trained in colonial schools and had internalized the colonial map. Mbodj, 54.

⁹⁰⁷ Only after resorting to strong-armed tactics in the region, including herding civilians into concentration camps termed “protected villages,” was a treaty signed.

⁹⁰⁸ The straight lines of division avoided such natural features as the Yedsaram River while the Anglo-French division was drawn “in a casual way with a blue pencil.” Neither border was socially acceptable with the Anglo-German border dividing the Borno and Fombina people while the Anglo-French re-united the Borno but partitioned the Mandara. Peter J. Yearwood, “From Lines on Maps to National Boundaries: The Case of Northern Nigeria and Cameroun,” in *Maps and Africa: Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Aberdeen April 1993*, ed. Jeffrey C. Stone (Aberdeen University African Studies Group, 1993), 37-38.

states. After two civil wars and nearly 2.5 million casualties a plebiscite led to a peaceful separation of Sudan into two new states. However, even this plebiscite could lead to greater violence as the exact border, covering the oil rich Heglig and Bamboo oilfields right along the proposed boundary, is still in contention. However, one of the most violent areas of conflict due to European cartography is the Horn of Africa. The Eritrean War of Independence, a 30-year guerilla war, and the later war between Eritrea and Ethiopia have their legacy in the colonial map. Beyond Eritrea's boundaries a creation of the Italian state, there is the question of what map should be used to separate the two states. In this case there are several to choose from including the Italian map of 1890, the Italian map of 1946, or the British map made in 1941.⁹⁰⁹ This ambiguity in meaning leaves a violent legacy with millions in Africa becoming casualties to what was nothing more than diplomat's pencil stroke.⁹¹⁰ Another even more problematic issue was the Somali claim to Haud and Ogaden in Ethiopia. Only 80 miles of the boundary were demarcated by 1910 and the dividing line north of the Scebeli River was only noted on two maps made in an agreement between Italy and Emperor Menelik. As both maps are now lost the 1908 agreement, defining the boundary as "the line accepted by the Italian government in 1897," is utterly useless.⁹¹¹ The successive gazes of the European map

⁹⁰⁹ Mbodj, 56.

⁹¹⁰ Like the Sudan there is an increased chance of violence as Ethiopia continues to occupy territory the UN has recognized as Eritrean land, but the Ethiopians refuse to accept the UN border delineation.

⁹¹¹ Prescott, 255-256. See also, M.W. Mariam, "The Background of the Ethiopian-Somaliland boundary dispute," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 2 (1964), 189-218.

not only helped to conquer Africa for Europe, but also sowed a harvest of dragon's teeth that de-colonized Africa has been left to harvest.

It is hoped that this study will, in some small way, show how maps are nothing more than “a social construction of the world expressed through the medium of cartography.”⁹¹² The “reality” of the map led to great violence during the colonial period because it was thought that any resistance to what it depicted was an affront to the very laws of science. If maps can be recognized as a construct, not a constant, there is hope that the potential for future conflicts can be lessened. If territorial lines are no longer viewed as inviolable there is the possibility of negotiations. Having traced the use of maps to create political reality, and how maps have led to ever increasing violence, it is helpful to remember the admonition of Ishmael in *Moby Dick*:

Queequeg was a native of Kokovoko, an island far away to the West and South. It is not down in any map; true places never are.⁹¹³

⁹¹² Harley, *New Nature*, 35.

⁹¹³ Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick Or, The Whale* (London, Penguin Books, 1998), 61.

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